Language and Change: An Inter-Organisational Study of the Zero Vision in the Road Safety Campaign by Langeland, Trond Åge
Language and Change: An Inter-Organisational Study 












Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 

















Preface   
Preface 
 
The work on the thesis was started at the University of Stavanger in the 
autumn of 2002. I had a three-year scholarship until the end of 2005. 
Since then I have worked on the thesis part time whilst working.  
 
The scope of the thesis is to study the impact of the zero vision on road 
safety in Norway in the period 1999-2004, as informants from the key 
road safety organisations see it. The vision, which was first introduced 
in Sweden, states that the ambition or goal in the road safety campaign 
should be to strive for zero traffic fatalities and zero serious injuries.  
 
Three perspectives are introduced. The perspectives, which have their 
own special features and are intertwined, are as follows: 
 
1) Exploring how the zero vision is conceptualised and 
instantiated by key actors with respect to implicit change 
2) Examining the role of inter-organisational relations and 
conflicting interests after the introduction of the zero vision 
3) Assessing the political impact of the zero vision and how it 
challenges other goals besides safety 
 
The data are comprised of in-depth and semi-structured interviews and 
analysis of key government documents. The interviews were conducted 
during the spring, summer and autumn of 2004. I have been employed 
by the Public Roads Administration (Statens vegvesen) since the 
summer of 2006, working with road safety and aerial planning. This 
has given me the opportunity to maintain the focus on road safety and 
the zero vision. In the methodology chapter, I discuss the implications 
of these issues. 
 
I hope the thesis will be of interest not only to scholars and people 
interested in road safety, but also to people fascinated by the 
importance of language when it comes to creating change in society. 
The introduction of the vision is an example of how new initiatives are 
incorporated into the existing order of things and the importance of 
language in the ensuing work. This gives the thesis a generic character 
that I hope will capture the curiosity of a broader public. 
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I remember well when my stepdaughter Julie came into my study a 
couple of years ago, asking me what I was doing. At that time I had not 
really told her much about the thesis I was working on, so no wonder 
she was curious. I gave her the short version, telling her that I was 
writing a book. The answer she gave me was as subtle as it was wise, 
“you don’t have time to write a book.” With a growing family, a new 
house and a new job, she was quite right. Thankfully, my family and 
my employer have made it possible for me to finish “the book.” 
 
I would like to thank my counsellor at the University of Stavanger, 
Professor Kjell Harald Olsen, for the enormous amount of work he has 
put into the dissertation. Kjell has shown a great ability to motivate me 
and get me on the right track. Special thanks also to Ove Njå for giving 
important feedback on the thesis. Besides this I would like to express 
gratitude to fellow PhD students and employees at the department for 
giving advice along the way. You know who you are. 
 
During the work with the thesis I spent four months at the University of 
Wisconsin under the guidance of professor Harvey Jacobs. This was a 
great time both educationally and socially. I would like to thank Harvey 
for the guiding discussions on my thesis. 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to my employer over the past three 
years, the Public Roads Administration, for giving me paid leave of 
absence to work on the thesis. Without this it would probably have 
been impossible to finish it. Thanks also to my superiors, Eddie Westad 
and Hanne Hermanrud. I would also like to thank my good colleagues 
in the PRA who have shown interest in the dissertation along the way.  
 
My most relentless supporter and hardest critic during the last three and 
a half years has been my fiancé and best friend, Tone R. Hansen. Thank 
you for giving me the opportunity to work evenings and weekends, and 
for relieving me of some of my home chores. This brings me to my two 
other main inspirations, Julie as mentioned above, and my precious 
daughter Rakel. I am sure you will forgive me for working afternoons 
and weekends when I would much rather have spent the time with you.  
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Finally, I would like to thank my parents, my brother Øyvind and his 













The vision for the road safety work in Norway is to strive for zero 
fatalities and zero serious injuries. The policy is referred to as “the zero 
vision.” The Swedish National Roads Administration first introduced 
this in 1997. It was adapted to Norway by the Public Roads 
Administration (the PRA)1 in 1999 and passed by Parliament as part of 
the National Transport Plan in February 2001. Even if the zero vision 
was not passed before 2001, I count 1999 as the year when it began to 
make its mark on the Norwegian road safety work.  
 
The zero vision focuses on the ethical necessity of preventing fatalities 
and serious injuries in road traffic. It maintains a scientific approach to 
road safety, seeing the road users, the vehicle and the infrastructure in 
relation to each other. A third tenet of the zero vision is that the system 
designers and the road users have a shared responsibility for road 
safety.  
 
The thesis studies the impact of the zero vision on road safety in 
Norway during the period 1999-2004. Impact does not primarily refer 
to factual changes, but to how informants from the key road safety 
organisations see changes after the introduction of the zero vision. The 
following three perspectives are used to shed light on this:  
 
1) Exploring how the zero vision is conceptualised and 
instantiated by key actors with respect to implicit change 
2) Examining the role of inter-organisational relations and 
conflicting interests after the introduction of the zero vision 
3) Assessing the political impact of the zero vision and how it 
challenges other goals besides safety 
 
The perspectives are supported by three important sub-questions. The 
first question corresponds with perspective number one and so forth:  
 
1) Is the zero vision primarily a vision for the Public Roads 
Administration?  
                                                 
1 Statens vegvesen. In the thesis I refer to the Public Roads Administration as PRA. 
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2) Is the zero vision a repositioning tool for the key actors?  
3) Is the zero vision more stationary than visionary?  
 
The thesis employs a qualitative research method. The data consist of 
semi-structured interviews with informants from the key road safety 
organisations, as well as analysis of important government documents. 
Some other written material is also studied. Most focus is placed on the 
PRA, the Police and the Norwegian Council for Road Safety.2 These 
are generally seen as the most important actors in the Norwegian road 
safety campaign.  
 
The thesis is underpinned by social constructionism theory. A central 
tenet in this theory is that change takes place through language. As 
ideas and new initiatives are put into words, a basis is created for 
action. The thesis captures how the zero vision is given meaning by the 
key actors, and how this in turn creates the basis for action.  
 
The important connection between language and change is hinted at in 
the title of the thesis. The way new policies are put into words to a 
large extent determines their effects in practice. Rhetoric has a central 
position in the thesis. The theory of rhetoric is used to point out how 
the zero vision is conceptualised and instantiated by the key actors in 
terms of change. When it comes to theory of power, this is relevant in 
connection with inter-organisational relations and conflicting interests 
after the introduction of the zero vision, as well as the political impact 
of the zero vision and how it challenges goals that are competing with 
safety. However, this division is not absolute. For instance, rhetoric is 
also used to highlight aspects of the latter two perspectives.  
 
The thesis has a generic character, meaning it can be transferred to 
other arenas in society where new policies and new concepts are 
introduced. A central tenet is that language plays an important role in 
such processes, so the thesis studies how language contributes to 
change, and how new concepts can alter the existing perception among 
actors. The study also focuses on how new policies affect the relations 
                                                 
2 Trygg Trafikk. In the thesis I refer to The Norwegian Council for Road Safety as 
Safer Driving.  
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and conflicting interests between the actors. The degree of change 
ascribed to new policies is important when it comes to the competing 
goals. New policies tend to attach heightened importance to some 
aspects at the expense of other goals.   
 
Turning to the most important findings in the thesis, it is natural to 
structure the discussion around the three perspectives of the thesis.  
 
 
1) Conceptualisation, instantiation and change 
 
The zero vision is built on three cornerstones; an ethical necessity, a 
scientific approach and a shared responsibility for road safety. There is 
agreement on the zero vision at the outset; all the informants see the 
zero vision as a positive thing. The findings show that what the 
informants agree on is the ethical necessity of the zero vision. As a 
concept, all the important road safety actors warmly welcome the 
vision.     
 
However, when moving from concept to conceptualisation this 
becomes more complicated. A concept is conceptualised when it is 
defined and instantiated, when the concept is given more specific 
meaning. Thus, the actors may agree about a concept but not about how 
it should be conceptualised. The transition from concept to 
conceptualisation has an important position in the thesis. Even if all the 
informants are positive to the zero vision, the ways of conceptualising 
it differ significantly. There is a dividing line between the PRA and the 
other central actors when it comes to ascribing change to the vision. 
Informants from the PRA and to some extent the Ministry, place more 
change in the vision compared to the other key actors. The Police and 
Safer Driving primarily refer to the zero vision as being business as 
usual in their road safety work.    
 
At the same time as the informants from the PRA are most inclined to 
ascribe changes to the zero vision, there is also a great deal of 
scepticism towards it. In fact the views expressed by informants from 
the PRA are more critical than those uttered by the informants from the 
other actors. Few informants in the PRA feel a genuine relationship 
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with the zero vision. A majority of informants, irrespective of 
organisation, point out that the road safety work is more or less 
unaffected by the zero vision. This indicates that there is displeasure as 
to how the vision is being complied with. This also shows that the 
informants do not see the vision as a new scientific approach to road 
safety, and a vast majority of them state that the vision has not resulted 
in new measures. 
 
When elaborating on the zero vision a common strategy is to use 
rationalising strategies. By this is meant that the zero vision is 
rationalised, not primarily by using rational arguments, but through a 
process characterized by the use of power or the rationality of power. 
This is seen among all the actors, but it is most prominent in the PRA. 
Diffuse and ideological concepts are also widely used in depictions of 
the zero vision, especially in the PRA. I take this as a sign that the zero 
vision has not been instantiated beyond its ethical starting point.  
 
The zero vision focuses on a shared responsibility between the road 
users and the system designers, and the road users are portrayed as an 
important partner in the road safety work. The thesis studies how key 
actors view the necessity of communicating the vision to the public. 
The PRA is given a clear responsibility for this in the key documents. 
Nonetheless, the informants from the PRA are more hesitant to 
communicate the vision compared to informants from the other actors. 
This probably has much to do with the different ways of 
conceptualising the zero vision. The more that is added to the vision, 
the more complicated it is to communicate. The PRA clearly sees the 
zero vision as meaning much more than the other key actors. 
 
The zero vision is to a limited extent conceptualised and activated by 
the key actors. The PRA has done the most work in this respect. The 
Police and Safer Driving have welcomed the zero vision, but they do 
not see it as something tangible that they can shape and fit into their 
existing work. Thus, the PRA has considerable leeway when it comes 
to defining the future developments. The shaping of the zero vision is 
reserved for the PRA and it will be up to the PRA to decide where they 
want to go with it. The findings in the thesis clearly show that the zero 
vision is first and foremost a vision for the PRA.  
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2) Cooperation and conflicting interests 
 
The thesis concludes that the vision has affected the relationships 
between the key actors to a limited extent. This is not surprising 
considering the discussion in the previous section. With the small 
degree of changes that can be attributed to the zero vision, there is no 
reason why it should make an impact on the relations between the 
actors. All in all, there are few open confrontations between the key 
actors and the cooperation is good. This could be because the actors 
believe they benefit from stable relationships, and not from antagonism 
and confrontation.  
 
The relationships between the key actors are characterised by 
asymmetrical power relations. The actors differ in focus, manpower 
and resource situation, to mention just some of the factors. One 
question is to what extent this causes tension between the actors. There 
are cases between the PRA and Safer Driving and between the PRA 
and the Police where this is evident. The PRA are eager to expand on 
their road safety activities. Two examples are their desire to conduct 
information campaigns in schools and to perform speed checks. Safer 
Driving and the Police historically perform these tasks, and the PRA’s 
wishes to assume these responsibilities are met with much scepticism in 
these organisations. One reason why this situation has arisen is that the 
PRA has more resources, both in terms of money and manpower. 
 
I believe it is far-fetched to link changes in the inter-organisational 
cooperation to the vision. There are few signs that the key actors utilise 
the vision as a repositioning tool. The PRA has done most of the work 
in conceptualising the zero vision. Thus, if someone were to use the 
vision as a repositioning tool it would be natural to think of the PRA. 
There are some indications that the vision is used as a legitimising 
factor to take on more tasks in the PRA. However, this is not a 
prominent feature. One reason why the vision is not used in this way to 
any large degree is probably because it is not instantiated very much, 
not even in the PRA.  
 
The intensified efforts implied in the zero vision challenge different 
interests in the organisations. This may be an important reason why the 
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vision remains on an abstract level and hence a reason why the 
relations seem unaffected by the vision. What is interesting is the 
manner in which the PRA uses its authority and ethos in its reasoning. 
Informants from the PRA see their own organisation as most important 
in the road safety campaign. This is linked to the knowledge base in the 
PRA, which is seen to be more developed compared to the other actors.  
 
The disparity between the actors evidently leaves a situation where the 
Police and Safer Driving come together often, while the PRA does 
much work on its own. The key actors cooperate well, but there is also 
a potential for improvement. Based on the findings in the thesis, the 
zero vision has had a very limited affect on the relationships between 
the key road safety actors.  
 
 
3) Competing goals and political pragmatism 
 
A natural consequence of the zero vision and the increased focus on 
safety is that goals competing with safety are ascribed less importance. 
The conflicts with other goals should become more visible after the 
introduction of the zero vision. It is therefore surprising that a vast 
majority of the informants believes it has not influenced goals 
competing with road safety. The most plausible explanation is that the 
vision has not been instantiated to the degree that it impacts conflicting 
goals. There is also a tendency to downplay the importance of 
competing goals among the key actors.  
 
It varies as to how the key actors view the goals competing with safety. 
This depends on the focus of the actors and the tasks they perform. 
Informants from the Police and Safer Driving have little to say about 
the environment and the economic efficiency of road building projects. 
This is natural considering that they do not have to pay attention to 
these goals in their work. The PRA, however, has to consider these 
competing goals in addition to the goal of enhanced road safety. As 
such, the PRA has a more intricate view of the competing goals.  
 
The zero vision challenges goals that are competing with road safety. 
The more the vision is instantiated, the more it will challenge other 
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goals, for instance mobility, the environment, economic efficiency and 
individual freedom. The informants view mobility as the most 
important competing goal. A vast majority of the informants, 
irrespective of organisation, believe safety should be the main objective 
in the transport sector. However, the prioritising between mobility and 
safety has not been challenged after the introduction of the zero vision. 
Mobility is apparently still the main objective in practice.  
 
Turning to the environment, the views are more or less restricted to the 
PRA. There is a dualism in the PRA relating to the environmental 
issues, and there is difficulty in setting priorities. Based on the 
interviews, there are often clashes between the safety people in the 
organisation and people from the development department and 
landscape architects. The zero vision brings a stronger focus on the 
roadside terrain and “off-the-road accidents”. Nevertheless, the views 
offered by the informants from the PRA are split when it comes to 
whether safety comes before the environment. It does not appear to be 
obvious that safety is prioritised ahead of the environment. A common 
view is that it depends on whom you ask in the organisation.  
 
It is natural to assume that the vision has had an effect on the economic 
efficiency of road building projects. The Police and Safer Driving have 
few opinions on this. A vast majority in the PRA believe this is so. 
From a zero vision perspective this is positive, as it conveys the view 
that the vision has (or at least should have) an effect in practice. Some 
informants from the Directorate of Public Roads disagree that the 
economic efficiency is reduced. This is not the only area where the 
policy level is hesitant to ascribe negative effects to the zero vision.  
 
The actors do not mention individual freedom as a goal in the transport 
sector before this is explicitly mentioned in the interviews. Probably 
much of the reason lies in the fact that it is not seen as politically 
correct to emphasise this as a goal, especially after the introduction of 
the zero vision. The informants are generally positive to the 
implementation of restrictive measures. Most reluctance is seen in the 
PRA. I believe this is in part because the informants from the PRA do 
not feel a strong relationship to these measures. However, restrictive 
measures are an implicit part of the zero vision. This could be a variety 
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of measures, ranging from more controls to such vehicle interventions 
as Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) and breathalysers. It could be 
argued that such measures reduce the individual freedom of the road 
users. What is clear is that further implementation of restrictive 
measures needs political approval. This begs the question if there is an 
incentive among the politicians to radicalise the road safety efforts in 
accordance with the zero vision. 
 
In many ways we have reached the core of the problem when trying to 
intensify the road safety efforts in accordance with the zero vision. It 
needs a more radical approach if it is to maintain its legitimacy, but 
who is willing to initiate such an approach? The more the vision is 
instantiated, the more it will challenge the politicians to take a stand on 
radical measures, but do they have incentives to lead them in this 
direction if such measures are not popular with the general public?  
 
Here the division between concept and conceptualisation plays an 
important role. The data in the thesis underscores that politicians have a 
pragmatic and ethical perspective on the vision. Few politicians have 
really understood what the vision means in practice, and they have 
hardly begun to conceptualise it. This reveals a mismatch between 
professionals and politicians already this early in the process. The 
politicians also tend to focus on short-term effects in the road safety 
work, as they want to see visible results while in office. This clashes to 
some extent with the long-term perspective of the professionals. 
 
The interplay between professionals and politicians is important when 
it comes to road safety and the zero vision. The professionals were the 
ones who brought the vision up to the political level. Thus, it should 
also be the professionals who elaborate what is needed to radicalise the 
road safety efforts. Findings suggest that the professionals are not 
proactive enough in this respect, and that they primarily focus on what 
they think the politicians will support. A common view in the PRA is 
that this is due to loyalty to the hierarchic system. The situation 
suggests that the zero vision as it is manifested today is a fairly 
stationary undertaking with a limited outlook for intensified action. 
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1. Introduction, Subject and Problems for Discussion 
 
In Norway, road safety work is based on a visionary perspective called 
“the zero vision.” This states that we should strive for zero fatalities 
and permanent injuries in our road safety efforts. This thesis uses three 
perspectives in its examination of the impact of the zero vision on road 
safety in Norway during the period from 1999 to 2004. Impact does not 
primarily refer to factual changes, but to how informants from the 
important road safety organisations see changes following the zero 
vision. Three perspectives are studied to shed light on this:  
 
1)  Exploring how the zero vision is conceptualised and 
instantiated by key actors with respect to implicit change 
2) Examining the role of inter-organisational relations and 
conflicting interests after the introduction of the zero vision 
3) Assessing the political impact of the zero vision and how it 
challenges other goals besides safety 
 
The zero vision has been adopted as the new policy for the Norwegian 
road safety campaign, but little is said about how it should be 
interpreted. It has not been clearly defined by its initiators so that 
interpretation is largely up to the various actors. Bearing this in mind, it 
is natural to assume that various actors will conceptualise and 
instantiate the zero vision concept in different ways. This may have 
significant bearing on the impact the zero vision can have in practice. 
To shed light on this I explore how key road safety actors give meaning 
to the zero vision in terms of implicit change.  
 
The second perspective focuses on how the zero vision challenges 
various priorities and interests among and between important road 
safety actors. Different priorities and conflicting interests may disrupt 
the relationship between key actors. The thesis primarily focuses on the 
Public Roads Administration (Statens vegvesen), the Police and the 
Norwegian Council for Road Safety (Trygg Trafikk)3. These three are 
                                                 
3  Henceforth, I will use the abbreviation PRA when referring to the Public Roads 
Administration and “Safer Driving” when referring to the Norwegian Council for 
Road Safety. 
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considered the most important actors in the road safety campaign. I will 
examine inter-organisational relations between them after the 
introduction of the zero vision. To what extent have the relationships 
changed? 
 
There is reason to believe that changing priorities, focusing on new 
measures and thinking about road safety in new ways will affect the 
priorities for the competing goals. Once the zero vision is 
conceptualised and instantiated, it will challenge other goals besides 
road safety, for instance mobility, individual freedom and the 
environment. The third perspective focuses on how the zero vision 
affects other competing goals. This is studied by elaborating on how 
the actors relate to the above-mentioned competing goals. Politicians 
play an important role when setting priorities for the competing goals. 
Thus, as part of this perspective, I will also examine the role of 
politicians when it comes to road safety in general and the zero vision 
in particular. 
 
I will elaborate on the three perspectives at the end of the chapter. But 
first I will provide a brief survey of developments in road safety in 
Norway since the 1970s, as they are an important reason for the 
introduction of the zero vision as the new strategy for the road safety 
campaign. Then, I will introduce and explain the zero vision. This will 
be followed by an introduction to the context of road safety and a look 
at the important road safety actors and their characteristics, as well as 




1.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN ROAD SAFETY 
 
Traffic accidents cause a tremendous amount of personal anguish and 
suffering in society. Around 250 people are killed each year in traffic 
accidents in Norway, while another hundred are severely injured. 
Traffic accidents are also extremely costly. The Institute of Transport 
Economics (TØI) has assessed the costs of accidents to NOK 28 billion 
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a year4. Hence, it is quite evident that traffic accidents constitute a 
severe public health problem.  
 
Improving road safety is a painstaking affair, but one that has paid great 
dividends over recent decades. A significant change in the concept of 
road safety occurred around 1970, the same year the number of 
fatalities peaked at 560. From a relatively one-sided emphasis on 
mobility, the authorities took a more differentiated approach, where 
safety became an important factor. Until that shift, the risk of traffic 
accidents had mainly been considered a consequence of the progress of 
society and the demand for mobility. We could say that a utilitarian 
principle had prevailed, where casualties in traffic were seen as 
justifiable costs of mobility. In the 1970s, the car was seen as a mixed 
blessing, and with it came a stronger focus on regulations and 
sanctions.  
 
The 1970s saw a decrease in the accident tolls, and this trend continued 
through the 1980s despite a dramatic increase in traffic volume. The 
safety advancements more than offset the increase in traffic volume, 
and the number of fatalities was reduced to fewer than 300 by the early 
1990s. Among the factors that contributed to this development were 
seat belt legislation, campaigns targeting drunk driving, enhanced 
vehicle safety and improvements in infrastructure (Englund et al. 
1998). The declining trend in the number of fatalities came to a halt in 
the 1990s. While safety advancements counterbalanced the continuous 
growth in traffic volume, there was no significant decline in the 
accident statistics as there had been in the 1970s and 1980s, where the 
number of fatalities had been reduced by well over a 100 during each 
decade. During the last ten to fifteen years, we have reached a safety 
level where it is obviously difficult to make any further headway. Part 
of the explanation lies in the law of diminishing returns. It has become 
progressively difficult to improve on recent results, and it is in this 
climate that the zero vision has been introduced. The development in 
accidents is important for us to understand the emergence of the zero 
vision, as there is reason to believe that this stagnation triggered its 
introduction.  
                                                 
4 In the National Action Plan for Road Safety on Roads 2006-2009. 
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Fatalities and serious injuries in road traffic accidents in Norway, 
1996-2008 
Year  Fatalities Severe injuries Serious injuries 
1996  255  183 1179 
1997  303  140 1201 
1998  352  161 1168 
1999  304  138 1010 
2000  341  116 1149 
2001  275  106   937 
2002  310  136 1015 
2003  280   96   898 
2004  257   82   898 
2005  224   87   890  
2006  242   X5   940  
2007  233   X   879 
2008  255   X   907 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
As the table shows, road safety efforts in Norway continue to produce 
results, even if the reductions are not as pronounced as in the 1970s and 
1980s. In 1996, there were 255 traffic fatalities, close to the figures for 
2008. It is worrying that the number of fatalities has not been reduced 
in this period. However, the number of severe injuries has declined 
considerably. Even if the development in recent years has been fairly 
positive, the anticipated continuous increase in traffic volume 
combined with new trends in the risk picture, for instance that more 
people are driving under the influence of illegal substances, suggests 
that it will be a tough battle to reduce the death tolls further. It will be 
difficult to make more progress without introducing expensive and/or 
restrictive measures.  
 
Professionals, road users and policy makers determine the development 
in accident figures. However, societal mechanisms, such as the gross 
                                                 
5 From January 2008 Statistics Norway group the categories “severe injuries” and 
“serious injuries” collectively, as “serious injuries”. 
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domestic product and the purchasing power of the public, also play a 
role. If people have more income at their disposal, they buy more cars. 
As a result, there will probably be more accidents on the roads. 
However, at the same time, new cars replace older cars, which of 
course is a positive factor from an accident perspective. A report from 
the Institute of Transport Economics (Bjørnskau 2008) points to the 
fact that after 2005, there has been a trend towards more traffic 
fatalities. The report believes that this trend may turn around due to the 
financial crisis we are now experiencing, and that we might see a 
reduction in the coming years. In tough economic times, there is a 
tendency where especially the number of fatalities is reduced. This was 
seen at the end of the 1980s when we had a similar slump. According to 
Solheim (1999B), experience suggests that such reductions may create 
a climate of optimism about achieving a continuous reduction.   
 
According to a report from the Institute of Transport Economics (Elvik 
1999A), which was issued around the same time as the zero vision was 
introduced, the biggest potential for improving road safety is to be 
found in traffic regulations, improvements in vehicles and increased 
control activities. The report states that education and information have 
a smaller potential in the short term. One question we can examine in 
this connection is the extent to which the zero vision follows up on 
these measures. All the measures highlighted as important by TØI are 
to some degree what we can call “restrictive” towards road users. It will 





1.2 THE ZERO VISION 
 
In the same way as “hygienic” and “clean” became fashionable words, 
and the foundation for many projects dedicated to spreading new 
technological solutions in society, “zero vision” has become a concept 
with increasing importance in the contemporary safety debate. A vision 
can be seen as a picture of a desired future state that appeals to the 
creative forces in society, and which plots out the future course. One 
area where creativity is thriving is in the offshore industry. It is usually 
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referred to as the sector where the zero vision strategy was first 
introduced at the behest of some of the major oil companies. The aim 
was to eliminate all accidents causing death, injury and damage to the 
environment or property. The basic premise is that accidents do not just 
happen; they have a cause that can be prevented. When elaborating on 
the zero vision, the head of Health, Safety and Environment at Shell Oil 
explained that the “aim of avoiding all accidents is far from being a 
public relations puff – it is the only responsible policy” (in Adams 
1995:16). 
 
One important difference between the road traffic system and the 
offshore industry is that the latter is a closed system. An oilrig can be 
used as an example. It is a closed off area, only accessible to people 
who have been through a safety course, trained not only in retrieving 
oil and gas, but also in avoiding hazardous incidents that might cause 
death, injury or damage to property. The zero vision in the offshore 
industry deals with situations where people are at work, performing a 
task for an employer. It is probably easier to gain acceptance for such a 
philosophy under such circumstances compared to a zero vision that 
deals with spare-time activities like driving a car, walking down the 
road or riding a bicycle. Another important difference is the level of 
control. People working on an oilrig have to go through a thorough 
check at the heliport to prevent, for example, offshore drug abuse. 
Compared to road traffic, the control regime is far stricter.    
 
It is then interesting to ask what demands society places on safety. 
When it comes to road safety, the demands have changed since the 
birth of motoring, and have never been higher than they are today. The 
increasing concerns about injuries caused by traffic accidents and 
greater awareness about what causes accidents has contributed to more 
radical regulations. Adams believes that the way society responds to 
perceived danger for its citizen’s amounts to a kind of hysteria. As he 
sees it, there is “no obvious stopping point short of a world in which 
everyone is compelled to look like a Michelin man dressed as an 
American football player” (1995:146).  
 
Adams has a point that society demands more and more when it comes 
to safety. It seems we are moving towards a zero risk ideal. Adams sees 
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this ideal as a “figment of the imagination of the safety profession” 
(1995:16). The literature assumes that everyone’s risk thermostat is set 
at zero, but because “people compensate for externally imposed safety 
measures, the risk regulators and safety engineers are chronically 
disappointed in the impact that they make on the accident toll” (Adams 
1995:59). People adjust their behaviour in response to perceived 




1.2.1  The zero vision in traffic 
 
The zero vision was introduced at a time when Norway encountered 
stagnation in the accident tolls. The number of traffic fatalities had 
steadily decreased since the peak in 1970, but now the figures were 
alarming, levelling off and even showing signs of increasing. In 1998, 
the year before the zero vision was passed in the Norwegian 
Parliament, there were more than 350 traffic fatalities. This was the 
highest number for the whole decade and the highest figure since the 
late 1980s. This development triggered the present effort in the field, 
and provided the opportunity to put greater focus on road safety.  
 
The zero vision was introduced in the Swedish National Road 
Administration (Vägverket) in 1995. Channels were established with 
the political decision makers, represented by the Ministry of 
Transportation. The government prepared a proposition in May 1997 
that stated that the zero vision should be the basis for all road safety 
work. In October 1997, the Swedish Parliament decided that the zero 
vision should be the guiding principle in the road safety efforts. The 
resolution reads: “The long-term goal for road safety should be that no 
one is killed or permanently injured when moving within the road 
transport system” (Vägverket 1996). It was stated clearly that the design 
and function of the transport system should be adapted to the demands 
of this vision. The zero vision, as Vägverket presented it, had a strong 
physical orientation.  
 
The same year that Sweden passed the zero vision, the Danish 
Parliament adopted an action plan stating that “one accident is one too 
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many”. Here the focus is on all accidents, not just accidents resulting in 
fatalities and permanent injuries. This makes the Danish vision even 
more radical than the Swedish one. In fact, it resembles the offshore 
industry’s zero vision. However, the action plan does not prescribe a 
method for how to prevent all accidents, and when it comes to 
measures; the action plan has the same focus as in Sweden – fatalities 
and permanent injuries. As such, the title of the plan probably more 
reflects a political desire than a true belief in zero accidents. 
 
Compared to Sweden, the launching of the zero vision in Norway was 
more abrupt. There were not as many thorough and detailed discussions 
on the zero vision. According to a source in the PRA, the first time the 
zero vision was mentioned in a government document in Norway was 
in a report from the Transport Committee concerning the Norwegian 
Road Traffic Plan for 1998-2007. The committee refers to Sweden, 
where they were already planning their zero vision. The committee 
asked the department to monitor this work and analyse the measures 
that were implemented. “The committee assumes that the department 
will return to this 0-vision in connection with the next plan rotation” 
(1997:23). 
 
This was the last time the road traffic plan was developed. Instead a 
joint National Transport Plan was prepared. Here road traffic, rail, 
aviation and sea transport were treated under the same umbrella. The 
PRA aimed to implement the zero vision in this work. When putting the 
transport plan together, both local and national “challenge documents” 
were prepared. The national document, dated February 1999, argued 
for the benefit of introducing a zero vision in the road safety work in 
Norway. In September 1999, the transport department’s proposal6 for 
the National Transport Plan 2002-2011 advised the following about the 
vision: “The zero vision, the future image we shall strive for where 
transport does not lead to death, life-threatening accidents or permanent 
loss of health, demands a totally new way of thinking. The basic 
attitude must be that we cannot accept that traffic takes lives” 
(1999:12). 
                                                 
6 The PRA, the Norwegian Air Traffic and Airport Management (now Avinor), the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration and the Norwegian National Rail Administration. 
28 
Introduction, Subject and Problems for Discussion   
The PRA has been the main actor in lifting the zero vision from an 
administrative level to a political level. They have more or less 
functioned as planners and “sold” the idea to the politicians, who have 
then embraced the zero vision and incorporated it in the National 
Transport Plan 2002-2011. The transport plan states: “In the long-term 
work with safety in the transport sector, the Government lays down a 
vision saying there should be no accidents that result in death or 
permanent injuries” (NTP:8). 
 
The National Transport Plan argues that other occupational activities 
and other parts of the transport sector have a higher safety level, and 
that road traffic should come closer to this level. It is stated that for a 
long time other transport organisations have worked according to “a 
similar vision when it comes to public transport” (NTP:41). This is a 
qualified truth. Until recently the railway services used accept criteria – 
verbal or numerical expressions for an acceptable safety level. This is 
not equivalent to a zero vision. Comparisons are also made to working 
life, where there used to be many deaths each year due to industrial 
accidents. While a zero vision was announced, it was brushed aside as 
unrealistic. The goal in the Working Environment Act of “total safety” 
was ridiculed, but today it is taken for granted.  
 
The National Transport Plan refers to “permanent injuries” when 
addressing the zero vision. It has, however, become common practice 
to talk about “serious injuries” in the public debate. This gives the zero 
vision a wider content than first intended. The intention was to focus on 
deaths and permanent injuries, and serious injuries are not always 
permanent. The reason for not using permanent injuries is said to be 
that only the categories, “serious injuries” and “severe injuries” are 
reported. One might ask why “permanent injuries” was used in relation 
to the zero vision in the first place. 
 
Each year approximately 1000 people are seriously injured, and around 
100 are severely injured in traffic accidents. The number of severe 
injuries and the number of permanent injuries coincide to a large 
extent. Why then do we not use “severe injuries” instead of “serious 
injuries?” One reason is probably that in using serious injuries the 
decision makers have a technical advantage because it gives a larger 
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numerical base for statistics. As pointed out by Adams (1995), it is 
easier to achieve ‘statistical significance’ in studies of accident 
causation if large numbers are used rather than small ones. Another 
reason could be the concern that the public would react negatively if 
“severe injuries” were used instead of “serious injuries”. This could be 
seen as a signal that serious injuries are acceptable as long as the 




1.2.2  The zero vision and change 
 
The zero vision is said to symbolise a change in policy, from a 
continuous decrease in the number of fatalities and injuries to a vision 
of zero fatalities and permanent injuries. The zero vision is presented as 
a collective term for a new way of thinking about road safety. When 
describing the implicit change in the zero vision, its initiators focused 
on it as an ethical imperative, as a scientific approach and as a focus on 
a shared responsibility for road safety between the road users and the 
system designers (Tingvall & Lie 2001). Although this is just one way 
of perceiving the zero vision, it is an important distinction because of 
whom it relates to. What did the initiators have in mind when they 
introduced the zero vision? I assume that the key actors lean heavily on 
what was first inferred about the zero vision, and that this is still 
governing various descriptions of the zero vision. 
 
 
The zero vision as an ethical imperative 
 
The zero vision is presented as a democratically based human-ethical 
position, stating that it is unacceptable to trade lives and health for 
other benefits in society. The zero vision puts the health of people first, 
stating that it is unethical to tacitly accept a certain number of deaths 
each year. The ethical view is said to bring safety thinking in the road 
sector in line with the reasoning in aviation, maritime transport, rail and 
the manufacturing industries. The zero vision is described as “saving” 
as many lives as possible by using the resources available. To what 
extent and how fast this can be achieved depends on the political will 
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and the cooperation between actors. The ethical starting point for the 
zero vision is easy to embrace, and many seemingly embrace it without 
further reflection, as I will elaborate on later in this thesis.  
 
 
The zero vision as a scientific approach 
 
The zero vision is said to represent a scientific approach to road safety. 
“The zero vision is not simply a term for a desirable future situation in 
the road transport system – it has a scientific basis” (Tingvall 1997:44). 
The zero vision is said to symbolise a new construction of the road 
safety problem, encompassing a new view on human health. The focus 
is on the consequences of accidents, not the probability of accidents. 
The philosophy is to accept injuries, but to keep the extent of violence 
to such a level that lives and long-term health are not threatened. It is 
stated that the zero vision deals with the essential road safety problem; 
that humans are exposed to exterior violence the body is not equipped 
to endure.  
 
The view is that the components of the road traffic system – the road 
users, the vehicles and the infrastructure, have not been adequately 
adapted to each other. The elements have to correspond better to lead 
the road users to the right behaviour and prevent common mistakes 
from having fatal consequences. Seeing these components in relation to 
each other is portrayed as a new element introduced by the zero vision. 
This is a qualified truth. There have been advancements within each of 
these elements, and the ability to think in more holistic terms has 
improved, but the system view itself is not new. Research into the 
interplay between these three elements started in the US back in the 
1960s, initiated by Dr. William H. Haddon.  
                         
The safety philosophy of the zero vision implies that speed becomes the 
regulating factor that compensates for inferior safety in the vehicle and 
infrastructure. Reducing the speed limits is maintained as necessary in 
the National Transport Plan if we are to reduce the extent of serious 
injuries. “The speed level on roads bears significant importance for the 
number of accidents and their severity. In general, reduced speed will 
contribute to a reduction in the number of killed and permanently 
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injured people in traffic” (NTP:146). The National Action Plan asserts 
that we should introduce “speed limits based on human levels of 
tolerance” (HP:56). Speed limits based on human tolerance imply 50 
kph or below when there is a danger of side collisions, and 30 kph or 
below where non-motorists interact with motorists.   
 
  
The zero vision as a shared responsibility 
 
The historical basis for the road traffic system is that it is open for 
everyone at his or her own risk. The responsibility for traffic accidents 
has traditionally been ascribed to the road users. Tingvall & Lie (2001) 
contend that even though we know that the individual road user can 
control his or her own safety only to a limited degree, and even though 
we know that there are effective ways of breaking the chain that leads 
to accidents, the road user remains the only party with a judicial 
responsibility. According to Tingvall & Lie, “blame the victim” 
remains the only judicial and moral principle in road traffic.  
 
The zero vision confronts this view and promotes shared responsibility 
between the road users and the system designers7. Interplay between 
the road users and the system designers, where both parties take their 
responsibility, is said to be the only viable way towards a zero vision. If 
the road users obey the rules and regulations, the system designers will 
take responsibility for the built-in safety of the system. The basic tenet 
is that if the road users are given a “survival guarantee”, this will 
encourage them to accept limitations that affect freedom. But can the 
system designers give such a guarantee, and does it matter much to the 
road users? 
 
The shared responsibility between the road users and the system 
designers is referred to be one of the cornerstones of the zero vision. 
There is an implicit “danger” in moving the boundaries when it comes 
to responsibility for traffic accidents, as the PRA could be held 
responsible in more cases. The turnaround this represents necessitates 
                                                 
7 System designers refer to organisations responsible for designing the road traffic 
system.  
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institutional changes where the system designer acquires a clear and 
articulated responsibility. This might make the work of the PRA more 
credible and morally sound, but it also exposes the organisation to 
scrutiny. Even though the road system has become more organised as it 
has developed, the principle that the road users are responsible for 
accidents is still well embedded among the authorities and in the 
specialist environment. Is the PRA ready to move in the direction 
proposed by the proponents of the zero vision, or is the elevation of 
responsibility more of a rhetorical gambol? 
 
Today laws do not regulate the responsibility of the system designers 
for road traffic. Thus, the responsibility for road safety is highly 
intangible. After the introduction of the zero vision in Sweden, a report 
was prepared that proposed a clear judicial responsibility for the system 
designers, not just a principal and moral responsibility 
(Näringsdepartementet 2000). A similar responsibility for system 
designers has not been proposed in Norway. The Norwegian 
government has established a joint accident commission for the four 
transport modes,8 and expanded the mandate of the accident 
investigation board for civil aviation and railways to also incorporate 
investigations of traffic accidents. When it comes to traffic accidents, 
the board undertakes independent investigations and clarifies causes 
and courses of events with the intention of improving road safety.  
 
 
1.2.3  Motivational factors behind the zero vision 
 
The development in the accident tolls probably motivated the 
introduction of the zero vision. However, this was most likely not the 
only motivation for it. Solheim, a researcher at the Institute of 
Transport Economics (TØI), suggests four possible reasons why the 
zero vision was introduced (1999B).  
 
The zero vision could be seen as an attempt to increase the allocation of 
resources to the road sector. Behind this lies a belief that the zero vision 
and its call for intensified action may make the governing authorities 
                                                 
8 Statens Havarikommisjon for Transport (Accident Investigation Board Norway). 
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more inclined to put more funds into the road sector. Solheim thinks the 
zero vision might represent the desire to achieve everything at once, 
without considering potential conflicts. Other considerations may be 
put aside for the benefit of road safety. It will be interesting to see if 
potential conflicts are considered in the zero vision debate, and if so, 
how they are dealt with. Solheim suggests that the zero vision may be a 
rhetorical strategy to create an impression of vigorousness but without 
much happening in practice. Such a motive would indicate that the road 
authorities are not actually planning for an intensified effort along the 
lines of the zero vision. If this is the case, the zero vision is little more 
than a rhetorical slight of hand. Lastly, Solheim infers that the zero 
vision may represent an ambitious impression of a willingness to 
change the power structures in society for the benefit of road safety. 
When Solheim refers to the power structures in society, road safety is 
taken to a political level. As such, it has much in common with the first 
motive.  
 
The motivations Solheim examines may also have surfaced after the 
zero vision was introduced. Similar discussions on cause and effect, 
what spurred on what, are omnipresent when discussing the zero vision 
and “the new in the new.” It is difficult to conclude what motives 
played a part when the zero vision was introduced. The only motive 




1.2.4  How the key actors received the zero vision  
 
A vision can be seen as a future-oriented conceptual scheme that is 
developed to mobilise different groups towards a common goal. Hård 
(2003) points out that a vision can be successful if its initiators manage 
to convince representatives from other groups that the visionary image 
of the future coincides with their values and interests. In the case of the 
zero vision, the question is if the PRA manages to convince politicians 
and professionals that it fits with their own values and interests.  
 
The PRA was the main actor in lifting the zero vision philosophy to a 
political level. Thus, it is plausible to assume that the PRA concurs 
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with the ideas and arguments governing the zero vision. But how did 
the other actors react to the zero vision when it was presented in the 
proposal to the National Transport Plan 2002-2011? I assume that key 
actors like the Police and Safer Driving gave written comments on the 
zero vision. However, according to a source in the PRA, only three 
actors who submitted consultative statements on the transport plan 
explicitly mentioned the zero vision, and the Police and Safer Driving 
were not among them.  
 
It is surprising that neither the Police nor Safer Driving submitted 
consultative statements on the zero vision. However, Safer Driving 
expressed concern with the zero vision at an early stage, opposing it 
because they thought it focused too much on technical aspects of road 
safety compared to human aspects. Safer Driving feared the Swedish 
approach would be repeated in Norway. They were probably afraid that 
the zero vision would undermine their work, as less focus on the road 
users would result in less attention for their organisation. Safer Driving 
did not concur with the thinking that accidents should be “allowed” to 
happen as long as they were not severe. In a report from the Nordic 
Road Technical Association (NVF) in 2000, dealing with the 
possibilities of the zero vision, a representative from Safer Driving 
stated that it should be based on two strategies: That it is important to 
prevent near misses and less serious accidents, and that we have to 
prevent the serious consequences of accidents. Safer Driving maintains 
that these approaches are not mutually exclusive.  
 
A respondent from the Directorate of Public Roads explains that for the 
Police, the work with the National Action Plan for Safety on Roads 
2002-2011 got them to take a more active part. With the surfacing of 
the action plan, the Police were given a more explicit role in the road 
safety efforts. Bearing this in mind, it was probably not to be expected 
that the Police would give consultative statements on the zero vision. 
 
 
1.2.5  Against the vision – common research objections 
 
Researchers raise many objections to the zero vision. The most 
common objections can be summarised as follows: 1) the zero vision 
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has not been made operational, and there is a gap between vision and 
action. 2) The zero vision does not deal with competing goals, 
conflicting interests and organisational barriers. 3) The zero vision may 
have serious economic consequences for other sectors in society. 4) 
The zero vision is fundamental and authoritarian, and confines 
individual freedom. In the following I will briefly examine these 




The zero vision has not been made operational, and there is a gap 
between vision and action 
 
Lind & Schmidt (2000) consider the strategy behind the zero vision to 
be vague and difficult to relate to. As they see it, the separation 
between vision and goal represents a pedagogical problem. Lind & 
Schmidt underline the importance of having goals that can be applied at 
the national, regional and local levels that make the work more 
concrete and tangible. They believe that for regional and local levels of 
authority to feel they “relate to” the zero vision; it has to be brought 
down to a more concrete and operational level. One way to do this is to 
introduce subsidiary goals in the road safety campaign. 
 
 
The zero vision does not deal with competing goals, conflicting 
interests and organisational barriers 
 
In my Master’s thesis I found that the zero vision primarily is promoted 
by ethical reasoning in key governmental documents, and that it comes 
across as a highly abstract idea which is anchored to a limited degree in 
concrete policies (Langeland 2002). While it is not wrong to dwell on 
ethics and emotions, the account of the zero vision should also focus on 
arguments for why a zero vision will improve road safety. The 
reasoning in the key documents lacks a discussion on competing goals, 
conflicting interests and organisational barriers. It will be interesting to 
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The zero vision may have serious economic consequences for other 
sectors in society 
 
Elvik (1999B) deals with the possible economic implications of the 
zero vision. Elvik’s point is that the goal of eliminating traffic fatalities 
may be so expensive that there will be fewer resources available to 
control other causes of death. The consequence of the massive effort 
implied by the zero vision could be that society’s overall mortality rate 
rises. The problem with the zero vision, as Elvik sees it, is that it does 
not use a cost-benefit analysis. Proponents of the zero vision argue that 
there is no conflict between the zero vision and financial concerns, 
claiming that what is “right” or economically feasible from a zero 
vision perspective will also be “right” from an economic perspective 
for a long time to come. 
 
 
The vision is fundamental and authoritarian, and confines individual 
freedom 
 
Ekelund (1999) accuses zero visions for promoting an environment of 
safety fundamentalism and authoritarianism. The author states that zero 
visions in general promote an extreme form of thinking about safety 
that legitimises drastic actions and curtailment. According to Ekelund, 
little attention is given to the fact that humans have different risk 
tolerances and interests. Even if humans do not always make rational 
choices, it is important to maintain the individual’s responsibility and 
freedom of choice. In the zero vision, this is subjugated to an assumed 
collective goal of increased safety, as Ekelund sees it.  
 
 
1.2.6  The zero vision – a paradigm shift? 
 
Elaborating on the change perspective of the zero vision, one 
interesting question is whether it is plausible to assert that it represents 
a paradigm shift in road safety efforts. Reading Kuhn’s theory of 
scientific revolutions (1962), the threshold for referring to an 
innovation as a new paradigm is high. A paradigm can be defined as 
general agreement within a specific research environment on how 
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problems should be understood and attacked, or as a set of practices 
that define a scientific discipline over a period of time. Kuhn’s theory 
points to scientific revolutions that shake the foundation of our beliefs 
and how we conceive the world. In such a perspective, the zero vision 
is hardly a new paradigm. Seen in a broader perspective though, the 
discussion becomes more interesting. Seeing the zero vision in light of 
Kuhn’s theory is useful to capture “the new in the new” in the zero 
vision.    
 
To say something sensible about this, we need to look at the historical 
development. An interesting watershed was when the Swedes changed 
to right-hand driving in 1967. Prior to the change, a scientific 
workgroup was appointed to pave the way for implementation 
(Englund 1998). According to Englund, this group’s contribution 
marked the start of a new way of assessing road safety – a system view 
that emphasised the importance of coordinated efforts that included 
road users, vehicles and infrastructure. The inspiration for this came 
from the US where Dr. William Haddon (1964) had launched a strategy 
to reduce accidents and injuries. Haddon, a public health physician, 
recognised that standard public health methods could be applied to 
prevent motor vehicle related injuries. The interaction between human, 
motor vehicle and the environment, in the zero vision referred to as a 
system perspective, was a prominent feature of this work. The 
subsequent activities have to a great extent been based on these 
innovations. It could be said that these developments established a 
paradigm for how to work with road safety.  
 
The zero vision emphasises that we have to focus on the most serious 
accidents. This focus on severe accidents is depicted as something new 
that the zero vision has introduced. This is collated with human levels 
of tolerance and presented as a cornerstone of the zero vision. 
However, car manufacturers have focused on the human level of 
tolerance for decades, especially following the criticism of the industry 
for their reluctance to spend money on improving safety, articulated by 
Ralph Nader in his book, “Unsafe at Any Speed” (1965). Nader 
demonstrated that many American automobiles were unsafe.  
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A characteristic of the paradigm shift is that the world should not be the 
same after it (Bjørkum 2003). “The same” does not refer to minor 
changes. “Paradigm shift” refers to real upheavals and dramatic 
reconstructions of reality on a new basis. A new paradigm is based on 
different assumptions, terms and definitions. The zero vision hardly 
satisfies these criteria. The most important objection to it as a paradigm 
shift is that different paradigms have different starting points. The zero 
vision is not based on “new premises” in a paradigmatic sense.  
 
Englund points out that road safety researchers and specialists, and the 
approaches to road safety, have become more and more homogeneous. 
Researchers and specialists have more or less arrived at a common 
view of what the road safety efforts entail. According to Kuhn, this is 
what characterises “normal science”, working within a paradigm –a 
period of adaptation. The consequence of a homogeneous environment 
can be repetitive attitudes and few innovations. Bearing this in mind, 
one can ask if the zero vision has the potential to become a new 
paradigm in the road safety work, leading to new innovations, for 




1.3 THE CONTEXT OF ROAD SAFETY 
 
Gilje & Grimen (1993) maintain that we have to know the context to 
identify meaning. The context of road safety comprises several actors 
and societal mechanisms. The discussion in this chapter is restricted to 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the PRA, the Police, 
Safer Driving, NAF and the county administration. The thesis first and 
foremost provides a study of how key actors give meaning to the zero 
vision, but the importance of surrounding societal mechanisms will be 
evident throughout. This section focuses on how the actors are 
organised, the number of employees in the organisations, how many are 
working with road safety and the main tasks of the organisations, with a 
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1.3.1  The Ministry of Transport and Communications 
 
The Minister governs the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
The rest of the political leadership is comprised of a State Secretary and 
a political advisor. There is an administrative leadership consisting of 
six people. The organisation is divided into five departments: an 
information department, a transport department, an air, mail, and 
telecommunications department, a planning, economics and 
administration department and a road and railway department. The last-
mentioned department consists of a road section, a railway section and 
a road safety and civil emergency section. In addition to the need for 
the political leadership to be engaged in questions concerning road 
safety, most work with road safety is dealt with in the road safety and 
civil emergency section. In 2008, there were a total of 139 employees 
in the Ministry, including 15 in the road safety and civil emergency 
section. 
 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible for 
policy formulation and for preparing cases for the Parliament, including 
government budgets, revisions, law proposals and law amendments, 
plans for the transport and communications sector, and matters relating 
to the organisational set-up. The Ministry is responsible for the 
implementation of guidelines and requirements laid down by 
Parliament, and towards the administrative bodies and enterprises for 
which the Ministry is responsible. The Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, together with the PRA as the underlying department, 
has the main responsibility for road safety.   
 
 
1.3.2  The Public Roads Administration 
 
Until it reorganised in 2003, the PRA consisted of a central road office 
in each of the 19 counties in Norway. In 2003, it was divided into five 
larger regions, each with three to five counties with a regional road 
office in each of the regions. The five regions were then divided into 
districts. There are a total of 30 district road offices across Norway. 
The regional road office is responsible for the overall management of 
the region, which includes allocating resources, local management, 
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coordination and strategic planning. The districts have an operational 
responsibility for much of what goes on in the enterprise.  
 
The Directorate of Public Roads governs the PRA. The Directorate is 
an autonomous agency under the authority of the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications. In other words, there are two hierarchic levels in 
the PRA, with the Directorate functioning as a link to the Ministry. In 
this thesis, both levels are referred to as the PRA, but I will differentiate 
between them when they differ in opinion. The PRA is responsible for 
the planning, construction and operation of national/county roads, 
vehicle inspection and requirements, driver education and licensing. 
The articles of association state that the PRA should “propose and 
implement measures to promote road safety.” Road safety is supposed 
to pervade the PRA and its 4500 or so employees. Nonetheless, only a 
limited number of employees have a defined responsibility for road 
safety. It is estimated that approximately 150 employees in the PRA 
have a defined responsibility for road safety.  
 
A report from the Institute of Transport Economics (Olsen & Ravlum 
2006) has concluded that there are big differences in how the regions 
work with road safety, which measures they prioritise and how they 
organise their work. The report also found differences in how road 
safety is incorporated among the employees. This is not surprising 
considering that some employees in the PRA have a defined 
responsibility for road safety. If road safety work was present in the 
entire organisation, as it is supposed to be, the whole organisation 
would seek to promote safety considerations, whether or not they have 
a defined responsibility for road safety. Then road safety would have 
spread in the organisation like a “virus”, a term used by Røvik (1992). 
Based on the report, this is the case in the PRA to only a limited degree. 
 
After reorganising in 2003, there have been some smaller change 
processes in the PRA. It has gone from detail-oriented to function-
based management, and from the 1 January 2010, a new administrative 
reform will be in place.9 One goal of this reform is to have greater 
public involvement and democracy on both the local and regional 
                                                 
9 Forvaltningsreformen (Administrative Reform). 
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levels by decentralising power and authority, and by having a clear 
division of responsibility between the various governmental levels. A 
consequence of the reform is that the responsibility for most of the 
Norwegian national roads10 will be transferred to the county level.  
 
There have been interesting developments in the road safety area as 
well. Since 2005, the PRA has conducted an analysis of all fatal 
accidents. This work is deemed highly important, and it is a step 
towards a more proactive attitude to traffic accidents. Annual reports 
are issued on this work. Moreover, the PRA has put a lot of effort into a 
safety course. One goal is to get employees directly involved in road 
safety work to take this course. Whether these developments are a 
result of the zero vision is impossible to say, but it has probably helped 
to “soften the climate” for such initiatives.  
 
 
1.3.3  The Police 
 
The Norwegian Police is an integrated entity, meaning that all police 
functions are concentrated in one organisation. The police consist of the 
National Police Directorate, 27 local police districts and seven special 
agencies organised under the Directorate. Each police district is under 
the command of a Chief of Police, and each district is responsible for 
all police work, including budgets and results. Each district has its own 
headquarters, totalling 70 police stations. The districts are divided into 
319 sub-districts. The Police have approximately 11 000 employees.  
 
The Ministry of Justice has the overriding responsibility for police 
activities and decides the framework for their plans, goals and 
allocations. The Ministry delegates a great deal of responsibility to the 
National Police Directorate, which acts under the constitutional 
responsibility of the Minister of Justice. The Police Director and 
executive group are the head of the National Police Directorate. The 
Directorate is responsible for the professional management and for 
supervising the districts and the special agencies. The National Police 
Directorate has about 120 employees.  
                                                 
10 Riksveger (National roads). 
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The National Police Directorate governs the professional and 
administrative leadership of the traffic service in the police. Only one 
person has a defined responsibility for road safety in the Directorate. 
The goals of the traffic service are drawn up together with the Mobile 
Police (UP) and the Chief of Police in each district, who then bears the 
responsibility for the traffic service in his or her district. The traffic 
service is organised differently from district to district. In large districts 
it is common to have traffic departments, whilst in smaller districts 
individuals often conduct the organising and planning of the service. In 
general it is the department of “law and order” that conducts the 
service, even if some civil servants are given the responsibility for 
traffic duty. It is difficult to estimate how many employees in the Police 
are involved in road safety work, but few have a defined responsibility 
for this. 
 
The Mobile Police is a central police organ. The main task of the 
Mobile Police is to reduce traffic accidents that cause deaths and 
injuries by preventing violations of the law. The Mobile Police has a 
head office and ten districts offices around the country. The police 
districts supply the manpower in the Mobile Police. The total 
manpower varies, but it is usually around 280 full-time equivalents. 
Because the various districts supply the workforce, the competence 
level in the Mobile Police varies from year to year.  
 
The Mobile Police prioritises control activities directed at speeding, 
drunk driving and the use of protective equipment. They also focus on 
aggressive behaviour in traffic, control of heavy vehicles and transport 
of dangerous goods. Visible and unpredictable control activities are the 
main strategy in their road safety work. The Mobile Police prioritise 
behaviour that has a major risk of personal injury. Their task is to 
ensure that people are law-abiding. This is done through preventive 
work and goal-oriented controls. The Mobile Police also contribute to 
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1.3.4  Safer Driving 
Safer Driving is a nationwide organisation for voluntary work on road 
safety, which has its origin in the growth in car traffic and increase in 
traffic accidents. In the 1930s, a working committee was appointed to 
look into the worrying accident figures that had developed since the 
first cars were registered in Norway in 1899. This committee was the 
forerunner of today’s Safer Driving. Interestingly enough, the road 
director headed the organisation. In other words, Safer Driving was not 
an organisation, as we know it today, independent of the PRA.  
Safer Driving was appointed the task of increasing road safety and 
improving traffic culture together with the public authorities, various 
organisations and other interested parties. Its activity ended in 1935. In 
the years around the Second World War, road safety interests did not 
have top priority. When the war ended, and with it the car rations and 
other restrictions, car traffic and traffic accidents once again escalated. 
Insurance companies and interest organisations suggested that an 
organisation should be established to counteract this development. The 
Ministry of Transport and Communications supported the initiative and 
in 1956 Safer Driving, as we know it today, was established, albeit 
under another name.  
The biggest part of the budget for Safer Driving comes from allocations 
from the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Safer Driving 
functions as a link between the voluntary road safety work and the 
authorities. Safer Driving undertakes their activities through their 
national administration and secretaries in 19 counties. There are 44 
employees in Safer Driving.  
Safer Driving aims for optimal safety for all road users. The 
organisation is responsible for road–safety education and information, 
and for promoting activities to the authorities and business community. 
Safer Driving has adopted three values in their work: a road-safe 
childhood, responsible road users and road safety as a responsibility of 
society at large. In Safer Driving, all the employees’ work is 
completely dedicated to road safety. 
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1.3.5  The National Automobile Association (NAF) 
 
The National Automobile Association (NAF) is the largest road user 
organisation in Norway, including vehicle policies, road safety, road 
development, tax questions and public transportation. NAF is 
independent of any party affiliation and has close to 500 000 members. 
The board of representatives is the deciding body. The board represents 
NAF’s nationwide network of 75 local departments. NAF is organised 
into three focal areas, safety, experience and influence, and into five 
regions. There are about 400 employees in NAF.  
 
In their policy platform, NAF’s vision is said to be “to take 
responsibility and make Norway a safer and better country to be a road 
user in” (NAF 2004). NAF aims to enhance road safety for all road 
users, and to be the consumer’s strongest advocate with the authorities 
and the transport sector. One of its overarching goals is to satisfy the 
road users’ demands for mobility, while also addressing the public’s 
demand for an environmental and safety focus.  
 
NAF believes they are an important actor in society, working actively 
in contact with the politicians and the authorities. One informant 
explains that they have developed a new programme as a supplement 
and continuation of the car policy programme. In their political 
platform, NAF emphasises that the political direction NAF has chosen 
is societal policy. This gives NAF the opportunity to “influence all 
parts of the political system that influence our possibilities of mobility” 
(NAF 2004). NAF aims to strengthen their influence, become more 
visible in the road safety debate and base their work on a professional 
approach. The organisation wants to be a strong commentator in the 
media, as well as be part of the political processes. In NAF, no one 
works directly with road safety.  
 
 
1.3.6  The county administration 
 
According to section 40 of the Road Traffic Act, the county 
administrations are responsible for coordinating and giving advice on 
road safety efforts in each county. The county administrations 
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coordinate the priorities between the municipalities and the PRA, and 
give them their political anchor. They are then responsible for ensuring 
that concrete action programmes are introduced as the follow up to 
these strategies.  
 
Twelve counties manage their road safety work through a political 
committee11, while seven counties are organised in a way that is not 
politically managed. Berg & Olsen have conducted a study that 
concludes that the counties with politically managed committees 
achieve more in road safety than the counties that do not have this type 
of management committee (2005).  
 
 
1.3.7  Summary of the road-safety context 
 
This has been a brief introduction to the road–safety context. The aim 
has been to highlight features of the key road-safety actors as well as 
NAF and the county administration. Most emphasis has been placed on 
the key actors. From what we have seen, the Police and Safer Driving 
have to be considered marginal actors in the road safety campaign 
compared to the PRA. The PRA has more resources and is in a totally 
different position when it comes to manpower. In other words, the 




1.4 THESIS PERSPECTIVES 
 
The aim of the thesis is to study the impact of the zero vision on road 
safety in Norway. My aim is to capture this through three approaches. 
Each approach has its own special features while it also intertwined 
with the others. In this section I will elaborate on the three approaches 
and examine problems with each of them. The approaches are: 
 
1) Exploring how the zero vision is conceptualised and 
instantiated by key actors with respect to implicit change 
                                                 
11 A County Road Safety Panel (FTU). 
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2) Examining the role of inter-organisational relations and 
conflicting interests after the introduction of the zero vision 
3) Assessing the political impact of the zero vision and how it 
challenges other goals besides safety 
 
 
1.4.1  Conceptualisation, instantiation and change 
 
The zero vision means many things at once and different things to 
different people. The ambiguity of the zero vision makes it effective for 
political language, but it is difficult for the actors to relate to it. The 
vision has introduced new modes of expression which the actors have 
to relate to and choose whether or not to incorporate in their 
vocabulary. It brings a linguistic change to road safety, but does it 
represent a change in practice?  
 
The zero vision is an abstract concept that has to be defined, 
conceptualised and instantiated through language. The vision has to be 
conceptualised and instantiated for change to take place, and to gain 
effects in practice. Is the zero vision merely adjusted to ongoing 
practices, or is there something new in the term? Are abstract 
depictions prominent, or is the vision instantiated and does it open for 
action?  
 
Attention is especially focused on language and how key actors give 
meaning to different aspects of the zero vision. What cognitive effect 
does the vision have on actors? Has the zero vision changed the actors’ 
conception of road safety? One main motive behind the zero vision is 
to initiate change and hereby achieve a marked and lasting reduction in 
the number of fatalities and permanent injuries in traffic. The zero 
vision is said to incorporate a new way of thinking, but what separates 
the zero vision from road safety thinking prior to its introduction?  
 
Another interesting aspect is the extent to which interpretations of the 
zero vision vary between key actors. There is reason to believe that 
because actors focus on different aspects of road safety, they also 
interpret and relate to the zero vision in different ways. Do the actors 
define the zero vision in such a way that it makes their own views 
47 
Introduction, Subject and Problems for Discussion   
predominant? Even if the actors agree about the necessity of the zero 
vision, they may disagree when it comes to how the zero vision should 
be put into practice. The initial agreement may be of an abstract nature.  
 
New initiatives are often accused of being a manifestation of existing 
ones, the same thing in a new disguise, or trivial changes. This type of 
allegation often comes from people who are not directly dealing with 
the new initiatives. Actors who feel they are on the sidelines often 
display such a mentality. One assumption in the thesis is that the zero 
vision is more or less reserved for the PRA and that the other central 
actors do not feel a similar connection to the zero vision. This is based 
on the fact that the PRA promoted the zero vision as the new policy in 
the road safety campaign. 
 
It is plausible to assume that a comprehensive turnaround like the zero 
vision results in changes in structures and goals in key road safety 
organisations. One would at least think that the zero vision results in 
changing priorities and increased efforts. If it is seen to be an abstract 
guideline, it could be that it has not affected these factors to a 
noticeable degree.  
 
The discussion around subsidiary goals is important when it comes to 
ascertaining whether or not the zero vision is instantiated beyond its 
ethical starting point. The absence of subsidiary goals may be seen as a 
lack of willingness to instantiate the zero vision. Having subsidiary 
goals implies that efforts are being made to attain them, while the 
absence of them may imply an abstract approach to goal achievement. 
Subsidiary goals are not present in the road safety work. My aim is to 
discover why this is the case, how the key actors see this and what the 
consequences might be.   
 
One important aspect of the zero vision is that it gives the public many 
different associations and can be viewed from many different angles. 
Thus, presenting and arguing for the zero vision is a challenging task, 
one that demands knowledge about language. There are many 
considerations to be taken, and it does not take many errors in 
judgement before the message is misconstrued or even ridiculed. This 
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thesis focuses on how the zero vision is communicated to the public, 
one of the vision’s important partners. 
 
 
1.4.2  Cooperation and conflicting interests 
 
The introduction of the zero vision is complicated by the fact that road 
safety involves many political and professional actors. The 
responsibility is fragmented, the commitment varies, the organisations 
have different perspectives and no one has full decision making 
authority. In many ways, this diversity is a blessing to road safety 
because it opens for a versatile approach. However, overall, it is a 
mixed blessing when it comes to cooperation and coordination, as 
dilemmas of collective action may lead to self-protectionism and sub-
optimal conditions for road safety. Has the zero vision altered the 
relationship between the important road safety actors? 
 
Visions are beneficiary to the “corridors of power” because of the 
leeway they give. When it comes to road safety, the corridors of power 
are the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Directorate 
of Public Roads, often referred to as the policy level. The power of 
Safer Driving as a self-appointed watchdog, the Police and their control 
activities and NAF’s ability to advocate mobility and safety through 
their members are in many ways subordinate to the machinery referred 
to as the road authorities. The imbalance between the road authorities 
and the other key actors is also made clear when we consider how 
many employees in the organisations are working with road safety.  
 
The zero vision calls for intensified efforts and a shift in road-safety 
thinking. When some measures are emphasised as more important 
under the zero vision and others are toned down, this suggests that the 
way various actors work with road safety will be affected. One example 
is Safer Driving and their initial reluctance to support the vision 
because of its strong physical orientation. Such incidents can give rise 
to inter-organisational conflicts. The PRA may find that the zero vision 
has opened for repositioning in road safety. The zero vision may be a 
psychological element that fortifies the position of the PRA because of 
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the way road safety work is redefined. Has the zero vision become a 
repositioning tool for the PRA in the road safety campaign?  
 
 
1.4.3  Competing goals and political pragmatism 
 
This thesis focuses on goals competing with road after the introduction 
of the zero vision. The examination of competing goals sheds light on 
the challenges present when trying to intensify the road safety efforts. 
Four competing goals are highlighted: mobility, the environment, 
economic efficiency and individual freedom. These goals are examined 
in light of the intensified focus on road safety after the introduction of 
the zero vision so that we can see how the actors perceive the affect it 
has had on these goals. 
 
Historically, mobility has had a high priority among the competing 
goals. However, following the development that peaked with 560 
deaths in 1970, it has become politically incorrect to prioritise mobility 
at the expense of safety. With the zero vision, the road authorities have 
stated that mobility can only been improved within the bounds allowed 
by safety considerations. In reality, this means putting safety first. I aim 
to find out how the key road safety actors feel about this.  
 
One goal, which traditionally has been focused on, is the environment. 
However, in many ways it would be more accurate to refer to this as a 
goal about aesthetics, that the road environment “looks nice.” The zero 
vision is said to focus on the type of road accident where the vehicle 
leaves the road, one of the three most important accident types. Implicit 
in this is the need to remove dangerous elements alongside the road, for 
example trees or rocks that might be dangerous in case a vehicle 
swerves off the road. It will be interesting to see how actors view the 
conflict between safety and the environment.  
 
Another interesting question is what effect the zero vision has had on 
the economic efficiency of road-building projects. Roads built 
according to the zero vision have another safety level than roads built 
prior to its introduction, so it is safe to assume that the zero vision has 
had an effect on the efficiency of such projects. The basic figures for 
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this have not been collected as the focus is on how the key actors 
perceive this. If the actors state that the economic efficiency of road-
building projects is unaffected by the zero vision, this probably 
indicates that the zero vision’s keen focus on building safer roads is not 
being followed up in practice.  
 
One competing goal that is much contested is individual freedom. 
Opinions differ as to whether this should be a sought after value in 
transport policies. However, there is no arguing that it is a goal for the 
road users. As such, the authorities cannot ignore this as a goal to be 
considered. One issue that is highlighted in the zero vision is the need 
for more restrictive measures, measures where individual freedom is 
traded for safety. Politicians have the final word when it comes to how 
restrictive and regulated road traffic should be. Because the public does 
not like restrictions and regulations, the politicians are likely to avoid 
such discussions.  
 
Politicians play a very important role when it comes to road safety, 
both with respect to balancing between competing goals and allocating 
resources. In many ways they determine the agenda. Politicians are 
advocates of the people and act according to the public will. Important 
actors have to push for effective road safety measures even if they are 
unpopular among the public. Politicians, on the other hand, can choose 
not to follow up what is suggested in order to please the public. Often 
the politicians follow the advice of professionals, but when it comes to 
“tying down” road users by applying more restrictive measures, there is 
reason to believe that there will be a discrepancy between what the 




1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
In the first chapter the purpose of the thesis is highlighted and 
elaborated on through three different perspectives. The development in 
the accident tolls is examined as an introduction to the zero vision, the 
subject of the thesis. Then different aspects of the zero vision are 
discussed. Following this I look into the context of road safety, where 
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the important road safety actors and their characteristics are 
highlighted.  
 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to a discussion on the philosophy of science. The 
thesis uses social constructionism for this purpose. In this chapter, the 
characteristics of social constructionism are explained, and I examine 
why social constructionism is a relevant and suitable scientific 
backdrop to the study. The intention of the chapter is not to cover all 
aspects of social constructionism, but to highlight its main features and 
illustrate its relevance to the study. 
 
In Chapter 3, I embark on the theoretical reflections of the study; theory 
on rhetoric and power. The selection of theory is based on the three 
perspectives of the thesis. This chapter introduces discourse analysis, 
which can be viewed both as a research method and as a theory of its 
own, with close ties to rhetoric. The main part of the chapter deals with 
different rhetorical aspects. Chapter 4 introduces different perspectives 
of power, and culminates in a summary of the different assumptions of 
the thesis.  
 
Chapter 5 covers the methodological approach of the thesis, elaborating 
on the selection of actors, respondents and documents. Furthermore, I 
examine how the interview guide was formulated. Preparing the 
methodological framework is a very important undertaking. It 
determines the direction of the study and is crucial for the data 
collection. There are positive and negative sides to all approaches and 
deliberations concerning method have to deal with both the strengths 
and weaknesses of the selected approach.    
 
Chapters 6 to 8 cover the empirical findings of the study. The division 
into chapters corresponds to the three perspectives introduced in 
Chapter 1. In Chapter 6 the focus is on how the zero vision is defined, 
conceptualised and instantiated by the important road-safety actors, and 
based on this – how much change is to be expected from the zero 
vision. In Chapter 7, the focus is on cooperation and conflicting 
interests between key road safety actors and how the zero vision has 
affected the relationships. In Chapter 8, the focus is on competing goals 
for road safety: mobility, individual freedom, the environment and the 
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economic efficiency, and how the zero vision has affected these goals. 
In this chapter I also examine political influence on road safety.  
 
Chapter 9 summarises the major findings in the empirical chapters 
before a more overall conclusion and some perspectives on the future 
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2. Social Constructionism 
 
The theory behind the thesis is based on social constructionism. A 
social construction, or social construct, can be defined as an 
institutionalised entity or artefact in a social system "invented" or 
"constructed" by participants in a particular culture or society that 
exists because people agree to behave as if it exists or follow certain 
conventional rules (Burr 2003). One main focus of social 
constructionism is to uncover the ways in which individuals and groups 
participate in the creation of their perceived social reality. This involves 
looking at the ways social phenomena are created and institutionalised 
by humans.  
 
Social constructionism is influenced by many disciplines and 
intellectual traditions, and contains many theories and beliefs. It can be 
divided into weak social constructionism and strong social 
constructionism. Proponents of weak social constructionism tend to see 
some underlying objective factual elements connected to reality, while 
proponents of strong social constructionism see everything as a social 
construction. In this study I adhere to weak social constructionism.  
 
An important belief of social constructionism, and the main reason for 
adopting this approach in this study, is the view that change takes place 
through language. As ideas and new initiatives are put into words, a 
basis is created for concrete action. When it comes to the zero vision, I 
aim to capture how the important road safety actors invest it with 
meaning, and how this in turn creates a basis for action. The aim of this 
chapter is not to describe every aspect of social constructionism, but to 




2.1 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM, MEANING AND 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
Social constructionism is critical to the possibility of true objective 
knowledge since nothing suggests that our knowledge of the world is 
true and constant. It challenges the view that knowledge is based on 
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objective and unbiased observation of the world around us. Social 
constructionism cautions us to be suspicious of our assumptions about 
how the world appears to be (Burr 2003). One question is whether this 
inhibits critical research. In principal, this might be the case because 
different utterances can be just as plausible. However, concrete 
research does not take place in a room of principles Utterances are 
made in a concrete reality with limits on what is accepted as 
meaningful. The point is not to produce a “true” version of different 
phenomena but to give an explanatory and defendable depiction.  
 
There is a close relationship between social constructionism, meaning 
and rhetoric. How we conceive meaning has a decisive bearing on the 
theoretical and moral consequences of the study of rhetoric. If meaning 
is seen as something inherent in situations, rhetoric becomes a parasite 
on the disciplines that claim to provide knowledge of the “real” 
situation. However, if meaning is viewed as something that follows 
from rhetorical utterances, the question rather becomes how symbols 
create the reality people respond to. I believe meaning has to be 
understood as the result of a creative process, and not as something that 
is purely discovered. When it comes to the zero vision, meaning is 
created when the concept is conceptualised and instantiated.  
 
Burr believes the concepts we use to understand the world are 
historically and culturally specific. These categories do not refer to real 
divisions, and the meanings of concepts are constantly changing. The 
implication is that understanding is not only bound by history and 
culture – it is a product of history and culture. Burr believes the 
knowledge that arises comes from artefacts of history and culture, and 
we should not assume that our ways of understanding represent “the 
truth.” The only plausible aim is to give an account of how the world 
appears to be at the present time. 
 
Social constructionism states that reality does not exist prior to its 
social invention. Reality is constructed through human activity. 
Individuals create meaning through interaction with each other and the 
environment they are a part of. The construction of meaning involves 
inter-subjectivity, which is a shared understanding among individuals 
whose interaction is based on common interests and assumptions that 
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form the basis for communication (Rogoff 1990). Inter-subjectivity 
helps people to extend their understanding of new information and 
activities that arise in a community. Giddens (1984) uses the term 
“diffusion” about instances where actors begin to share a socially 
constructed perception of reality. As the perception spreads among the 
actors, it becomes institutionalised and is taken for granted. This could 
be important for how the zero vision has been adopted among 
professionals and in political circles.  
 
The importance of context is vital in understanding what occurs in 
society and in constructing knowledge based on this understanding. 
“The goings-on between people in the course of their everyday lives are 
seen as practices during which our shared versions of knowledge are 
constructed” (Burr 2003:4). What we consider as “true” are current 
ways of understanding the world, born out of social processes and 
interaction between individuals. Knowledge is sustained through social 
processes, and knowledge and social action go hand in hand together. 
Berger & Luckmann (1966) argue that all knowledge, including the 
most basic common sense knowledge of everyday reality, is derived 




2.2 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND LANGUAGE 
 
Social constructionism maintains the importance of language when it 
comes to shaping new meaning and knowledge. Language structures 
how we experience our lives and the world around us. Through 
language actors not only describe the world – they create it. Language 
is a social phenomenon, something that happens between humans. It is 
not a channel that transparently conveys an existing reality. Through 
language we access new knowledge and construct new knowledge, and 
this construction process is rooted in language. “When people talk to 
each other, the world gets constructed. Our use of language can 
therefore be thought of as a form of action” (Burr 2003:8).  
 
According to Burr, language is not a system of signs with fixed 
meanings, upon which everyone agrees, but “a site of variability, 
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disagreement and potential conflict” (2003:54). The argument that 
meaning is debatable and temporary is fundamental. With this view of 
language “we are drawn into a view of talk, writing and social 
encounters as sites of struggle and conflict, where power relations are 
acted out and contested” (Burr 2003:54). Speaking of power, “the 
power of language to bring about a change in our thinking is sometimes 
explicitly utilised by those seeking social change” (Burr 2003:50). The 
purpose is often to secure consent for proposed action. Different social 
constructions sustain some patterns of social action and exclude others. 
The constructions are “bound up by power relations because they have 
implications for what is permissible for different people to do” (Burr 
2003:5).  
 
When the zero vision was introduced, it was not clearly defined by its 
initiators. It had to be interpreted. In this way, it became a social 
construction determined by different collective representations. The 
point that the zero vision is constructed through language is at the core 
of the study. The fact that the zero vision has to be interpreted opens for 
strategies where the use of power comes into play, and where the 
importance of rhetoric becomes evident.  
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3. Rhetorical Discourse 
 
Adopting the zero vision in the road safety campaign constitutes a form 
of societal planning. In societal planning, one has to produce arguments 
to reach agreement and convince an audience about what should be 
done and why. Planning means that we lead a discourse that is both 
guiding and convincing. In this perspective planning emerges as an 
expository art of reasoning that rests entirely upon rhetoric (Ramírez 
1996). Studying planning, and hence the zero vision, means studying a 
form of rhetorical discourse.  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with 
the practice of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is both a method 
and a theory and goes hand in hand with rhetoric. Both discourse 
analysis and a rhetorical undertaking deal with language and different 
portrayals of reality within a field. This is why I use the term rhetorical 
discourse for the approach to this. In the second section of the chapter, 
different features of rhetoric and their relevance for research are 
introduced.  
 
In the third section I examine various aspects of rhetoric relevant to the 
study. This is done from a political-discourse perspective. The 
following topics are studied: storylines, symbolism in political 
discourse, rhetoric and the construction of arguments, persuasion and 
the rhetorical “toolbox”, metaphors and analogies, values and intention, 
concepts and conceptualisation and concrete, diffuse and ideological 




3.1 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
 
Although it might be an enticing thought, we do not have direct access 
to the mental images of other people. We have to establish 
understanding based on how people act, speak and write about a 
subject. People speak and write about the zero vision from different 
positions and with different interests. In doing so, they utilise language 
and hence rhetoric. The zero vision becomes part of a meaningful 
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context by being referred to and treated as relevant by actors. In the 
interaction that arises, different actors use different discursive resources 
to interpret each other and to make themselves understood. In the study 
of discursive actions, we find traces of how the zero vision is 
interpreted and utilised in the road safety campaign. 
 
The language could be seen as structured in discourses. Hajer defines 
discourses as a “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories 
that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social 
realities” (1995:44). Hajer believes we “act upon our images of reality 
and are dependent on certain discourses to be able to express ourselves” 
(1995:16). Discourses offer a framework through which people can 
understand their own experiences, their own behaviour and the 
behaviour of others. The zero vision can be seen as a new discourse in 
the field of road safety. 
 
Foucault (1973) uses the discourse concept to explain how a field is 
defined, explained and changed at the same time as it is put into words. 
Speaking about it changes how elements in the discourse are organised, 
and as a result it changes the entire field. Through training in critical 
language awareness, people can learn about the possibilities of change. 
Change is possible because humans are capable of examining the 
discourses that surround them, and of embracing or resisting discourses 
based on their preferences. Change takes place when discursive 
elements are articulated in new ways.  
 
Discourse is an important form of social practice that reproduces and 
changes knowledge at the same time as it is shaped by other social 
practices. Discourses organise social relations, interests and phenomena 
through the formulation of differences, similarities and relations. A 
discourse attains authority when it is adopted by a cross-section of 
those in power and begins to structure the problems as well as the 
solutions (Hajer 1995). Hajer refers to it as “discourse 
institutionalisation” when a discourse is translated into institutional 
arrangement or shifting policies. It will be interesting to see the extent 
to which the zero vision has been institutionalised.  
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The discursive construction of reality is an important part of exercising 
power, and the force of political articulations makes it important to 
study new discourses. Defining the discourse is often juxtaposed with 
defining reality. By portraying reality in a particular way, discourses 
constitute objects in certain ways, create boundaries between true and 
false and make some actions relevant and some unimaginable. In this 
perspective, it becomes evident that language and discourse play a 
decisive role in the shaping of societies, and there is a continuous 
debate over which words should describe reality.  
 
The question of change and ideological consequences can be studied by 
analysing the relations between discursive practices and the broader 
social practices. Does the discursive practice reproduce the existing 
discourse in order to maintain status quo, or is the discourse 
transformed to create change? What ideological, political and social 
consequences does the discursive practice have? Does it reinforce and 
conceal power relations, or does it challenge the relations by portraying 
the reality in a new way? These are all highly relevant questions when 
it comes to the zero vision discourse.   
 
 
3.1.1  Approaching discourse analysis 
 
Political decision-making relating to road safety takes place in the 
context of, and through, essentially fragmented and contradictory 
discourses. The dynamics of road-safety policies are best understood by 
“deconstructing” the discursive practices that guide the field through a 
discourse analysis. The aim of a discourse analysis is to explore the 
constructive elements of language, how power relations are hidden in 
language and how this limits the scope of action.  
 
The work on discourse analysis could be divided into choice and 
delimitation of the discourse and identification of discourse 
representations. How discourses are delimited is a question of what 
meaning they are given by their carriers. Representations are things and 
phenomena as they appear through language. In research, the task is to 
point to similarities and differences between representations, and 
demonstrate that they belong to the same discourse. The next step is to 
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collect information about the different representations that exist in the 
discourse.  
 
Discourse analysis draws on different kinds of evidence. The more 
approaches and angles we have on a subject, the more vividly it can be 
depicted. Foucault believes that discourses in general and scientific 
discourse in particular are so complex that we should approach them at 
different levels and with different methods (1972). The bias in one 
method will then ideally be countered by other methods. Discourse 
analysis seeks evidence from both the spoken word and written texts.  
 
The approach to discourse analysis in this study builds on Hajer. He 
uses discourse analysis in the environmental discourse as a tool for 
dissecting and interpreting policy change. In this study, discourse 
analysis will be utilised to study the road safety discourse after the 
introduction of the zero vision. Hajer points out that language is “a 
system of signification through which actors not simply describe but 
create the world” (1995:44). A key element in discourse analysis is to 
study what Hajer refers to as “argumentative interaction” in discourses, 
in other words, the arguments put forth for different views by different 
actors. This makes it possible to explain the prevalence of certain 
discursive constructions.  
 
Discourse analysis is part of a trend towards more interpretive 
approaches to the analysis of politics. Such approaches see policies as 
socially constructed and focus heavily on language. In discourse 
analysis, language is seen as an activity or action rather than merely a 
transfer medium (Jørgensen 1999). Discourse analysis builds on 
structural philosophy, which states that the way to reality is through 
language. Language is not a reflection of an existing reality. 
Understanding must be sought in the context where language is at play. 
The focus is on the patterns of language, and on the social 
consequences of different portrayals.  
 
One of the points in carrying out a discourse analysis is to analyse 
meaning as a part of the social arena where meaning is shaped. 
Meaning is often a necessary condition for action and discourse 
analysis is, among other things, the study of prerequisites for action 
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(Neumann 2001). An important objective in discourse analysis is to 
outline how the meaning of concepts is determined, for instance the 
zero vision concept. Discourse analysis helps to frame the zero vision 





3.2 INTRODUCING RHETORIC 
 
The rhetorical perspective is based on the fact that the zero vision is 
given meaning through language, and that this is decisive for how the 
zero vision is made operational and for its pervasive power. By 
applying knowledge of rhetoric to the rise of new philosophies we can 
discover and obtain insight into different discources and the concepts 
that arise, as well as the underlying human perspectives and 
convictions. In this section I present features of rhetoric and its 
relevance for research.  
 
 
3.2.1  Features of rhetoric 
 
Rhetoric is a discursive practice, a study of tropes and figures, and a 
study of how to speak and write convincingly. McCloskey et al. 
describe the range of rhetoric when stating that “rhetoric covers at once 
what is communicated, how it is communicated, what happens when it 
is communicated, how to communicate it better, and what 
communication is in general” (1987:16). In other words, rhetoric is 
synonymous with language and communication.  
 
Aristotle defined rhetoric as the art of extracting the right degree of 
persuasion from a topic, or as the ability to uncover what is suited to 
convince (in Barthes 1998). When searching for convincing arguments, 
Aristotle stressed the importance of emphasising things that are 
beneficial for society.  
 
Ramírez (1995) sees rhetoric as the knowledge of how we use language 
to advise about and decide what to do and not to do. The eligibility of 
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action forces us into dialogue with other actors. Rhetoric points to 
when and how such a dialogue can take place and to what extent it 
leads to good results and not an escalation of conflict.  
 
To many, rhetoric is equivalent to manipulation and bad intentions. As 
McCloskey et al. put it: “Few want to be caught in the company with so 
nasty a word” (1987:222). Although rhetoric is also used to manipulate, 
equating rhetoric with manipulation is an unjust and counter-productive 
simplification of its ramifications. What is convincing does not have to 
be manipulative and dishonest. To manipulate someone is merely one 
side of language, and as such, merely one side of rhetoric.  
 
Paine (1981) sees rhetoric as a neutral instrument – as a tool that can be 
used with both good and bad intentions. As Paine sees it, rhetoric 
means expressing intentions in a communicative setting, independent of 
purpose. I believe this is a fair depiction, and it will serve as the starting 
point for the deliberations on rhetoric in this study. 
 
 
3.2.2  Relevance for research 
 
One reason why rhetoric has been discredited is that apodictic (for 
instance mathematics) and assertoric (for instance experience and 
experimental) knowledge, often thought of as superior exact knowledge 
that maintains a distance to language, has placed important constraints 
on rhetoric. Through their power, they have displaced the order of the 
discourse, which has led to a change of thought that has contributed to 
rhetoric’s bad reputation (Foucault 1972).  
 
In the human sciences, interpretation is front and centre. The subject 
being studied comprises events of human nature. By studying the inside 
of events and discovering the underlying thoughts, the researcher does 
something neither the mathematician nor the scientist can do. While the 
logic of apodictic and assertoric knowledge deals with the theoretically 
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Fundamental differences between the ideals of scientific discourse and 
the ideals of rhetoric have developed over time. The differences 
concern the use of language, the way of arguing, the foundation for 
discussions, how context is considered and views on rationality. The 
ideals of science have traditionally been positivistic and object related. 
These ideals stand in sharp contrast to the very essence of rhetoric. 
Rhetoric has fallen into intellectual discredit because of the drive 
towards the value of facts.  
 
Science pretends to utilise language as an instrument. Science seems to 
believe that by virtue of reason and good arguments, logical rules and 
concepts it can distinguish between language and reality. However, no 
rules, concepts or arguments, which themselves originate from 
language, can be used to separate language and reality (Pålshaugen 
2001). Science cannot elevate itself to an objective level that “saves” it 
from rhetoric without cutting the ties to language.  
 
We live in a virtual and dynamic world created by human beings. With 
language we create models of reality. As mentioned above, the only 
way we can bring our personal experiences and images of reality into a 
discourse is through language (Pålshaugen 1994). Language is not a 
depiction of something, but concurrent with human affiliation with 
nature and other human beings. Language cannot be disregarded as an 
insignificant element that we can distance ourselves from in the pursuit 
of objectivity. This view is winning more and more support, and as a 
result the way research is adapting to rhetoric is changing. The belief 
that science is self-sufficient and apart from rhetoric is losing 
momentum.  
 
Even if science wants to appear objective, it does not register facts 
passively but through creativity and construction. This is a different 
perception of language compared to what positivistic approaches are 
based on. Positivism seeks reference, anchoring and causes. Rhetoric 
seeks meaning, orientation and intentions. Positivism speaks about the 
world. Rhetoric speaks in the world. Science today is characterised by 
an ambiguous discourse where a series of non-apodictic rhetorical 
elements are visible. They are discourses that wish to persuade through 
rhetoric because their apodictic basis is forsaken (Holmgaard 2001). 
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It is highly interesting that Aristotle, who once formulated the notion of 
incontestable true knowledge, also wrote a composition on rhetoric. 
Today it is inconceivable that someone who aspires to an apodictic or 
assertoric view of science would express such an interest in rhetoric. In 
Aristotle’s12 texts, there is a close connection between linguistic 
expressions on logical and rhetorical utterances. Aristotle draws a line 
between the really true and the relatively rhetorically true. This line 
does not arise from “pure thought” or from science, but from a 
linguistic construction. The duality in Aristotle’s approach and the will 
to bridge logic and rhetoric is interesting in today’s modernity.  
 
In a depiction of the role of rhetoric in the twentieth century, Perelman 
& Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) refer to what they call “the new rhetoric.” 
The new rhetoric signals a change of perception where rhetoric is seen 
as an integral part of social science and scientific studies. The decades 
following the publication have shown that the focus on rhetoric has 
increased among scholars as a legitimate point of departure for 
research. One of the reasons for this is the rediscovery of the epistemic 
importance of rhetoric, how important it is to convince by arguments 
and how someone through linguistic practice creates understandings 
others accept as truisms. Barthes (1998) believes the reinvention of 
rhetoric represents an awareness of how we use our language. The 
increasing importance of rhetoric necessitates studies that shed light on 




3.3 RHETORIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
 
There is no prescribed method for studying rhetoric, and it is 
impossible to cover all aspects of rhetoric in one study. A selection has 
to be made based on the intentions governing the study. Rhetoric can be 
studied from different angles and with different perspectives. It is 
common to adopt typical concepts of rhetoric and investigate spoken 
and written data based on this. What is featured in this study is an 
                                                 
12 In Barthes 1998. 
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analysis of topics that accentuate the importance of rhetoric when 
introducing policy formulations like the zero vision.  
 
Political action is influenced by the perception of reality one manages 
to create through the use of suitable rhetoric, where some elements are 
emphasised and some suppressed. The aim of rhetoric is to convince 
others and to mobilise them to act in certain ways. Rhetoric is a way of 
altering reality by creating discourses that change reality through the 
mediation of thought and action. A central scope of the thesis is to 
explore how the zero vision is conceptualised and instantiated by key 
road safety actors in terms of change. The rhetorical renderings are not 
intended to be exhaustive. The selection is based on the research 
questions guiding the thesis. Through the rhetorical reflections, I 
introduce several problems for further discussion. 
 
 
3.3.1  Storylines 
 
Hajer (1995) introduces the concept of “storylines”, defining them as 
“narratives on social reality through which elements from many 
different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of 
symbolic references that suggests a common understanding” (Hajer 
1995:62). New discourses may alter existing cognitive commitments 
and influence the values and beliefs of individuals, for instance because 
new storylines create new cognitions that may give people a new idea 
about their role and the possibilities for change. The zero vision can be 
seen as a new storyline that frames a particular view of road safety. It 
structures the road safety debate, and important road safety actors have 
to refer to its concepts, arguments and methods to a great extent to 
legitimise action.  
 
As storylines are accepted and more and more people incorporate them, 
they acquire a ritual nature and give permanence to the debate. This is 
easier to achieve if one manages to define change as a symbol of 
modernity with an ideological superstructure. The zero vision is given 
an ideological superstructure in the form of its ethical basis. Hajer 
maintains that the power of discourses is related to how storylines 
pervade networks where policy debates are held and how they are 
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embedded in cultural practices. Bearing this in mind, it will be 
interesting to see if the zero vision storyline pervades the road safety 
networks, and to what extent it has become embedded in cultural 
practices in key road safety organisations.   
 
Hajer points out that although actors share a specific storyline, meaning 
they agree on its basic assumptions, they might interpret the meaning of 
it differently. They may also have their own interests to protect. Even if 
the actors agree that the zero vision is desirable on an ethical basis, they 
may disagree when it comes to how it should be further instantiated. 
The interpretative task of “unwrapping” the zero vision has serious 




3.3.2  Symbolism in political discourse 
 
Symbols are used as tools in communication between human beings. A 
symbol is a visible or linguistic image for abstract concepts, ideas and 
convictions. To understand symbols, we need knowledge about the 
culture in which they appear. Symbols are “collective representations” 
that mean many things at once and different things for different people. 
Symbols are connotative and ambiguous, and hence effective in 
political communication. Symbols elucidate an idea or notion, but 
without being explicit. Eco (1984) believes this is what makes symbols 
so attractive. “What is frequently appreciated in many so-called 
symbols is exactly their vagueness, their openness, their fruitful 
ineffectiveness to express a final meaning.”13 Symbols are often used 
in politics to mobilise groups with conflicting interests.  
 
Political symbols appeal to emotions and are often used in situations 
characterised by crises, conflicts and uncertainties. The anthropologist 
Victor W. Turner (1993) claims that the most potent symbols are two-
fold, blending ideological and emotional aspects. The ideological pole 
refers to the fundamental values and norms society rests upon. The 
emotional pole refers to human experiences with life and death. The 
                                                 
13 In Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992:91. 
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zero vision builds on both ideology and emotions. The ideological pole 
refers to the necessity of preventing deaths. The emotional pole refers 
to the suffering caused by traffic accidents. The zero vision has the 
potential to be an important symbol for road safety and many actors 
probably see it as exactly that – a symbol.  
 
 
3.3.3  Rhetoric and the construction of arguments 
 
When introducing new initiatives, it is important to appear to be 
trustworthy by arguing well. The objective is to organise the perception 
of reality and the experiences of the listeners in a way that renders 
one’s message obvious. Good arguments convey immediate 
understanding, or meaning comes as a result of thought processes that 
are initiated in the listener. The public does not care for obvious 
arguments or arguments that confuse. Hellspong maintains that “a 
political act that does not convince is not a good solution to a problem 
in a democracy” (1995:6). Bearing this in mind, this thesis focuses on 
the extent to which the key road safety actors focus on communicating 
the zero vision to the public. Considering that the public are seen as an 
important partner in the zero vision campaign, one would expect that 
this would be given emphasis. 
 
Throgmorton (1996) points out the importance of studying how 
arguments are constructed, how they are collated with the bigger 
picture and how they have a tendency to cover up or ignore the 
importance of other arguments. To win approval, it is common to argue 
in ways that escape examination. When emphasising support for a 
value, many prefer the strategy of not pitting it against other values. 
The idea is that by focusing on arguments that support the actor’s 
values, without discussing opposing views, it is easier to gain approval.  
 
Asmervik & Hagen (1997) point to the inadequacies of such an 
approach. In a study of the county plan for Oppland, they assert that for 
the plan to be taken seriously, it must point to the more troublesome 
aspects as well, including disagreements and clashes of interest. The 
authors maintain that this is necessary if the rhetorical potential of the 
document is to be utilised. The point made by Asmervik & Hagen is 
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not only valid for documents of this kind but for all new messages that 
seek to persuade and engage, as for instance the zero vision.  
 
Leith & Myerson believe that arguing is not just a matter of putting 
forward a view, but “to speak, or write, in the awareness of a differing 
or opposing view” (1989).14 When such arguments are embedded as 
part of the defense, the standpoint becomes more credible. The zero 
vision can be argued for in the same manner, by pointing out what the 
zero vision can do for road safety, but at the same time underlining its 
negative implications, for instance that it may lead to more restritive 
measures  and that extra efforts in this field may have implications for 
other sectors. The thesis explores how the reasoning for the zero vision 
is balanced between positive and negative arguments. Are there many 




3.3.4  Persuasion and the rhetorical “toolbox” 
 
Political influence comes through communication, which necessitates 
the use of persuasive language. Persuasion is the ability to organise 
people’s perceptions and experiences in ways that make our views and 
plans for action natural, self-evident and desirable. Rhetoric provides a 
“toolbox” with different means to persuade. Aristotle identified three 
types of rhetorical appeal; ethos, logos and pathos (in Barthes 1998). 
Ethos focuses on personality, credibility, authority, trust and the morals 
of the sender. Logos appeals to facts and logical reasoning, while 
pathos refers to the emotions that can be evoked in the public. Ethos, 
logos and pathos correlate to a great extent and they have to be seen in 
relation to each other. Collectively they mark the point of departure for 
all argumentation. Thus, it is of interest to see how the road safety 
actors, when reasoning about the zero vision, utilise ethos, logos and 
pathos. 
 
Ethos arguments supply the sender with credibility. Credibility is 
important for how the message will be received, and can be achieved 
                                                 
14 In Throgmorton 1996:39. 
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through intelligence, moral underpinnings and good will. Ryan (1984) 
points out that a text or an utterance has to give evidence of good moral 
underpinnings for it to be perceived as ethically justifiable. It is 
therefore important that the speaker or the writer show his or her ethical 
values and how these are shared with others. Ethos  arguments also 
express authority. Authority can be used to state that something is in 
the interest of society, without necessarily arguing very strongly in its 
favour. Authority is often linked to knowledge. Bearing this in mind, 
the study looks into the extent to which the PRA uses the organisations 
road-safety authority when arguing for the zero vision.  
 
Logos arguments are connected to logic and facts, and appeal to the 
intelligence of an audience. Such arguments activate the listeners’ 
ability to combine the information they are given and appeals to their 
critical judgment. The purpose is to help the audience draw the “right” 
conclusions and become positive to a subject. For the road authorities, 
it is important to substantiate their ethical underpinnings of the zero 
vision with arguments that convey what the zero vision can contribute 
in practice, for instance, being explicit about which measures will be in 
focus when complying with the zero vision. 
 
Pathos arguments build on the listeners’ emotions, for instance by 
referring to a positive image of the future. An appeal to feelings based 
on such universal values as justice, moral underpinnings and human 
compassion may also convince the audience. For the zero vision, for 
example, one could underscore its benefits to society. When a politician 
addresses the public by referring to the human suffering caused by 
traffic accidents, this is an example of the use of pathos. Focusing on 
pathos is a natural approach when dealing with traffic fatalities and 
injuries. There is no reason to object to emotional arguments. Rhetoric 
acknowledges all arguments under the condition that they are suitably 
based on the communication process (Jørgensen 1985). As Hellspong 
(1995) sees it, the value orientation that pathos arguments open for is 
necessary in order to assert our problem solving outwards and to gain 
acceptance. However, if pathos arguments dominate, it is natural to ask 
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3.3.5  Metaphors, analogies and change 
 
Eloquence can be an inventive factor, and a desire for change is often 
seen through the use of metaphors. Johnson & Lakoff (1980) point out 
the cognitive meaning of metaphors and the role metaphors play when 
it comes to understanding. A metaphor can be effective because it 
clarifies a subject in a fresh and powerful way, is open to many 
interpretations, establishes new connections and may lead to new 
understanding and change. Metaphors can be creative and liberating for 
political thinking. Because of its innovative force, the metaphor is often 
seen as the most important form of figurative speech. A metaphor that 
is often used about the zero vision is that it represents a “guiding star.” 
This has associations with how people at sea found their destination in 
earlier times. Moreover, it directs our attention to the concepts of 
guidance and star, both associated with something very positive.  
 
One strategy that has much in common with metaphors is the use of 
analogies, drawing parallels to other contexts or events and claiming 
kinship between them. The authorities do this when they compare the 
zero vision to the Working Environment Act and to other parts of the 
transport sector. A more colourful analogy is introduced by Tingvall & 
Lie (1997). They contrast the zero vision with the American decision in 
the early 1960s to send a man to the moon within ten years. At the time 
of the decision, the cost and technological demands were unknown. 
Nonetheless, the dream was achieved. In the same way, Tingvall & Lie 
maintain, the cost of achieving zero traffic fatalities and permanent 
injuries is more or less unknown, but we have the advantage of 
knowing more about the technological demands. What is lacking is a 
similar commitment from the politicians with respect to investments. 
Implicit in the reasoning is that if this commitment were present, it 
would be easier to attain the zero vision in road traffic than it was to 
place a man on the moon.  
 
The analogy between the lunar landing and the zero vision is 
introduced to create a connection between the Utopian dream, sending 
a man to the moon, and the Utopian dream (as many see it) of 
achieving a zero vision in road traffic. The analogy is used to 
emphasise the inherent value of the zero vision and the possibility of 
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change following in its wake. When launching a policy like the zero 
vision, which is supposed to initiate change, it would thus be natural to 
think that metaphors and analogies would be used to bolster the change 
perspective of the zero vision. It will be interesting to see how these 
rhetorical figures of speech are utilised by the road safety actors.  
 
 
3.3.6  Focus on values and intention  
 
Heradstveit & Bjørgo (1992) claim that in politics, rhetoric is primarily 
connected to a battle between values. Politics is more often a question 
of attitudes and values than of knowledge and facts. It is not unusual 
that the expressive side is given more attention than the effective side. 
Another way of saying this is that in politics rhetoric is mainly in the 
ethos and pathos mode, with not as much logos. Political language is 
often characterised by a floating semantic structure. It is common to 
use words without a fixed meaning to better facilitate  for evasions at a 
later stage. A skilful rhetorician often plays on a calculated ambiguity 
instead of saying things in clear terms (Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992). 
This might involve statements that are always true, or impossible to 
disagree with.  
 
Torgersen (1993) points out that in politics there is often a bias towards 
focusing on intention. The political task is often defined as a 
responsibility for conveying intentionality, where it is important to 
express certain values. Take the zero vision as an example. It is 
difficult to prove that a vision of zero deaths and zero permanent 
injuries is realistic. According to Torgersen, what is often done in such 
cases is to highlight the premise that the listeners are expected to agree 
on. If a certain value is seen as important in the population, it is easier 
to convince the population by using ideas and images that identify these 
values with what is suggested.  
 
The premise for the zero vision is its ethical necessity. In Norway, 
where ethics is seen as an important value, an effective strategy is 
probably to place a sharp focus on aspects that highlight this value. The 
thesis examines the extent to which the actors focus on intention and 
73 
Rhetorical Discourse    
the ethical necessity of the zero vision compared to the operational 
aspects of the vision.  
 
 
3.3.7  Concepts and conceptual change 
 
Politics can be seen as a struggle for discursive hegemony where actors 
try to secure support for their definition of reality (Hajer 1995). One 
way to do this is to become master of interpretation and define the 
order of the day. Having the power to define what a concept should or 
should not contain to a great extent determines the agenda. Thus, the 
design and definition of new initiatives are closely related to power. By 
incorporating certain aspects and excluding others, the future course is 
plotted.  
 
Political discourse characteristically consists of concepts whose 
meaning are not agreed upon by citizen speakers (Ball 1988). 
According to Ball, such concepts can be seen as “contested” if they 
have no single definition or criterion of application upon which all 
parties agree. In other words, many concepts fall into this category. 
Whether concepts are contested or not depends on the political and 
social climate. Based on their political importance, some concepts are 
seen as worth disputing while others are not. Concepts that define 
future paths are often contested. Considering that the zero vision 
determines the future path of road safety, there is reason to believe that 
the concept is contested among the road safety actors. The thesis aims 
to ascertain whether this is indeed the case. 
 
Rawls (1993) distinguishes between “concepts” and “conceptions”. 
According to Rawls, the concept is the meaning of a term, while the 
conception includes the principles required to apply it.15 People may 
agree on the meaning of a concept, but have different conceptions of it 
because they emphasise different things when applying it. People may 
for example agree on the concept “zero vision” but still have highly 
different conceptions of it.  
 
                                                 
15 In Langhelle 2000. 
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Johnson & Lakoff maintain that “changes in our conceptual system 
change what is real for us and affect how we perceive the world and act 
upon those perceptions” (1980:145). If the zero vision has penetrated 
the conceptual system of the key road safety actors, it is likely that the 
zero vision has changed how the actors see road safety. However, if the 
zero vision remains “just” a new concept, it is not likely that it has 
resulted in any changes in this respect. Most likely it varies to what 
extent the zero vision has been conceptualised among actors, and an 
important aim of the thesis is to see how this materialises among the 
actors.   
 
 
3.3.8  Concrete, vague and ideological concepts 
 
Langhelle (2000) has studied the concept of “sustainable development”. 
It is common to view this concept as imprecise and unsuitable as a 
point of departure for concrete policies. Langhelle argues that the 
concept may have become part of the political language precisely 
because it is imprecise and non-binding. The similarities between 
sustainable development and the zero vision are clear. Both are abstract 
rhetorical expressions of a better future, highly ideological and well 
intended, but at the same time vague and non-binding.  
 
Ramírez (2000) divides concepts into three main categories: concrete, 
vague and ideological. Concrete concepts are unambiguous and well-
defined, and represent material things and nature-bound phenomena. 
Such concepts are measurable and formed in relation to the objective 
sides of reality. This gives rise to an accumulative knowledge system 
that we can give an account of in precise terms. Such concepts 
correspond with apodictic and assertoric knowledge as mentioned 
above.  
 
Vague concepts are ones that we cannot take literally. Different 
interpretations have to be fitted to the context. The result is competing 
knowledge systems where different interpretations compete as to which 
is the “right” interpretation. Vague concepts have similarities with 
symbols, but they lack the persuasive ability that often characterises 
symbols. Vague concepts have to be broken down into other terms 
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depending on the situation. This should take place in an open 
discussion with interested parties, where words are linked to action 
through action-oriented clarifications. I suspect that such forums are 
rarely formed. 
 
The third group comprises ideological concepts. Ideological concepts 
are vague concepts with an additional value dimension. Ideological 
concepts are often used in politics to invoke positive associations. 
Under closer scrutiny, ideological concepts often lack informative 
value. They often describe an ideal, or Utopian and unattainable state. 
As Ramírez (2002) sees it, such concepts often represent wishful 
thinking. Their value depends on the specifications they can inspire in 
terms of concrete action. According to Ramírez, ideological concepts 
that are not operationalised are inapplicable for action plans.  
 
The zero vision in itself is both a vague and ideological concept. It can 
be seen as an ideological abstraction about which one can speak in an 
ostensibly universal voice. The zero vision is said to imply this and 
that, but as a point of departure, it is little more than an idea about a 
transport system where no one is killed or permanently injured. Beyond 
this, the actors need to define the zero vision into the existing work, and 
every definition involves its own interpretation. A lot can be put into 
the zero vision, and that is perhaps its weakness. This resembles what 
Wildavsky (1973) has said about planning, “if planning is everything, 
maybe it is nothing”. For the zero vision, it is tempting to paraphrase 
this by asking: “If the zero vision is everything, maybe it is nothing”?  
 
Ramírez (2000) contends that concepts that describe a future state often 
become blurred and lead to an abstract reasoning that is difficult to 
associate with a practical reality. The abstract versus concrete 
dichotomy is a key element in the thesis. By keeping the zero vision on 
an abstract level, the actors may evade the conflicts that will arise when 
it is instantiated. The actors might find this beneficiary, as it gives them 
more leeway. When the zero vision is instantiated, conflicting interests 
and competing goals come to the fore. This may generate uncertainty 
for the parties involved. When guidelines are not instantiated to 
challenge the existing work, they remain largely impotent. Using 
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Ramírez’s theories (2000), I examine the use of vague and ideological 
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4. Power  
 
This chapter is based on a selection of theory on power that are found 
relevant in addressing the research questions, especially the questions 
concerning inter-organisational cooperation and conflicting interests in 
complying with the zero vision. When the zero vision is instantiated, it 
challenges goals competing with safety and different interests in 
organisations, which in turn impedes the realisation of the radical 
commitments implicit in the vision.  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. First different features and 
dimensions of power are examined. Then power is viewed in a 
planning perspective. In part two, I illustrate why power is important 
when studying policies like the zero vision. The following topics are 
examined: discourse coalitions, sources of power and disparity between 
actors, rationality and power, how stable relations are preferred to 
antagonistic confrontations, the quality of power to maintain the status 
quo and reforms and barriers to implementation. Several problems for 




4.1 INTRODUCTION TO POWER 
 
In the thesis, power is viewed in a structural and dynamic perspective 
that deals with how power is distributed among actors, what interests 
actors seek to realise, which processes emerge and what the results are 
when different interests are challenged. The thesis first and foremost 
studies the power relation between the key road safety actors: the PRA, 
the Police and Safer Driving.  
 
 
4.1.1  Features of power 
 
Power is a versatile term that can be viewed from many angles and with 
different perspectives. Giddens emphasises the role of power in the 
constitution of society and the important role of power in the discourse 
of reflective social agents. “There is no more elemental concept than 
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that of power … Power is the means of getting things done and, as 
such, directly implied in human action” (1984:283). According to 
Giddens, power means having real influence and setting the agenda, 
being part of decision making and getting things implemented, and 
being able to dictate what to communicate and what not to 
communicate.  
 
Power can be defined as the ability to achieve one’s goal despite the 
will and interests of other actors. Power is not  the same as freedom 
because contrasts to the interests of other is an integral part of the 
concept of power. A person may have little power but great freedom if 
his or her goals do not clash with the goals of others. Power also has to 
be separated from authority. Authority makes it possible to reach goals 
against other’s interests without going against their will. Authority has 
an element of legitimacy that is not found in power. The strength of 
authority was pointed out in the previous chapter.  
 
 
4.1.2  Dimensions of power 
 
Dahl defines power as a “relation between social actors in which one 
social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B 
would not otherwise have done” (1957:202). This one-dimensional 
view of power “involves a focus on behavior in the making of decisions 
on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) 
interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political 
participation” (Lukes 2005:19). What matters from this perspective is 
to analyse observable conflicts over concrete political issues. Lukes 
(2005) contends that power is always out in the open, as implied in the 
one-dimensional view.  
 
Bachrach and Barantz (1970) criticise the behavioural focus of the one-
dimensional view, claiming that it does not take into account that 
“power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of 
decisions to relatively ‘safe’ issues” (1970:6).16 In their two-
dimensional view of power, the authors bring the idea of the 
                                                 
16 In Lukes 2005:22. 
80 
Power   
“mobilisation of bias” into the discussion. Mobilisation of bias is “a set 
of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures ... 
that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain 
persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are 
placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested 
interests” (1970:43).17 The two-dimensional view points to the forces 
that prevent potentially controversial issues from generating 
“observable conflicts.” In order to grasp this dimension, it is important 
to identify issues that non-decision making keeps off the agenda. 
 
Lukes considers the two-dimensional view of power to be a step in the 
right direction. However, he objects to the idea of non-decision making 
as a form of decision making. According to Lukes, the crucial point of 
power is to prevent conflict from arising in the first place. “Is it not the 
supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances, by shaping their perceptions, 
cognition and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in 
the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no 
alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or 
because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?” (2005:28).  
 
The three-dimensional view allows for “considerations of the ways in 
which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the 
operation of social forces and institutional practices or through 
individual decision” (Lukes 2005:28). According to Lukes, this can 
occur in the absence of an actual, observable conflict, which may have 
been successfully averted. This is interesting in light of the zero vision. 
If there are few observable conflicts in the road safety campaign, it 
could be that these are averted in ways described by Lukes.  
 
 
4.1.3  Power in a planning perspective  
 
Three theories are often highlighted when it comes to planning: 
instrumental rationality, communicative rationality and rationality and 
power.  
                                                 
17 In Lukes 2005:21. 
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Banfield (1959) outlines the instrumental ideal by emphasising that 
planning is the process by which we select a course of action for the 
attainment of ends. Although planning is rarely that streamlined, the 
rationality of such planning is often an ideal. In the communicative 
ideal, the goal is to get all the parties with an interest in a case involved 
from the outset. An exchange of ideas and opinions follows, where the 
“best” argument wins. Aven et al. (2004) believe planning based on the 
communicative ideal can succeed if power is equally distributed 
between actors, and if the actors welcome the changes in new 
initiatives. The communicative ideal considers to a limited extent that 
planning takes place in the face of power, and that power is present in 
deliberations on important crossroads in society.      
 
Instrumental rationality and communicative rationality are met with 
critisism because they downplay how conflicts of interests and power 
relations impede the possibility of translating such ideals into practice. 
Everyone going from plan to action has to take into account that 
conflicts of interest arise, and that the process might be colored by the 
most powerful actors.  
 
I adhere to a third approach to planning, rationality and power. This 
approach can be linked to Flyvbjerg. Flyvbjerg (1998)18 focuses on the 
dynamics of rationality and power in democratic societies. According 
to him, power defines and creates concrete physical, economic, 
ecological and social realities. The dialogue in such a context is 
characterised by non-rational rhetoric and protection of interests, and 




4.2 POWER AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
 
Within a discourse, some interpretations, utterances and actions are 
natural, while others are seen as unthinkable. The discourse confines 
the limits of what is permissible. In this way all the members of a 
                                                 
18 I have used the translated version from 1998. The original version “Rationalitet og 
magt” [Rationality and power] was published in 1991. 
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discourse contribute to sustaining the power structure of it. The view of 
a division between the oppressor and the oppressed is replaced by an 
understanding of the dynamics and social interaction which makes 
political and cultural change possible. Vigar maintains that “even 
though the existence and prevalence of particular discourses cannot 
directly be equated with power, they convey meaning and highlight, or 
imply, where power lies and what might be necessary to change policy 
direction” (2002:18).  
 
 
4.2.1 Discourse coalitions 
 
A key concept in Hajer’s study is “discourse coalitions”. The 
emergence of new discourses may “alter the individual perception of 
problems and possibilities and thus create space for the formation of 
new, unexpected political coalitions” (Hajer 1995:59). Storylines play 
an essential role in the creation of “discourse coalitions” between actors 
in a domain. Discourse coalitions develop and sustain a particular 
discourse, a particular way of talking about politics. As pointed out 
above, the zero vision can be seen as a new discourse in the road safety 
campaign - a new way of talking about road safety. The zero vision 
opens for new discourse coalitions. The thesis seeks to unravel if the 
zero vision has affected the relationship between central actors, and if 
new discourse coalitions have emerged.  
 
 
4.2.2 Sources of power and disparity between actors 
 
When studying power, it is important to discover how sources of power 
are distributed between actors. Morgan (1986) highlights legitimacy, 
resources, knowledge and position as important sources of power. As 
highlighted in the introductory chapter, there is great disparity between 
the key road safety actors. The disparity is not limited to the factors 
mentioned by Morgan, but to different values and interests, size, real 
influence and tradition. This suggests that power is unevenly 
distributed between the actors. The power relations are asymmetrical. 
One question is what impact the zero vision has had on this, and 
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furthermore, to what extent this gives rise to inter-organisational 
conflict.  
 
Foucault (1983)19 points out that power in the modern society is 
increasingly allied with discipline-specific “knowledges” consisting of 
specialised skills, techniques and schemes of classification. A system is 
created in which power and knowledge are inseperable. To draw a 
parallel to road safety, the PRA is arguably the most powerful actor. 
Even if not everyone in the PRA works directly with road safety, they 
still have a different manpower situation compared to the Police and 
Safer Driving. In many ways, they dominate the road safety arena. 
Informants from the PRA may see it as the actor with most knowledge 
about road safety, and hence as the most important actor in the road 
safety efforts. It will be interesting to see if this is expressed in the 
interviews.  
 
In a study of how road safety work is organised in counties and 
municipalities, Berg & Olsen (2005) point out that professional 
agreements concerning measures and responsibility, and who is to 
receive honour for different undertakings, contribute to good relations. 
Conflicts may arise if one organisation is skilful in marketing the 
organisation, without mentioning other contributors. This may be 
perceived of as “going behind the back” of other actors. The study shed 
light on whether the division of roles in the road safety efforts are 
unclear, and on the role of the zero vision in this context. Unclear roles 
may lead to conflicts over who does what when it comes to road safety.  
 
 
4.2.3  Rationality and power 
 
Flyvbjerg (1998) focuses on the dynamics of rationality, power and 
democracy. He shows that rationality is dependent upon context, that 
the context of rationality often is power and that power blurs the line 
between rationality and rationalisation. Power defines, and creates 
concrete physical, economic, ecological and social realities. The 
dialogue in this context is characterised by non-rational rhetoric and 
                                                 
19 In Ball 1988. 
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protection of interests, not consensus-seeking through rational 
arguments. Flyvbjerg believes the asymmetrical relationship between 
rationality and power represents a basic weakness of democracy.  
 
Rationality in a given context is produced by the participants of a given 
discourse. Rationality is linked to the sensible, while rationalisation is 
linked to the justifiable. What is justifiable is not necessarily sensible. 
Rationality can be thought of as the facade, while rationalisation is the 
hidden forces governing it. Rationalisation presented as rationality is a 
common strategy in the exercise of power. Flyvbjerg believes the 
freedom to use these terms pell-mell is a key element in the rationality 
of power and in defining “reality”. The absence of rational arguments 
and documentation may be a sign that someone is trying to rationalise a 
given subject.  
 
The zero vision is often criticised because it does not deal with rational 
arguments for why a zero vision is beneficiary. How would you react if 
someone confronted you a zero vision and asked you to reason for it? 
What if you were unable to arrive at any good arguments for why the 
zero vision was appropriate, only that it sounds good? In such a case, 
many turn to rationalising strategies, especially if they are occupying 
positions of power. The greater the power, the less the rationality, 
according to Flyvbjerg. If you cannot make something sensible, then 
make it justifiable. The point is that actors who are in positions of 
power may argue their case without using what others see as rational 
arguments. Such strategies are often easy to spot, and one aim of the 
thesis is to identify cases where rationalising strategies come into play.  
 
 
4.2.4  Stable relations are preferred to antagonistic 
confrontations 
 
Flyvbjerg (1998) points out that stable power relations are more 
common than antagonism and open confrontation, just as peace is more 
common than war. Confrontations are actively avoided, and when they 
surface, they are usually quickly transformed back to stable relations. 
What is implied by stable power relations is that there are no visible 
conflicts among actors. It could of course be that there are latent 
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conflicts, or that conflicts are kept off the agenda, as described, in 
relation to different dimensions of power.  
 
When confrontations surface, rationality becomes inferior to power. 
Because the exercise of power is more efficient than arguments based 
on reason, power-to-power relations dominate and arguments based on 
reason are ascribed little or no weight. Reason is often completely 
surpassed in open confrontations because the power entity has optimal 
conditions to exercise power. Because rationality has to give way to 
power in open confrontations, the power of rationality – the penetrating 
force of reason, is not found here. Rationality is found in stable 
relations characterised by negotiation and consensus seeking.  
 
Decisions based on rationality are on the basis of reason and thereby 
achieve a greater legitimacy than decisions based on the exercise of 
power. It is therefore in the interest of rationality that relations remain 
stable, as this gives legitimacy to the power of rationality. This leaves 
an impression of rationality as fragile and in need of being secured 
through strategies seeking to eliminate the exercise of power. The road 
safety actors are used to working together and probably have an 
understanding that they are better served by avoiding confrontations. 
The discourse between the key road safety actors has become 
routinised, and routinised forms of discourse “express the continous 
power relationship that is particularly effective because it avoids 
confrontation” (Hajer 1995:57). Bearing this in mind, there may be 
grounds to assume that the level of confrontation is kept to a minimum 
in the road safety work.  
 
 
4.2.5  Reforms and institutional identity 
 
Brunsson & Olsen (1990) focus on reforms in organisations. They see 
reforms as changes in an organisation’s structures and methods adopted 
to achieve better behavior and results. Studies of reform processes may 
give insight into who has power over meaning and how democratic this 
process is. The authors find that the tasks of an organisation may be 
redefined through a process characterised by sloagans and symbols, but 
without this having an affect on structures and processes in the 
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organisations. In such cases, attempts to reform a structure may be 
interpreted as a form of public education. By showing a willingness to 
readjust and act in the interest of the common good, it might be easier 
to achieve support. This might explain why attempts to reform occur 
even if they have little influence on structures and processes.  
 
The zero vision can be regarded as an attempt to reform the road safety 
campaign in the sense that it represents changes in the methods used to 
combat traffic accidents. On the other hand, the zero vision could also 
primarily be a symbol for the future, as Brunsson & Olsen (1990) 
maintain is common with “new reforms”. To elucidate this aspect, the 
thesis studies how informants from important road safety organisations 
see organisational change following the zero vision. One important 
question here is if the zero vision has had an effect on processes and 
structures in the organisations.  
 
How people in organisations react to changes depends on how changes 
correspond with the organisation’s institutional identity. Reforms that 
represent a break with an organisation’s identity demand a considerable 
concentration of power. This raises the question of whether  or not the 
zero vision breaks with the institutional identity of the key actors. As 
mentioned above, Safer Driving was sceptical to the zero vision at the 
outset because of its physical orientation. It could be argued that the 
strong focus on infrastructure breaks with the identity of Safer Driving. 
As time has past, this has evidently not turned out to be a major issue as 
the road users have allegedly been incorporated in the zero vision. The 
thesis focuses on  how the actors see this, particularly respondens from 
Safer Driving. 
 
At the same time as informants from Safer Driving may feel that the 
zero vision breaks with their identity, respondents from the PRA may 
find that the zero vision strengthens theirs. Elvebakk & Steiro (2005) 
believe the zero vision may provide employees in the PRA with a new 
understanding of their role in society, a re-interpretation of their tasks 
that can be advantageous internally as well as externally. “Externally, it 
gives their demands for more resources a new ethical momentum; 
internally, Vision Zero can lead to a self-understanding as an 
organisation dedicated to saving lives, rather than merely maintaining 
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the road system” (2005:5). The consequence might be that the PRA 
seeks to take on more tasks relating to road safety, and that this spurs a 
desire to redefine their role in road safety.  
 
 
4.2.6  Impediments to implementation 
 
Brunsson & Olsen (1990) point to the lack of precise goals, conflicting 
goals, lack of knowledge, lack of power and legitimacy, and the values 
and attitudes of the implementing actors as factors that might impede a 
decision making process. The zero vision lacks precise goals, and there 
are also several competing goals. Furthermore, the values and interests 
of the key actors differ, which again makes it difficult to achieve 
legitimacy for proposed action. Even if there is much knowledge about 
road safety among the key actors, there are several factors that make it 
difficult to reach decisions on intensifying the road safety efforts. 
 
Solheim has analysed how realistic the the implementation of the zero 
vision is, not just as an ethical imperative, but as a practical and 
political action programme (1999A). Solheim concludes that no 
measure is problem-free in its implementation. Measures that encounter 
wide public resistance, measures that no one has direct interest in and 
measures that challenge values and interests in organisations are 
especially difficult to implement. According to Solheim (1999B), it is 
easier to implement a measure when it is based on clear and consistent 
goals than when the goals are unclear or when there are conflicting 
goals. Solheim (1999B) believes it is important to cooperate on 
measures that unite different interests. Absolute politics, like the zero 
vision, can fortify power positions and undermine the basis for 
discussion. 
 
According to Solheim (1999A), most measures conflict with other 
goals. Immediately, measures to reduce speed limits result in conflicts 
with mobility and environmental goals. With the greater significance 
given to safety in compliance with the zero vision, the thesis focuses on 
the extent to which the key actors’ find that the vision has led to a 
change where mobility is willingly traded for safety. The thesis also 
explores if safety considerations are placed before the environment. 
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Economic efficiency is a goal that may conflict with road safety. One 
would think that the enhanced focus on safety has implications for the 
economic efficiency of road building projects. The thesisaims to reveal 
the opinions of the ley actors on this point. When it comes to such 
measures as intilligent speed adaptation (ISA) and breathalyzers, it 
could be argued that such measures conflict with the goal of individual 
freedom. The thesis focuses on the extent to which individual freedom 
is maintained as a goal by the key actors, and furthermore, how the zero 
vision has affected this.  
 
Van Meter & Van Horn (1975) believe the realism of a given 
implementation process can be attributed to the degree of implicit 
change, and to the extent to which there is agreement on the goals. 
Policies with little change and solid agreement stand the best chance. 
This begs the question of whether the zero vision represents little 
change, and if there is agreement about it. Implicit in this is that the 
more the zero vision is instantiated in terms of actual change, the more 
difficult it will become to ensure implementation. When the zero vision 
is instantiated through new policies, it will challenge goals competing 
with road safety. This will probably impede further realisation of the 
zero vision. Having said this, the fact that there is solid agreement on 
the goals counts in favour of implementation, if by this we mean a 
marked reduction in traffic fatalities.   
 
 
4.2.7  Conserving the status quo 
 
If one party wins through with their view, this might effectively end the 
controversy on the issue. Hajer (1995) asks how actors can secure the 
reproduction of their discursive position in the case of a controversy. 
Power involves the opportunity to freeze meaning. This is done by 
repeating specific representations of things, actions and identities until 
a presentation appears obvious, and then continue to repeat it to keep 
other representations from suppressing it. If one actor in the road safety 
campaign wants to “end the controversy” on how the zero vision should 
be interpreted, this could be done by using such a strategy. Considering 
that the PRA raised the zero vision to the political level, it would be 
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most plausible to assume that this is a strategy utilised by the PRA 
rather than the other key actors.  
 
Neumann (2001) asks why so many practices remain the same over 
time. Could it be because they are an effect of a system of self-
preservation, where the inertia of discourse favours existing practices 
and complicates the introduction of new ones? This is interesting in 
light of the zero vision, where there are signs indicating that it is a case 
of business as usual, without much attention being given to the the zero 
vision’s radical measures. This may be due to the concern that 
disagreements may arise due to the conflicting interests of different 
parties. Are there forces in the road safety environment and in political 
circles that want to preserve the zero vision in its present form? If this 





4.3 SUMMARY OF RHETORIC AND POWER 
 
The theoretical approach has focused on the close ties between 
discourse analysis and rhetoric. The discourse analysis investigates 
different portrayals of either spoken or written statements. A study of 
rhetoric investigates the statements and examines how language is used 
to convey meaning.  
 
Chapter 4 has focused on the importance of power in relation to new 
policies such as the zero vision. To understand planning and its 
possibilities, we have to consider the values and interests of different 
actors. If there are major conflicts and the power relations are skewed, 
the effect of policies might not satisfy intentions. The policy may come 
off as a symbolic exercise with limited outlook to intensified action, 
and not as an instrument for consensus and collaboration. 
 
The theoretical chapters have introduced several problems for 
discussion based on the presented theory. Some of the problems that 
will be interesting to examine in more detail are summarised in this 
chapter, structured around the three main perspectives of the thesis. 
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1) Exploring how the zero vision is conceptualised and instantiated 
by key actors with respect to implicit change 
 
• One interesting question is how the zero vision is instantiated 
and conceptualised by the key actors. It is plausible to assume 
that this varies among the actors, and as the zero vision is a 
contested concept, the various actors will disagree on what the 
concept entails. One key focus is how the road safety actors 
argue for the vision. Are mainly positive arguments that praise 
the zero vision used, or are arguments that discredit the zero 
vision also heard?  
 
• The study looks into how the zero vision pervades road safety 
networks and the extent to which it is embedded in the cultural 
practices of important organisations. Is the zero vision talked 
about much among the actors, and has the zero vision created an 
institutional identity in the organisations? It will be interesting 
to see how the public is included in the zero vision storyline 
considering that one of the cornerstones of the zero vision is “a 
shared responsibility”. 
 
• The thesis sheds light on how metaphors and analogies are used 
when arguing for the zero vision; as it is intended to imply 
changes in the road safety efforts. As such, one would expect 
that rhetorical figures linked to change would be beneficiary. 
The focus is also on concrete, vague and ideological concepts. 
Widespread use of vague and ideological concepts could be an 
indication that the zero vision is primarily an abstract notion 
with limited outlook for intensified action.  
 
 
2) Examining the role of inter-organisational relations and 
conflicting interests after the introduction of the zero vision 
 
• The thesis focuses on the relationship between the key actors. 
One question is what effect the zero vision has had on these 
relations. If the zero vision has resulted in major changes, the 
relationships have probably changed. If, on the other hand, the 
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zero vision remains an abstract notion, the relationships may be 
more or less unaffected. When it comes to inter-organisational 
relations, it will be interesting to examine if the zero vision has 
given birth to new discourse coalitions, or if things are much the 
same as before.  
 
• The important road safety actors differ considerably in size, 
tradition and focus. Thus, the power basis between these actors 
is highly asymmetrical. The thesis highlights how this affects 
road safety, and examines if the zero vision has had a bearing 
on this. The study aims to find disputes connected to the 
division of roles. Do actors agree about who does what in the 
road safety work, and if not, does this lead to open 
confrontations?  
 
• The PRA is the dominant actor in the road safety campaign, and 
also the actor with the most power. The study sheds light on the 
extent to which the PRA uses its road safety authority when 
arguing for its cases. Does the rationality of power surpass the 
power of rationality, and are rationalising strategies used in the 
reasoning? Based on the position of the PRA and the fact that 
the zero vision was initiated by it, the thesis asks if it also uses 
the zero vision as a repositioning tool.  
 
 
3) Assessing the political impact of the zero vision and how it 
challenges other goals besides safety 
 
• Considering that the zero vision is said to represent a change 
where safety is the first priority, this necessarily has 
implications for other goals in the transport sector. How 
informants view goals that are competing with the safety goals 
and what effect the zero vision has on this will also reveal how 
anchored the zero vision is among the key actors. The 
competing goals examined in this connection are mobility, the 
environment, financing and individual freedom. It could be said 
that the less change ascribed to the relationship between 
competing goals, the less change ascribed to the zero vision.   
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• The political impact on road safety is important, and it will be 
interesting to see how key actors refer to the role of politicians 
when it comes to road safety. There are many factors that 
determine the success of new policies. One very important 
criterion is to secure support from politicians. The politicians 
have adopted the zero vision as the new strategy in the road 
safety efforts, but what about its implications?  
 
• When it comes to implementing the zero vision and its radical 
measures, the thesis focuses on how the key actors feel about 
this. If there are forces in the political circles or in the road 
safety environment that are trying to keep the zero vision in its 
present abstract form, the zero vision could be more stationary 
than visionary.  
 
There are a number of interesting questions derived from the theory. 
These questions will be returned to in the empirical chapters. In the 




Methodological Reflections                                                    
5. Methodological Reflections 
 
There is a dividing line between qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. The terms first and foremost refer to the characteristics of the 
data that are collected and analysed. There are many ways of 
conducting qualitative research and the methods are technically quite 
different. What they have in common is that verbal expressions are 
emphasised at the expense of numerical descriptions, as in quantitative 
methods. Qualitative research methods focus on a few occurrences and 
investigate these thoroughly. The selection is not representative as in 
quantitative research, which means it is not possible to draw substantial 
inferences. 
 
Before deciding on the methodological approach, it is important to 
answer the following questions: What do I want an answer to? How can 
it be answered? What information do I need? How can the information 
be obtained? Bearing the focus of the thesis in mind, it is natural to 
adopt a qualitative research approach. The empirical basis for the study 
is in-depth and semi-structured interviews with key actors in the road 
safety campaign, and document analysis, mainly of the most important 




5.1 APPROACHING THE FIELD OF STUDY 
 
When performing research in a field, there are two things to be 
particularly aware of: the prior experience with the field and the 
dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. 
 
 
5.1.1  Prior experience 
 
Researchers always approach their field of study with some form of 
background information. It is neither desirable nor possible to approach 
questions in society without some form of prior understanding. This 
understanding is based on experiences, expectations and theoretical 
assumptions about the field. Objectivity is impossible since we have to 
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confront the world from some perspective, and because the questions 
we pose about the world, our theories and hypotheses, have to come 
from assumptions that are part of this perspective. Our prior 
understanding influences what we look for and what we direct our 
attention on. It is still important to acknowledge the basis for the 
knowledge produced, explain our position and prior understanding of 
the field, where we stand in relation to what is studied, which rules we 
follow and what the consequences of our contribution to the discursive 
production might be. 
 
The first time I heard about the zero vision was in a risk and reliability 
course in 2000. I went on to write my Master’s thesis on the subject, 
studying the rhetoric in important government documents: the National 
Transport Plan, the Strategy Plan and the National Action Plan. In 
addition to examining what these documents said about the zero vision, 
studying the documents also gave me deep insight into transport 
questions in general. I have taken the lessons learned from this work 
with me into my doctoral study. My Master’s thesis has to some extent 
determined the direction of the doctoral study, the focus on language 
and change due to the zero vision. Inter-organisational cooperation, 
conflicting interests, competing goals and the intervention of politicians 
in road safety were all recognised as interesting topics for further study 
in my thesis. In the doctoral study, I have the opportunity to pursue 
these issues further.   
 
 
5.1.2  Is there a way out of subjectivity? 
 
The dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity is important, 
especially considering the scientific backdrop of the study. Social 
constructionism is often accused of taking too lenient a position on this. 
Foucault (1972) asserts that traditional history tries to keep a distance 
between the researcher and the subject of research to avoid subjectivity. 
Some authors have used mechanisms to counteract subjectivity in 
research. Haraway (1997) suggests that researchers should, 
metaphorically speaking, place themselves in brackets. I believe this 
reveals a naïve view of how research is and has to be conducted. 
Moreover, using brackets as a metaphor for the researcher’s ability to 
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avoid subjectivity is misleading. Even if the author “manages” to stay 
within the brackets, the brackets are also influential. 
 
According to Foucault (1972), research is not a collection of objective 
events, but a process characterised by understanding and explanation 
where the researcher will never be able to create a product that is 
completely impartial. The most constructive approach to research is to 
acknowledge this from the outset. Foucault encourages subjectivity in 
research, thus deliberately seeking proximity to the centre of events. 
The closer one gets to the centre, the greater the understanding, 
Foucault contends. According to Foucault, the notion of objectivity and 
truth should be rejected. Instead the distance between the observer and 
the observed event should be shortened. The researchers own beliefs 
should be incorporated in the story. In the objectivity versus 
subjectivity debate, I adhere to Foucault’s view, and this explains why I 
have chosen to incorporate my own views and interpretations when 
dealing with the empirical findings.  
 
A researcher is never just a fly on the wall that can see things as they 
are. A researcher creates reality at the same time as he or she depicts it. 
Even if a researcher is aware of this and adopts reflexive approaches, 
he or she will never achieve a transparent state. The project in a 
discourse analysis can be seen as continuous argumentation for the 
probability of interpretations. Interpretations of texts and discourses can 
never become final, but they can become more or less plausible. There 
is no inconsistency in acknowledging that language construes 
perceptions of reality, or in claiming that some perceptions correspond 
better with a perceived reality. 
 
One issue relevant to this discussion is that I have been employed by 
the PRA since the summer of 2006. This has given me the opportunity 
to work on road safety issues and participate in interesting discussions 
with skilled colleagues. It could be claimed then that this colours my 
descriptions of the zero vision and the actors involved in the road safety 
efforts. But it is important to remember that all the interviews were 
conducted prior to this employment. Moreover, the material was 
extracted from the interviews long before I started working in the PRA. 
Thus, the material studied in the empirical chapters (Chapters 6 to 8) is 
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from work undertaken in 2005. Hence, I do not see my employment in 




5.2 INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
 
This section gives an account of different considerations concerning the 
interview analysis. I explain why the thesis is limited to a focus on 
particular actors, and on what basis respondents have been selected. I 
explain how the interview guide has been developed, how the data have 
been analysed and what challenges and advantages I have had in 
conducting the personal interviews. 
 
 
5.2.1  Selecting organisations and respondents 
 
The PRA, the Police and Safer Driving are generally seen as the most 
important road safety actors. The main focus in the thesis is on them. 
Moreover, I focus on the Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
as the long arm of the PRA. I also focus on the Norwegian Automobile 
Association (NAF), the largest consumer interest organisation for 
transport-policy questions in Norway (and Scandinavia). On the 
regional and local level, the county administrations, local authorities 
and volunteer organisations are important actors. Interviews with 
informants from one county administration are used to expand on other 
findings. The county administration is interesting because of its role as 
an executive body at the regional level. During the test interviews I 
conducted one interview in a municipality. The data from this interview 
is not used in the study, as I decided to focus more on the central 
organisations. This is also the reason why I have excluded volunteer 
organisations from the study.  
 
Respondents were selected according to position and responsibility. 
Organisational charts were used to pinpoint respondents in order to 
attain a cross-section of the organisations. The Ministry interviews 
were conducted with a political advisor and a member of the Section 
for Traffic Safety and Civil Emergency Planning. In the Directorate of 
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Public Roads, interviews were conducted with the traffic director, 
members from the strategy staff, the road safety section, the 
development department, the vehicle section and the road user section. 
A total of six respondents were interviewed in the Directorate.  
 
At the regional level of the PRA, three respondents were selected, in 
part because of their experience of working closely with the zero 
vision. One informant was picked because of concrete experience with 
a zero vision project. Moreover, four interviews were conducted at the 
regional level of the PRA. A total of eight interviews were conducted 
with informants from the regional level of the PRA. I distinguish 
between the Directorate of Public Roads and the Public Roads 
Administration when informants from the two levels differ in opinion. 
 
With the Police, interviews were conducted with a member from the 
National Police Directorate and two members from the Mobile Police. 
Interviews were also conducted with two regional police officers, 
including one who had specific experience with a zero vision project. 
There were five informants from the Police. In Safer Driving, three 
interviews were conducted at the central level and one at the county 
level. In NAF, interviews were conducted with two members from the 
society–policy department. I also conducted two interviews with the 
Rogaland county administration and one with the Stavanger local 
authority. As mentioned above, the interview with the municipality has 
been omitted. The total number of interviews in the thesis is then thirty.  
 
 
5.2.2  The interview guide 
 
I tried to keep the interviews within a limit of one and a half hours. 
Some interviews were shorter, while others lasted a little longer. It is 
difficult to highlight all relevant aspects influencing the perceptions on 
the zero vision of key road safety actors in just one and a half hours. 
Much time was therefore spent on developing an interview guide that 
would elucidate the research questions and assumptions of the thesis.20 
The questions were prepared after a thorough analysis of the zero 
                                                 
20 Appendix B – Interview guide. 
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vision, during which time I experienced how beneficiary it was for me 
to have worked with the vision in my Master’s thesis.  
 
I considered it necessary to conduct test interviews with a selection of 
respondents. These interviews gave me the basis for deeper reflection 
and maturation. Four interviews were conducted for this purpose. The 
interviews were held with informants from the PRA, Safer Driving, 
Rogaland county administration and the Stavanger local authority. The 
interviews showed that minor adjustments to the interview guide were 
necessary. A few questions were dropped because they did not function 
as intended, while some questions were added as the need to highlight 
certain topics became more evident. The consequence is that the four 
respondents were not given exactly the same questions as the rest of the 
respondents. For reasons explained above, one of the test interviews 
has not been used in the thesis. 
 
The interview guide was structured so I could discover how important 
road safety actors experience road safety work after the introduction of 
the zero vision. The interview guide was divided into categories that 
reflected the main research questions of the thesis. After asking the 
respondents about their education and occupational history, the focus 
was on the respondents’ experience of working with road safety. The 
zero vision was then introduced. The respondents’ attitudes towards the 
zero vision were dealt with through several questions, many of which 
had a change perspective. The respondents were asked how the 
relationship with other actors had changed after the introduction of the 
zero vision. They were then asked about competing goals in the road 
safety campaign, and about what they believe the future holds for road 
safety. In conclusion, the respondents were given 20 statements about 
road safety. Some of the statements have not been used in the study, as 
some of the other statements were considered sufficient for ascertaining 
what the actors’ opinions were. In the empirical chapters, the 
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5.2.3  Analysing interview data 
 
All the interviews were taped, but not transcribed in detail. The parts 
that highlight the research questions of the thesis were extracted and 
categorised based on the three perspectives of the thesis: how the zero 
vision is conceptualised and instantiated by the key road safety actors, 
the role of inter-organisational relations and conflicting interests after 
the introduction of the zero vision, and how the zero vision challenges 
goals competing with road safety, including the political impact on road 
safety and hence the zero vision. 
 
The data material were collected in Norwegian and translated into 
English, both from the interviews and the documents. In translating 
from Norwegian to English, there is the risk of meaning being lost in 
translation. To prevent this I have done my best to ensure that the 
translation fully renders the original statements. Even if some words 
and phrases were difficult to translate, I do not consider this to be a 
methodological problem. This would have been a greater challenge if 
the data were to be translated from English to Norwegian, as there are 
about nine times more words in the English language than Norwegian.  
 
 
5.2.4  Methodological advantages and challenges 
 
One advantage with personal interviews is the possibility of following 
up with new questions depending on the answers given, and the fact 
that respondents have the opportunity to elaborate on their answers. 
This is why the interviews are described as semi-structured.  
 
The interlocutors are rarely on the same “wavelength” in an interview 
setting. The knowledge produced is a function of an imbalance of 
power between the researcher and the respondent. The interview setting 
may be intimidating to the respondent. The respondents featured in the 
thesis were encouraged to be open when answering the questions and it 
was emphasised that the results would be treated confidentially. 
Although this probably reassured the respondents somewhat, their 
accounts of the zero vision might still be skewed.   
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The discourses that shape our identity are closely linked to structures 
and actions that are lived out in everyday life. Individuals are placed in 
certain positions and expectations are connected to their behaviour. The 
expectations create an identity – an identity that can be difficult to 
disclose methodologically. The expectations might create a feeling of 
“having” to be positive to the zero vision when working with road 
safety. Expectations in connection with behaviour may limit the degree 
of openness in an interview setting, and the answers may be coloured 
by what the respondent feels is the “right answer.” The consequence of 
this may be that the data does not reflect how the respondents really 
feel about various aspects of the zero vision. There is not much one can 
do about this. It is something researchers must deal with when trying to 
gather valid data.  
 
Hajer (1995) contends that once a person has taken a position, he or she 
sees the world from that position and in terms of the images, 
metaphors, storylines and concepts coherent with that view. Hajer talks 
about the disciplinary force of discursive practices. When a discursive 
practice is institutionalised, there is an “assumption that subsequent 
speakers will answer within the same discursive frame” (1995:57). 
People who work with road safety might experience this when 
complying with the zero vision; meaning they believe it is expected of 
them to favour the vision. 
 
I assume that people working with road safety are preoccupied with the 
accident figures. With the zero vision, the scenario of zero fatalities 
was introduced for the first time. This could be experienced as a 
positive aspect that gives a new identity to their work. The value of the 
work is made more explicit. Thus, the zero vision has possibly brought 
a new optimism and created a more satisfactory identity for people 
involved in road safety work. This brings a form of ethos to the work, 
which might inhibit negative reflections on the zero vision. 
 
As we see, there may be several reasons for respondents not answering 
according to their “true beliefs.” The fact that we cannot know if 
respondents are speaking from the heart is a problem, but something all 
interview analyses have to deal with. The results in the study could 
have been different if other informants had been chosen in the 
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organisations. However, with reference to social constructionism, it is 
not the aim of the study to present representative data from the 
organisations. The interviews have to be seen as separate stories when 
it comes to working with road safety after the introduction of the zero 
vision. Even if the stories themselves are not representative of the 




5.3 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
 
In this section I give an account of factors relating to document 
analysis, which means that the text is not taken at face value, but is 
scrutinised to extract its more hidden aspects (Høyrup 1988). Holter & 
Kalleberg maintain that document analysis is important, stating: 
“Available documents of and about a field are of great importance in 
modern societies. This is strangely unexploited by social scientists” 
(119:41). In this section the choice of documents is elaborated on, and a 
hermeneutic analysis is used to analyse the data. The section ends with 




5.3.1  Important government documents 
 
I focus most attention on the three key government documents for road 
safety in Norway: The National Transport Plan, the Strategy Plan for 
Road Safety and the National Action Plan for Road Safety. I also look 
at the preparatory documents for the National Transport Plan: the 
challenge document and the joint planning document, prepared by the 
PRA, the Norwegian Coastal Administration, the Norwegian National 
Rail Administration and the Norwegian Air Traffic and Airport 
Management.21 The latter documents are important for the 
investigation of the “background deliberations” prior to the 
introduction of the zero vision. I also focus on reports from the 
                                                 
21 This was taken over by the government on January 1 2003 and changed its name to 
Avinor AS. 
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Transport Committee to the Norwegian Parliament and debates in 
Parliament dating to when the zero vision was introduced. These 
debates tell a story about the general atmosphere relating to the zero 
vision among politicians in Norway. 
 
Svennevig et al. (1995) explain that our society has a public culture 
based on the written language with its own conventions for how we 
articulate ourselves in subject-oriented prose. The written language is 
closely connected to the executive power in society and the written 
style in these environments has to a large degree formed the ideal for 
written portrayal. I expect the key documents to be characterised by the 
political genre. Political documents are usually prepared by a group of 
people with different backgrounds and judgments. The task is to work 
out a decision basis for politicians – to prepare a recommendation for 
further decisions. The group’s composition and the nature of the task 
lead to a strict objective and formal attitude.  
 
 
The National Transport Plan 2002-2011 – Preparatory documents 
 
An inter-organisational group wrote the challenge document, 
introduced in February 1999. The aim was to prepare the grounds for a 
broad public debate on important choices in transport policies, and to 
give a basis for the various organisations’ work and priorities. The 
document describes challenges and discusses means for a collective 
effort in the transport sector for the next 12 years.  
 
The PRA, the Norwegian Air Traffic and Airport Management, the 
Norwegian National Rail Administration and the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration formulated the proposal for the National Transport 
Plan. The aim of the joint planning document is to prepare the grounds 
for political priorities, effective use of means in the transport sector and 
a strengthening of the interaction between the various modes of 
transport in order to contribute to effective, safer and more 
environmentally sound transport solutions. The various departments are 
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The National Transport Plan 2002-2011 – No. 46 (1999-2000) 
 
In the spring of 1997, the Norwegian Parliament asked the government 
to prepare a National Transport Plan. The plan was intended to replace 
the previous system with sector-reports for each of the four 
governmental transport departments. The Stoltenberg government 
presented the report to Parliament on the National Transport Plan 2002-
2011 on 29 September 2000. The plan was passed by Parliament on 15 
February 2001. The tabling of the first transport plan coincided with the 
introduction of the zero vision. 
 
The National Transport Plan presents the government’s strategy and 
plans for future transport policies. Through the plan, the government 
prepares for holistic transport policies where all modes of transport are 
seen as interrelated. This replaces the previous long-term plans for sea, 
road, air and rail. The time horizon for the plan is ten years, but the 
primary emphasis is on the first four years. The plan is revised every 
fourth year. The proposal for the National Transport Plan 2010-2019 
was presented on January 17 2008. The Ministry of Transport and 
Communications governs the road safety work through the transport 
plan, which makes this the guiding document for road safety and hence 
for the zero vision.  
 
 
The Strategy Plan for Road Safety 2002-2011 
 
Together with the National Transport Plan, the government presented 
the Strategy Plan for Road Safety 2002-2011. The strategy plan is 
intended as an elaboration on the road safety measures in the transport 
plan. The preface states that the plan in part “elaborates on measures 
and priorities for road traffic in the National Transport Plan” (SP:6). 
However, the content is close to identical. The two aspects that 
distinguish the two documents are primarily that the strategy plan has a 
preface by the Minister of Transport and Communications and it has a 
different introduction. Another difference is that the strategy plan uses 
illustrations and pictures, probably with the intention of giving it a 
wider rhetorical appeal.  
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The National Action Plan for Road Safety 2002-2011 
 
The PRA, the Police and Safer Driving have prepared the National 
Action Plan – an important document for road safety.22 The action plan 
was first released on the 7 March 2002. The action plan is based on the 
road safety discussion in the National Transport Plan, and is an 
instantiation of the concepts highlighted in this plan. The Ministry of 
Transport and Communications assigned the Directorate of Public 
Roads with the task of leading the work on the action plan. This 
distinguishes it from the National Transport Plan, which has been 
developed by the Ministry with a view to presenting it to Parliament. In 
the thesis, I mainly ascribe the views that appear in the action plan to 
the key road safety actors, the PRA, the Police and Safer Driving, while 
I ascribe views in the transport plan to the road authorities, represented 
by the Ministry. 
 
The target group for the action plan comprises all the actors involved in 
road safety work, including the road users. This has left a mark on the 
linguistic style of the document, which is looser and less formal than 
the National Transport Plan. A press release states that the purpose of 
the plan is to present a broad range of effective road safety measures 
for the coming period. Another aim is to establish good relations 
between key actors so that resources can be utilised in the best way 
possible to prevent and reduce damage caused by traffic accidents. It 
states how the number of fatalities can be reduced by about one 
hundred and the number of seriously injured by about 300. This may be 
achieved by reaching defined “status condition” goals for traffic 
behaviour, vehicles and road standards. The action plan describes the 
broad range of measures the various actors are to work on, as well as 





                                                 
22 The Directorate for Health and Social Affairs has contributed to the updated version 
2006-2015. 
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5.3.2  Other written material 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned documents, official statements 
made on the zero vision concept are examined. I expect that the 
important road safety actors had something to say about the zero vision 
when it was first introduced as the new strategy in the road safety 
campaign. Other documents prepared by key actors also constitute 
important data material in the study. This could be documents that 
specifically deal with road safety and the zero vision, or documents that 
deal with transport questions in general. Statements in the media are 
also incorporated to provide information from other sources. This is 
also the case for statements that appear in newsletters, for instance the 
internal newsletter in the PRA, “The Road and Us”. 
 
 
5.3.3  Hermeneutic analysis 
 
It is important to have an idea about the totality of the data; a 
systematic and detailed view of what the data imply and which 
conclusions can be drawn. This can be achieved by adopting a 
hermeneutic approach, which searches for the meaning and intentions 
behind phenomena (Ramírez 1992). The goal is to judge a message and 
acquire a deeper understanding of it. A hermeneutic analysis focuses on 
interpretation as a process, pointing out that that there is no “true” 
explanation of a phenomenon. 
 
The first step is to read the entire text to acquire a general impression of 
it. Then the various utterances are examined to crystallise their meaning 
and significance before going back to seeing the text as a whole again. 
This continues in a positive spiral referred to as the hermeneutic circle 
(Hellspong 2001). The idea is that a text has to be judged according to 
its different parts and that these parts have to be understood according 
to the totality. Hermeneutic analyses is well suited for texts where the 
meaning is hazy, or open to several interpretations, as I suspect is the 
case with the documents that are analysed in this study. 
 
The hermeneutic circle gives a good picture of how the documents are 
analysed in the thesis. I read through the documents once to acquire a 
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first impression of them. I then wrote down my impressions so that they 
could be returned to later. After this, I approached the material in a 
more thorough manner. By now it was natural to examine one 
document at a time. As the material matured for me I developed a good 
reading of all the documents. I then started to systemise parts and 
quotes according to the research questions in the thesis.  
 
 
5.3.4  Methodological challenges and advantages 
 
There is a degree of uncertainty when interpreting political signals. Of 
course this does not mean that we should stop interpreting them, but 
just as with subjectivity, it is important to focus on the challenges of 
interpreting text. Performing a document analysis is important if we are 
to find deviations between expressed policy and the reality of policy 
interventions. Documents provide us with knowledge on expressed 
values, while interviews give knowledge about “everyday” theories. A 
document analysis says something about the division between demands 
and goals, and what is revealed in practice. One of the reasons why I 
have chosen to study key documents is to look for discrepancies 
between what is expressed in them and what is expressed in the 
interviews. 
 
One problem with document analysis is that one can read more into the 
text than what is actually there. According to Heradstveit & Bjørgo 
(1992), every text has an ambiguity that makes several interpretations 
possible, and these can change according to the reader and the context. 
The result is that a text has as many interpretations as there are readers 
of it. Two elements exist in the interaction between a text and its social 
conditions – the production of the text and its consumption. It is 




5.4 END NOTES  
 
The data in the thesis were collected during the spring, summer and 
autumn of 2004. In other words it has been close to five years since the 
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data were collected and presented here. It could be argued that this is a 
long period from data collection to data presentation and that things 
may have changed during this period. There have indeed been changes, 
probably also in the perception of various informants. However, this 
could also have been the case one year removed from data collection.  
 
In considering this, it is important to take the aim of the study into 
account, which is not primarily to study factual changes after the 
introduction of the zero vision, but to study the views and 
interpretations of key road safety actors. Here I would also like to point 
out the scientific approach of the study, social constructionism. The 
thesis is an attempt to capture different storylines and perceptions of the 
zero vision five years after its introduction in 1999.  
 
As a result of the time that has passed since the interviews were 
conducted, it is relevant to ask how issues about the zero vision have 
changed over the past years. One issue is how extensively the term 
“zero vision” is actively used today. Could it be that I was too early 
with my data collection and the zero vision term has now taken more 
root? There is no indication that it has had a greater impact during the 
period from 2004-2009 than the preceding five-year period. Thus, I do 
not believe it would have mattered if I had waited with my data 
collection. When I collected the data, the zero vision was already about 
five years old. If the zero vision had not taken root by then, there is no 
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6.  Conceptualisation, Instantiation and Change 
 
The main focus of this chapter is to investigate how the zero vision is 
defined, conceptualised and instantiated by the important road safety 
actors. This is studied by examining how the actors reason about the 
zero vision and how they compare the zero vision with road safety 
work prior to its introduction. The chapter is divided into five sections. 
In the first section the focus is on how the central actors see the implicit 
change in the zero vision, and how perceptions of it differ between 
them. The next section deals with the extent to which the actors believe 
the zero vision has resulted in organisational change before looking at 
the debate over subsidiary goals. This debate has implications for how 
concretely the zero vision is perceived. In section five, I disclose what 
the actors think about communicating the zero vision to the public.  
 
The sections dealing with the PRA are often longer than for the other 
actors. This is partly due to the larger number of respondents from the 
PRA. Another reason is that the respondents from the PRA generally 
had more to say about most of the issues. The heading of each of the 
sections is not meant to symbolise the opinion of the organisations as a 
whole, but to convey views that were expressed by the respondents in 
the interview setting. In the empirical chapters, I discuss the issues and 
give my own views as part of the discussion. The assumptions raised in 




6.1 CONCEPTUALISING AND INSTANTIATING THE 
ZERO VISION 
 
The aim of this section is to investigate how the key actors 
conceptualise and instantiate the zero vision with respect to change. 
How do the key actors move from referring to the ethics of the zero 
vision to considering specific change under it? This chapter focuses on 
how this varies between the actors, with particular emphasis on the key 
road safety actors.   
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The informants were asked the following questions: 1) is it your 
opinion that it is a good idea that we have a zero vision in the road 
safety campaign? 2) What do you personally experience as new with 
the zero vision? 3) Do you have belief in the zero vision and does the 
zero vision guide you in your everyday work? 4) The zero vision is 
intended to stimulate the development of measures that are necessary 
for realising the zero vision. Which measures do you see? 5) Is it your 
experience that the various actors have their own understanding of the 
zero vision?  
 
Three claims are used to shed light on the subject: The progression in 
the building of median barriers is satisfactory, the liability legislation 
for traffic accidents should be changed so that others than the road 
users can be held accountable for traffic accidents to a greater degree 
and the zero vision in practice is a continuation of the existing road 
safety efforts.  
 
The progression in the building of median barriers has become an 
indicator of how the zero vision is being complied with in practice. It 
will be interesting to see what the key actors think about median 
barriers. The liability legislation is important because of what is said 
about a shared responsibility in the zero vision. The claim that the zero 
vision in practice is a continuation of the road safety work is meant to 
illuminate whether the actors see it as something concretely new or if 
they see it as more or less business as usual. The answers to the 
questions and statements are not dealt with in succession, but form a 
coherent story.  
 
 
6.1.1  The Ministry – “Not merely empty words” 
 
The two informants from the Ministry believe the zero vision has 
brought some new elements to the road safety campaign. The 
respondents do not see it as a continuation of the existing road safety 
work. One respondent explains that he used to have the impression that 
road safety was “something talked about in speeches,” but this has 
gradually changed, and the introduction of the zero vision is one of the 
reasons for this. The respondent believes “the zero vision is not merely 
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empty words – it will have an impact as we go along.” In this way, the 
respondent distances himself from the view that the zero vision is 
merely rhetoric.  
 
The shift from probability thinking to consequence thinking is pointed 
out as an element introduced by the zero vision. This is seen in the 
following two utterances: “The zero vision has contributed to directing 
efforts towards serious accidents,” and “The zero vision has resulted in 
greater awareness about the consequences of traffic accidents and the 
price we pay for mobility.” The last statement focuses on emotions in 
connection with traffic accidents. This is typical pathos reasoning. 
 
When they elaborate on this, it appears that their view is that the 
changes are not necessarily a result of the zero vision. Both informants 
from the Ministry doubt that the zero vision is the “true cause” for 
changes. In other words, there have been changes but it is unclear what 
has caused them. It seems the respondents are indeed hesitant to ascribe 
change to the zero vision. One respondent points out that the zero 
vision has resulted in different priorities when it comes to measures, 
but this “could have been the case even without a zero vision. Who 
knows?” One informant explains that “it would be far fetched to link 
changes to the zero vision” and that road safety work is “pretty 
constant.” The respondent is not sure that we would have been “very 
far off from where we are today without a zero vision.” I interpret this 
as saying that the zero vision has not been an important contribution to 
the road safety work.  
 
It is common to make causal connections between the zero vision and 
road safety measures as if the measures would not have been 
implemented had it not been for the vision. Having established 
causality, the link is portrayed as a truism, with few questioning its 
plausibility. “There’s not necessarily a link between the zero vision and 
measures,” a respondent from the Ministry explains. The measures 
applied should be the ones that have an effect on serious accidents: 
“Really the same measures as before.” According to the respondent, 
you do not have two separate boxes, one with zero vision measures and 
one with ordinary measures. In other words, the zero vision has not 
contributed to new road safety measures.  
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The cause and effect debate is prominent in many depictions of the zero 
vision. This is a sign that it is difficult to point exactly to what is new 
about the vision. One informant conveys the interpretive qualities of the 
zero vision when stating that the Ministry has “tried to figure out what 
they want the zero vision to be.” In other words, it is not obvious what 
the zero vision entails. It has to be interpreted and filled with content. 
One way of interpreting this is that the Ministry has adapted the zero 
vision to coincide with their existing work, as a way of legitimising 
their approach to road safety. This discussion coincides with what 
Rawls (1993) infers about the difference between a concept and the 
conceptualisation of a concept. Even if the actors agree on a concept, 
they may disagree on how to conceptualise it.  
 
Both informants from the Ministry believe the actors see the zero vision 
in different ways to some extent. However, one respondent believes 
this was more the case in the first years of the zero vision. To a certain 
degree, the key actors have “worked their way towards a mutual 
understanding”. One political advisor believes the PRA, the Police and 
Safer Driving “are fairly well coordinated.” As such, the zero vision is 
“not just a vision for the road authorities.” It is interesting that both 
respondents seem content about the degree of consensus when it comes 
to how the key actors understand the zero vision.  
 
The respondents were asked if they think the liability legislation for 
traffic accidents should be changed so that others than the road users 
can be held accountable for traffic accidents. One of the respondents 
from the Ministry believes the road authorities should have a judicial 
responsibility: “Then it will not be so much a case of asking the fox to 
guard the henhouse.” What this metaphor conveys is that the 
respondent questions the fact that the road authorities have control over 
both the construction phase and the quality-evaluation phase. With 
respect to median barriers, one respondent does not have an opinion, 
while one informant disagrees that the progression in the building of 
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6.1.2  The PRA – “There are some new elements” 
 
The PRA is by far the organisation that ascribes most change to the 
zero vision. The most common answer is that the zero vision represents 
new elements. What is most often highlighted is the shift from 
probability thinking to consequence thinking. Three respondents see the 
zero vision as representing a definite change. All three had a central 
position in promoting the zero vision. Being involved in the launching 
of the zero vision probably gave these respondents a special 
relationship to it. I believe this is significant for how they relate to it in 
retrospect.  
 
In the theory section I discussed the strategy of using ambiguous 
concepts when arguing a case. It is evident that respondents from the 
PRA utilise such strategies when elaborating on the zero vision, as can 
be seen in the following two utterances: “The zero vision is a general 
way of thinking pervaded by safety” and “The zero vision represents a 
new way of thinking about road safety.” Neither of these statements 
says very much. The formulation “a new way of thinking” is often used 
in relation to the zero vision, but what exactly does this imply? 
 
Figurative speech is common in depictions of the zero vision. The use 
of metaphors is seen in the following statements [my italics]: “The zero 
vision is very healthy for the authorities,” “The zero vision is a new 
trick in the road safety campaign,” “Road safety has become more 
visible in light of the zero vision,” “The zero vision sets a direction and 
adds weight to the work,” “The zero vision represents a form of 
signature to road safety, and “The zero vision is something to cling to.” 
Besides using metaphors, these statements are also abstract. I do not 
believe the respondents use these metaphors deliberately or 
strategically, but what is clear is that they are not guiding them in 
taking concrete action to comply with the vision.  
 
When given the opportunity to embellish the zero vision, it is primarily 
promoted through rhetorical utterances with little or no link to action. 
Thus, one becomes suspicious about the willingness to fill the zero 
vision with action-oriented content, and to move beyond the ethics of 
the zero vision. The main focus is on intention and the ethical necessity 
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of the zero vision – not on operation and concrete action proposals. 
Torgersen (1993) sees this as a common strategy when introducing new 
initiatives. This coincides with the theory of Heradstveit & Bjørgo 
(1992) who claim that politics is often more a question of attitudes and 
values than knowledge and facts. In this process, it is common to use 
ambiguous words without a fixed meaning. One would expect the PRA 
to be more resolute when describing the zero vision, as the PRA raised 
the zero vision to the political level.  
 
A majority of respondents from the PRA express doubts about the 
implicit change in the zero vision, both in the Directorate and at the 
regional level. The following statements are a clear expression of this: 
“We have had the same way of thinking all along,” “The attitudes have 
not changed because of the zero vision,” “There are few new 
solutions,” “Everything has been in the toolbox before,” “Only minor 
things have happened,” “There is no difference from before and after 
the zero vision,” “The way they work would have developed in the 
same way independent of the zero vision,” “If we had kept up the work 
prior to the zero vision the result would have been the same,” “The zero 
vision is just a new name,” and “We have not come far enough with 
instantiating the zero vision.”  
 
These are harsh judgments on the implicit change brought about by the 
zero vision. What is clear is that there is a common opinion in the PRA 
that the zero vision does not have any particular impact on road safety. 
This is substantiated by answers given to the statement that the zero 
vision in practice is a continuation of the road safety work. Half of the 
respondents from the PRA believe this is the case. There can be many 
explanations for this attitude. One possibility is that they have thought 
the zero vision through and have arrived at a well-informed 
understanding that opens for scrutiny. It could also be that they are fed 
up with the lack of resources to follow up on the zero vision.  
 
Many statements discredit the zero vision and its importance for road 
safety. The scepticism is surprising considering that a vast majority of 
respondents ascribe change to the zero vision at the outset. The 
respondents point out new elements of the zero vision only to later 
conclude that it has very limited impact on road safety. They 
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acknowledge the zero vision, but their work is seemingly unaffected by 
it. It seems many respondents struggle with a dualism when speaking 
about the zero vision. On the one hand, they welcome it as a positive 
move, while on the other hand, they claim that it has brought nothing 
new to the road safety campaign. One explanation could be that the 
respondents have a hard time seeing a link from the ethics of the zero 
vision to concrete change, as the zero vision is manifested today.  
 
Comments made by two representatives from the PRA, who played a 
key role in the launching of the zero vision, mark a strange distance to 
it: “This is road safety work, not zero vision work,” and “The zero 
vision is the basis for all road safety work, but it is not part of the 
work.” This signals that although one might see the zero vision as a 
positive element, it is not always “there in mind” when working with 
road safety in practice. Although the actors see the zero vision as a 
good thing, this is no guarantee that it is guiding their everyday work. It 
is interesting that these utterances come from informants who were 
heavily involved in the zero vision at the outset.  
 
A majority of respondents from the PRA, both at the central and 
regional levels, do not link the zero vision with particular road safety 
measures. The following statements exemplify this: “The measures 
could have come regardless of the zero vision,” “It’s not like we 
wouldn’t have come up with measures if we didn’t have a zero vision,” 
and “It’s difficult to sort out zero vision measures because road safety 
is road safety.” One informant refers to the fallacy of crediting speed 
limits to the zero vision: “Risk assessment governs the speed limits, not 
the zero vision.” What these utterances convey is that new measures are 
born out of the zero vision only to a limited degree. It may have given 
some road safety measures a heavier focus, for instance median 
barriers, but they are not a result of the zero vision. 
 
A vast majority of respondents from the PRA disagree with the 
statement that the progression in the building of median barriers is 
satisfactory. Only three respondents, all from the Directorate, agree 
with the statement. Respondents who feel a more direct responsibility 
for the implementation of median barriers are apparently more inclined 
to see the progression as being satisfactory than respondents further 
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down the organisation hierarchy. An informant from the Directorate 
denies that there is a causal link between the zero vision and median 
barriers. The informant points out that there will always be two-lane 
highways in Norway without a divider. One respondent believes “we 
should test solutions that are not as bombastic as median barriers.” 
With reference to Flyvbjerg (1998), this could be seen as an attempt to 
rationalise the development (or lack of development) when it comes to 
median barriers.  
 
The zero vision opens for a multitude of interpretations and different 
views on cause and effect. Several statements about the zero vision 
reveal this. One respondent believes we cannot say that the zero vision 
focuses on road design and measures directed on vehicles. According to 
the respondent, some have interpreted that this is what the zero vision is 
all about, but it does not say anything about that. “Every measure that is 
conducted based on the zero vision is an interpretation.” Another 
respondent points out that “we do this and that and pin it to the zero 
vision even though it doesn’t say anything about what to do. The zero 
vision becomes a bit like ‘considering the zero vision …’ It becomes a 
legitimising factor for this and that, but on what grounds?” The 
respondents who convey these thoughts are obviously very aware of 
attempts to rationalise the zero vision. 
 
What becomes clear is that we have to distinguish between the zero 
vision as a concept and the conception of the zero vision. The concept 
is zero fatalities and zero permanent injuries, while the conception is 
what follows when the zero vision is conceptualised. Reference can be 
drawn to what Rawls (1993) says about this important distinction. 
There may be agreement on the zero vision as a concept, but 
disagreement when it comes to how it should be conceptualised. 
Another way of putting this is to say that there may be agreement about 
the zero vision as an abstract phenomenon, but not as a concrete action-
oriented strategy.  
 
The view that the key road safety actors define the zero vision 
differently dominates in the PRA, both in the Directorate and at the 
regional level. This is exemplified by such utterances as, “The zero 
vision is defined according to the actors own field of responsibility,” 
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“You try to incorporate most things into the zero vision,” and 
“Everyone uses the zero vision to substantiate their own case.” 
According to this view, the zero vision is a “contested concept”, as 
referred to by Ball (1988). The actors have different perceptions as to 
what the zero vision entails. One informant thinks that some people 
primarily find the zero vision to be just words. “They fill it with the 
same content in the same way they did with other things before. It has 
only resulted in a change in efforts here in the PRA.” The most 
uncomplimentary portrayal comes from a regional respondent, “The 
other actors are not preoccupied with the zero vision other than seeing 
it like a 17 May speech,23 something they think is great to talk about 
but without changing course. They keep doing what they have always 
done without paying attention to the zero vision.”  
 
A respondent from the Directorate points out that “it takes a long time 
to adapt to the zero vision. It demands personal effort. What does it 
mean in practice?” The respondent believes the Police and Safer 
Driving “have not spent too much time on this.” The zero vision does 
not have as strong a position in the Police and Safer Driving compared 
to the PRA, as the respondent sees it. One regional respondent explains 
that it took five years to understand the zero vision, implying that there 
is a group of “experts” on the zero vision because if it takes five years 
to understand it, there cannot be too many who actually understand it. 
When respondents from other organisations express that the good thing 
about the zero vision is that it is so clear and easy to relate to, they 
obviously interpret it in a different way. The PRA has the opportunity 
to gain deeper insight into the zero vision compared to other actors, as 
it operates more within their niche. They have the opportunity to be 
“the focal point in propelling the zero vision,” as one informant from 
the PRA put it.  
 
One respondent from the Directorate believes the PRA is the most 
important actor when it comes to road safety. “They are action oriented, 
and they coordinate the action plan.” The PRA positions itself, not only 
as the main force propelling the zero vision, but also as the prime 
mover for road safety in general. Another respondent from the 
                                                 
23 17 May is Norway’s Independence Day. 
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Directorate uses post-9/11 rhetoric to describe the relations with other 
actors. “They’re all important actors – the fact that they are with us and 
not against us.” Through such rhetoric, the PRA takes on a special 
position in the road safety campaign. Reference can be made here to the 
theory of power and what Morgan (1986) says about knowledge as an 
important source of power. The PRA apparently believes it has a 
knowledge base that is superior to the other actors. Overall, the PRA is 
not afraid to use its authority and ethos when arguing for road safety 
matters. 
 
The National Action Plan attaches importance to the shared 
responsibility of the zero vision when stating, “if the road users take 
their share of the responsibility, follow the rules, comply with the laws 
and regulations, show caution and always do their very best in traffic, 
the road authorities will provide a road system that has built-in barriers 
to prevent simple mistakes from leading to loss of life and irreparable 
damage. This is the new right the zero vision gives the road users: the 
right to life if they follow the rules” (2002:39). This is an example of 
ethos reasoning on the part of the road authorities. The new obligations 
for the road users exceed those that are stipulated in the Road Traffic 
Act. It is difficult to see what incentives the road users have to change 
their behaviour according to this. The authorities are trying to engage 
the road users in a kind of ethical contract with the promise that they 
will not be killed or seriously injured if they comply with the rules and 
regulations. To have all road users submit to such an “ethical contract” 
seems naïve. One respondent from the PRA is also sceptical to this 
guarantee given by the authorities. “They cannot say that if we take 
today’s roads into consideration. They cannot make that guarantee.”  
 
The PRA has the clearest image of what is involved when changing the 
distribution of responsibility. A majority of respondents from the PRA, 
both at the central and regional levels, believe they should have a 
greater responsibility. The following statements exemplify this: 
“Through the zero vision they have implicitly taken on a bigger 
responsibility,” and “The PRA has to be willing to accept demands 
from the outside world.” One respondent from the PRA points out that 
this is a controversial issue because it represents “a clammy hand” 
120 
Conceptualisation, Instantiation and Change    
which could result in the work situation becoming “a lot less 
enjoyable.”  
 
The Directorate is more hesitant on this issue. One respondent from the 
regional level explains that “the central level has a greater problem with 
this ... there is reluctance on their part to take on more responsibility.” 
One explanation could be that the Directorate is responsible for 
developing the guidelines and sees the problems that might follow in 
the wake of this. One respondent from the Directorate is afraid of “what 
the consequences will be from increased responsibility.” The shared 
responsibility is clearly a troublesome issue where it is difficult to reach 
an agreement on what the official policy should be. This is an area 
where it is natural to assume that there are forces that will attempt to 
preserve the existing order of things. 
 
There is internal disagreement as to whether the PRA should have a 
judicial or an objective responsibility. One regional informant thinks 
that “if we intend something with the zero vision we should also accept 
a judicial responsibility.” Another respondent believes there is no point 
in giving the PRA judicial responsibility. They have an objective 
responsibility. “They have a responsibility for applying their 
competence.” Based on Flyvbjerg (1998), this could be seen as a form 
of rationalisation to rule out the need for judicial responsibility. It could 
also be an attempt to preserve the existing situation – a strategy 
Neumann (2001) focuses on. 
 
 
6.1.3  The Police – “Something concrete has to happen” 
 
Five respondents from the Police were interviewed. All the respondents 
are positive to the zero vision, but they do not see it as representing any 
change in the road safety efforts. The informants see the zero vision as 
more or less a case of business as usual. Statements that exemplify this 
are: “The zero vision is how they have always worked,” “The zero 
vision brings nothing new to road safety,” and “It’s difficult to relate 
things to before and after the zero vision,” A majority of these 
respondents agree that the zero vision in practice is a continuation of 
the existing road safety efforts. One regional Police representative has 
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an interesting take on the zero vision, expressing that: “the zero vision 
is the PRA’s project. The Police are just a small player in this.”  
 
Some informants point to the gap between talk and action. “We can’t 
just talk about the zero vision,” “There are not enough concrete actions 
coming out of the zero vision,” and “Something concrete has to 
happen,” are some examples. The view that the zero vision remains an 
abstract notion dominates among these respondents. One respondent 
from the Mobile Police opposes the zero vision’s one-sided emphasis 
on consequence. “The zero vision does not consider variation … they 
cannot just focus on death and destruction.” All in all, the impression 
from the interviews is that the zero vision is more or less business as 
usual for the Police. The Police ascribe little or no change to it, nor 
have they conceptualised it.  
 
Informants from the Police disagree when it comes to whether or not 
the key actors understand the zero vision differently. One respondent 
from the Mobile Police explains that there are different interpretations 
and explanations because “one wishes to speak about the zero vision 
from one’s own standpoint.” An informant from the Police Directorate 
does not believe that the actors see the zero vision differently, claiming 
there is “reasonable agreement about it.” The respondent believes the 
differences are greater when it comes to measures. Hence, if the zero 
vision is instantiated through new measures, this could become an 
issue.  
 
The Police are split when it comes to whether or not the liability 
legislation should be changed so that others than road users can be held 
responsible for traffic accidents. Both respondents from the Mobile 
Police disagree with this statement. One important explanation is the 
concern that this will release road users from some of their 
responsibility for traffic accidents. “Let’s blame the road authorities,” 
could become the new tenet. A majority of respondents from the Police 
disagree that the progression in the building of median barriers is 
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6.1.4  Safer Driving – “We continue to do the same things” 
 
Four respondents were interviewed in Safer Driving. The general view 
is that the zero vision brings some new elements to the road safety 
efforts. This is seen in utterances like: “We think in a different way,” 
“The possibility of pushing new demands is more present,” “There is a 
new division of responsibility,” “There is more focus on human levels 
of tolerance,” and “Fatalities and serious injuries direct the measures 
applied.” Some informants describe the zero vision in metaphorical 
terms, calling it a “guiding star” and a “new dimension.” All in all, 
there is much optimism to be traced in what the Safer Driving 
informants have to say.   
 
Judging from the statements, respondents from Safer Driving believe 
the zero vision has brought a change to road safety. However, when 
presented with the statement that the zero vision in practice is a 
continuation of the existing work, a majority of the respondents agree, 
and in doing so imply that the zero vision does not represent that much 
change after all. It appears that the respondents cannot quite make up 
their minds as to whether or not the zero vision represents a change. 
The main focus seems to be on intention and the ethical necessity of the 
zero vision. From the theory section we remember that this is a strategy 
that is often used when the ethical motives behind an initiative are 
found to be more important than the operational aspects. 
 
Although respondents from Safer Driving are positive to the zero vision 
and ascribe some degree of change to it, there are serious doubts about 
its impact in practice. According to a key informant, the zero vision 
amounts to more or less nothing if there is no substance in practice. 
Today the zero vision “is a speech vision, not a practical vision. We 
have not succeeded in translating the zero vision into concrete 
measures. The measures are the same as before.” This informant does 
not think road safety has improved because of the zero vision. “We 
have to go through our experiences of the zero vision and “find where 
we have failed.”  
 
One informant believes “we are talking about the same problems.” 
While a National Action Plan has been prepared under the influence of 
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the key actors and their programmes, and which is said to mirror the 
zero vision, “nothing is new.” According to this informant, “we 
continue to do the same things regardless of the zero vision. It’s not 
like the zero vision came, and then this and that came.” According to 
one informant, “several theories that coincide with the zero vision have 
existed for a long time.” The way Safer Driving discredits the zero 
vision suggests that Safer Driving is not happy with its present form. 
 
One informant believes rhetoric and argumentation are more important 
for the PRA. “The zero vision is perhaps more concrete for them. They 
probably experience the zero vision as something new, something more 
than they have been doing. They are focusing on infrastructure, median 
barriers etc. – on building their way out of the problems.” In other 
words, the respondent equates the zero vision with a focus on 
infrastructure. Implicit in this is that the zero vision does not concern 
Safer Driving as much as it does the PRA. This means that Safer 
Driving has a weak relationship to the vision.  
 
A majority of respondents from Safer Driving believe the zero vision is 
interpreted in different ways, depending on the interests of different 
actors. One informant believes the actors to a great extent see things 
“from their own perspective” and “place what they want in the zero 
vision.” To some extent, each actor sees in the zero vision what best 
“fits his or her organisation.” In other words, the zero vision is a 
contested concept where various actors have their own way of 
conceptualising it. One view in Safer Driving is that everyone talks 
about the zero vision, but “very few know what they are talking 
about.”24  
 
A majority of informants from Safer Driving agree with the claim that 
the liability legislation should be changed so that others than the road 
users can be held accountable for traffic accidents. The diverging view 
between Safer Driving and the Police on this point is surprising. The 
Police are very focused on not relieving the road users of their 
responsibility, believing that this is what would happen if the 
                                                 
24 In the transport magazine published by the Institute of Transport Economics, No. 4 
– May 2006. 
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legislation were changed. Safer Driving obviously does not have the 
same concerns. When it comes to the claim about median barriers, all 
the respondents disagree that this is progressing satisfactorily.  
 
 
6.1.5  NAF – “The vision is not being followed up with 
enough measures” 
 
Two informants from NAF are featured in the study. The respondents 
disagree that the zero vision in practice is a continuation of the existing 
road safety work, which is surprising. Does this mean that NAF 
ascribes more change to the zero vision than the Police and Safer 
Driving? Part of the explanation could be that the respondents interpret 
the term “continuation” in different ways. It could also be that they see 
more potential in the zero vision than others. 
 
A respondent from the policy department finds that what is new about 
the zero vision is its “ambition”. But when the road authorities have 
launched a policy like the zero vision “they have to account for it by 
making it operational and easier to relate to.” According to NAF, the 
zero vision is not being followed up with enough concrete measures.  
 
Informants from NAF believe actors fill the zero vision with the same 
content as before. “It’s easy to carry on like before.” One respondent 
points out that “the zero vision is not crystal clear … the zero vision is 
probably defined according to the actor’s own standpoint”. The 
informant wishes there were guidelines provided by the central 
authorities for interpreting the vision.  
 
NAF is preoccupied with the greater responsibility the road authorities 
are given under the zero vision. “There is more focus on the 
responsibility of the road authorities,” one informant asserts. According 
to this respondent, the zero vision means that the PRA has to increase 
its efforts. The respondent has noticed that the PRA now acknowledges 
their responsibility at conferences. “It used to be people outside the 
organisation that talked about this.” Based on NAF’s focus on this, it is 
not surprising that the informants agree that the liability legislation 
should be changed so that others than the road users can be held 
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accountable for traffic accidents. Both the respondents from NAF also 




6.1.6  The County – “Is in parts just a lot of fancy words” 
 
Both respondents from the county-administration level believe the zero 
vision in practice is a continuation of the existing road safety work. The 
respondents believe the new thing about the zero vision is the keener 
focus as investigating traffic accidents and focusing on road safety 
measures that really pay off has been an area of concentration for many 
years. This is not something the zero vision has suddenly introduced. 
The focus on measures is not that different. When it comes to “so-
called zero vision measures,” one informant believes we should focus 
on measures that give the best result, for example surveillance and 
measures that affect behaviour. The zero vision tones down such 
measures compared to the focus on median barriers. The respondent 
feels the explanation lies in the fact that it is difficult to change 
attitudes and that more surveillance is unpopular. Thus, the county 
representatives share the view that the zero vision mainly has a physical 
orientation, which has also been a concern of Safer Driving. 
 
One informant explains that since 1997-1998, the priorities relating to 
means have been sharpened. This is not due to the zero vision, but a 
result of a general focus on safety in society. According to the 
informant, this started in the PRA in the early 1990s, so the reason for 
its position now is not just due to the zero vision. “The zero vision is in 
part just a lot of fancy words.” The vision does not mean more than 
other things. “The zero vision is just a term for an understanding they 
have had all along. We should be careful about making the Emperor’s 
new clothes and give the credit to the zero vision.” These utterances 
discredit the zero vision as a strategy that has resulted in concrete road-
safety changes. 
 
One informant from a regional county road safety panel (FTU) believes 
the good thing about the zero vision is that it gives a goal to work 
towards, but “we did work with measures before the zero vision as 
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well.” According to the informant, “good road safety measures are also 
good zero vision measures” and “the difference between the zero vision 
and previous strategies is in the wording.” You can put a lot into the 
zero vision and that is perhaps its weakness. The respondent would 
probably work in the same way even without the zero vision. “It’s not 
like it’s something new.” The respondent fully endorses the zero vision 
without ascribing change to it. The vision is not instantiated so that it 
has a bearing on road safety in practice, and this affects how actors 
outside the PRA view it.  
 
One respondent from the county administration believes that “on the 
whole, there is consensus about the zero vision, but the conception of it 
is different.” This coincides with the distinction made by Rawls (1993) 
between concepts and conceptions. There is agreement about the zero 
vision concept, but not the principals required to apply it – how to 
realise the definitional content of the concept. I have already referred to 
this distinction several times in the chapter and find that it is highly 
important in understanding why there can be agreement about 
something at the outset but great disagreement when ideas become 
actions. 
 
The respondents from the county-administration level disagree that the 
liability legislation should be changed. One possible explanation may 
be that they fear this will relieve the road users of some of their 
responsibility, as was also the objection from the Police. The 
respondents do not agree when it comes to the claim about median 
barriers. One informant agrees while the other disagrees that the 
building of median barriers is making satisfactory progress. 
 
 
6.1.7  The zero vision is not instantiated into an important 
factor for change 
 
All the respondents see the zero vision as a “good thing”, but it varies 
as to how the actors perceive its tangibility. Judging by the interviews, 
there is a dividing line when moving from the Ministry and the PRA, 
and to the Police, Safer Driving, NAF and the county-administration 
level. The Ministry and the PRA find that the zero vision represents 
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more of a change than the other actors. The “more or less business as 
usual” attitude is common in the Police, while Safer Driving is divided 
between seeing the zero vision as representing some new elements and 
as business as usual. NAF believes there are some new elements in the 
zero vision, but argue that this is not followed up in practice. The view 
at the county-administration level is that we should be careful about 
making the Emperor’s new clothes. One reason why the latter actors do 
not ascribe more change to the zero vision could be because the 
ambiguity of the vision makes it difficult to relate to.  
 
Compared to the other actors, the Ministry included, the informants 
from the PRA portray the zero vision more as a philosophy with an 
effect on priorities and efforts. The PRA has a more intricate view of 
what the vision implies. It is instantiated beyond its ethical starting 
point, even if the reasoning at times is vague and abstract. The Police, 
Safer Driving, NAF and the county administration do not ascribe much 
change to the zero vision. The abstract ways of describing it, focusing 
on the ethics, and being sceptical to its effects, substantiates this. The 
zero vision does not have a specific meaning for road safety on the 
practical level. It seems that to these actors, the zero vision primarily 
works as a symbol. With reference to Eco (1984), the data underscore 
that most actors see the zero vision as a symbol for the road safety 
campaign. 
 
One assumption in the thesis, which has much in common with what 
has been mentioned above, is that the main focus of the key actors is on 
intention and the ethical necessity of the zero vision, not operation and 
specific action proposals. Torgersen (1993), and Heradstveit and 
Bjørgo (1992) see this as a common strategy in politics. To some extent 
the findings in the thesis support this assumption. However, the PRA, 
the Police, Safer Driving and NAF also have much focus on what the 
effects of the zero vision should be in practice.  
 
All in all, there are more utterances that portray the zero vision as 
business as usual than as a change in the road safety efforts. The 
willingness to see the zero vision as a vehicle for change is greatest in 
the Directorate of Public Roads. Respondents from the regional level of 
the PRA and the Ministry are more reserved. The discrepancy between 
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the central and regional levels of the PRA is conspicuous enough to 
conclude that the policy level is more inclined to view the zero vision 
as representing a change than the operational level. At the regional 
level, we find more utterances that discredit the zero vision. One 
surprising finding, considering that all the actors endorse the zero 
vision at the outset, is the degree of negativity ascribed to it. In the 
PRA, the Police, Safer Driving and NAF, and at the county-
administration level, we find many statements that discredit the zero 
vision. Based on Throgmorton’s theory (1996), I did not expect to find 
this dualism. It is interesting that such negativity is more or less absent 
at the policy level, in the Ministry and in the Directorate. I suspect the 
respondents further down in the hierarchy feel more at odds with what 
comes out of the vision and therefore adopt this mentality. 
 
A majority of respondents, irrespective of organisation, are sceptical to 
the implications of the zero vision. “The zero vision is a good thing, 
but…” is a common way of reasoning about it, not only in the Police, 
Safer Driving, NAF and the county administration, but also in the 
Ministry and the PRA. The vision is seemingly difficult to relate to, 
which is interesting when trying to make something of its potential. It 
seems the actors are captivated by the zero vision as a concept but have 
a hard time moving from concept to conceptualisation. Most of the 
PRA’s work has been concentrated on conceptualising the zero vision. 
The findings in the thesis substantiate the huge differences in how the 
vision has been conceptualised by the key actors, which Rawls (1993) 
and Johnson & Lakoff (1980) have pointed out is an important factor in 
judging new initiatives. 
 
There is solid agreement that different actors understand the zero vision 
differently. The varying opinions and interpretations are both inter-
organisational and interpersonal. Based on the interviews, the zero 
vision is a “contested concept.” The actors do not agree what should be 
placed in the term and define it according to their own standpoint. Ball 
(1988) explains that this is a common trait concerning concepts that has 
an important bearing on the future. Having said this, it varies as to 
which extent the actors make an effort in this respect. The PRA is 
clearly the actor that has put most work into defining the zero vision. 
The question could also be raised if the vision has an important bearing 
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on the future when it comes to road safety. I believe the answers to this 
depend upon whom you ask. It would appear that the PRA and the 
Ministry ascribe most importance to the zero vision. As such, it is 
probably also these actors who see it as most important for future 
development. Thus it is no surprise that the PRA strives to have a 
strong definition of the vision.   
 
The data suggest that only a limited number of people feel a genuine 
relation to the zero vision, even in the PRA. The people who feel very 
connected to it are first and foremost the people who laid down its 
foundation and backed its implementation as a new policy. This is not 
to say that others have not acquired both knowledge about and 
attachment to the zero vision, but nothing suggests that they feel a 
special relation to the zero vision. The more time actors spend on the 
zero vision, and the more they understand it, the more inclined they are 
to perceive the other actors’ approach as lenient.  
 
There is a tendency that informants from the PRA see their own way of 
approaching the zero vision as more concrete and thorough compared 
to the other actors. The PRA sees itself as the actor with the most 
knowledge about road safety, and hence as the most important actor in 
the road safety campaign. The zero vision has elevated the position of 
the PRA to one of even more superiority as they now have a greater 
opportunity to define the future steps for road safety. On several 
occasions the PRA uses its road safety authority when arguing its case. 
Ryan (1984) sees this as important when conveying ethos.  
 
Most arguments given for the zero vision could have been arguments 
for any strategy in the road safety work. The arguments represent a 
non-legitimate justification of the zero vision. They appear as quasi-
arguments to give it more substance. This could be seen as a way of 
rationalising it. According to Flyvbjerg (1998), such strategies are often 
used when it is difficult to convey a policy based on rationality. As the 
empirical chapters show, rationalising strategies are common, not only 
when describing the zero vision but also on a more general plane. 
 
Varied and ideological concepts, as elaborated by Ramírez (2000), are 
used in depictions of the zero vision. However, the data material does 
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not suggest that such concepts are used in an unnatural way. This has 
much in common with the discussion above. Ethos and pathos are used 
in deliberations on the zero vision because this is deemed necessary due 
to the communicative task. The same could be said about varied and 
ideological concepts. Two other rhetorical tools, metaphors and 
analogies, are also used in relation to the zero vision, albeit to a small 
degree. Primarily the PRA and Safer Driving use these tools when 
giving their version of the zero vision. It is impossible to say anything 
concrete about whether the use of rhetorical figures is a conscious or 
more coincidental choice.  
 
Johnson and Lakoff (1980) point out the importance of metaphors in 
attempts to convey change. Considering that the PRA and Safer 
Driving ascribe most change to the zero vision, it is not surprising that 
they have the most developed use of metaphors. Having said this, the 
use of metaphors is not common, not even in the PRA and Safer 
Driving. This could mean that there is considerable reluctance to see 
the vision as a definite change in these organisations. One question 
raised in the thesis is if the zero vision remains an abstract notion with 
limited outlook on intensified action. I believe the data answers this 
question in the affirmative. The zero vision has not been instantiated 




6.2 THE ZERO VISION AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
 
If the zero vision is to have impact on road safety, it has to be 
incorporated in the practices of the important road safety organisations. 
Findings in the previous section suggest that actors have not 
instantiated the zero vision to a notable degree. Does this indicate that 
the zero vision has not resulted in organisational change and that it is 
not embedded in the cultural practices of organisations?  
 
This section focuses on organisational change and how the zero vision 
has affected goals, priorities and the general road safety effort, as the 
respondents see it. The respondents were asked the following 
questions: 1) has the zero vision resulted in organisational changes? 2) 
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What influence has the zero vision had on goals in the organisation? 3) 
What influence has the zero vision had on priorities in the organisation? 
4) Is it your experience that your organisation has increased its road 
safety efforts after the introduction of the zero vision? The answers are 
not dealt with in succession but told as a coherent story. 
 
The discussion is restricted to the three central actors, the PRA, Safer 
Driving and the Police. The respondents from the Ministry, NAF and 
the county-administration level did not have strong opinions on 
organisational change after the introduction of the zero vision. This 




6.2.1  The PRA – “The zero vision is there and thus 
anchored” 
 
All informants from the PRA, both in the Directorate and at the 
regional level, maintain that the zero vision has not resulted in 
organisational changes, and that it has not led to many new goals for 
the organisation’s road safety efforts. With respect to whether or not 
the zero vision has had an effect on priorities, a majority of the 
respondents believe this is true to some extent. Informants who have 
worked closely with the zero vision assert that to a great extent it has 
had an effect on priorities. Here again we see that proximity to the zero 
vision makes the respondents more inclined to claim that the zero 
vision represents a change. All the respondents from the PRA believe 
the organisation has increased its road safety efforts due to the zero 
vision.  
 
Several informants in the PRA believe their organisation has not 
adapted properly to the zero vision. The following quotes exemplify 
this: “The zero vision is there and thus anchored in the PRA,” “Most 
people in the PRA do not know enough about the zero vision and what 
it implies,” “There is still a long way to go to get the zero vision 
implemented,” and “It is not a guiding star.” Judging from the 
statements given when asked to elaborate on these views, it becomes 
clear that the zero vision is not well anchored in the PRA. In an 
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interview with the news magazine, The Road and Us, a regional 
director in the PRA explains that the zero vision is hardly reflected in 
internal plans and budgets.25 According to the director, “it hardly 
shows that we have introduced a vision about zero traffic fatalities and 
serious injuries.”  
 
One respondent points out that the zero vision has no consequences for 
the actors. “You can work as slow as you like.” It is “so far into the 
future anyway.” The respondent believes we are still just seeing the “tip 
of the iceberg of what should be the consequences of the zero vision.” 
One reason why it is difficult to anchor the zero vision in the PRA 
could be, as One respondent points out, that working with road safety is 
in an unpleasant job. “It is like running on a treadmill. People with 
visions often wish for something else, to work on bigger projects.” It 
surely represents a problem for the visionary perspective of the zero 
vision if people with visions are not inclined to work with road safety 
and the zero vision.  
 
Informants from the regional level of the PRA tend to see the 
organisation itself as an impediment to the realisation of the zero 
vision. A majority of respondents from the regional level dwell on 
organisational factors as an impediment. The concern is that the 
different layers of the PRA are not pulling in the same direction. 
According to one respondent, “independent cultures within the PRA 
make decisions at random.” In the Directorate, the inclination to single 
out the organisation as an impediment is not as evident. Part of the 
reason is probably that the Directorate is more involved in the 
formulation and design of policy. The regional level probably does not 
feel they have the same opportunity to influence the shaping of policy. 
One informant equates the relationship between the central and regional 
level to big brother and little brother. “It’s the A team, and the B team 
and for most time he feels like a reserve. They have to live their own 
life and create their own identity.”  
 
One informant is discouraged about the insufficient allocation of 
resources after the zero vision was introduced. “I’m surprised that we 
                                                 
25 Issue No. 1 – January 15 2004. 
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don’t have the opportunity to use the means we know will help the 
situation.” In addition to economic limitations, the informant points to 
internal limitations, such as disagreement on which measures they are 
permitted to use. The respondent blames management for a lack of 
willpower when it comes to implementing radical measures. 
Implementing measures “is their responsibility, however unpopular this 
is with the public.” A respondent from the regional level is critical to 
how management has adapted to the zero vision. “The first step is to 
have an organisation and management that are able to work in 
accordance with a vision. You have to have a management team that 
understands what it means to have a zero vision. That has not 
happened.” According to the respondent, this is because the managers 
sit in power positions where authority is important. It seems clear that 
the zero vision has not had a particular impact on management when it 
comes to radicalising the road safety campaign. 
 
One respondent focuses on the changes the zero vision represents. “The 
zero vision is supposed to be the starting point for everything they do. 
That is a comprehensive turnaround.” According to the zero vision, 
road safety is supposed to pervade the entire organisation, but in the 
process road safety becomes invisible. “It has become everything and 
nothing at the same time.” This resembles what Wildavsky (1973) has 
said about planning; if planning is everything perhaps it is nothing. 
There is a possibility that the zero vision will lose its meaning as a 
guiding principle because it becomes everything and hence in effect 
nothing. The concept may be watered down because of everything that 
is put into it. 
 
Respondents from the PRA have interesting views on how other central 
organisations adapt to the zero vision. Several informants from the 
PRA are sceptical to how the zero vision is anchored in both the Police 
and Safer Driving. According to one informant, the Police and Safer 
Driving are dealing with “the same things as before.” The zero vision 
has “not affected their priorities.” Another respondent believes that “the 
Police and Safer Driving have a perception of how things should be and 
as a result they are not adapting to the zero vision.” Another view is 
that the Police do not make “the organisation as a whole aware of what 
the zero vision implies.” One view in the PRA is that other actors 
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should feel obliged to adapt to it the same way they do. The zero vision 
should have a deeper impact on Safer Driving and the Police, “even if 
their work is hardly zero-vision related,” as one informant put it. But 
why should they feel obliged to adapt to the vision when their work is 
not zero-vision related?  
 
The view that the work of the Police and Safer Driving is not zero-
vision related is interesting. The informant does not elaborate on this, 
but one way of interpreting this is that the zero vision is first and 
foremost connected to the road safety work the PRA conducts, and not 
so much the controlling activities of the Police and the information and 
education provided by Safer Driving. This then underscores the initial 
worries Safer Driving had about the zero vision, that it primarily has a 
physical orientation. What is also evident from this reasoning is that the 
PRA utilises its road safety authority when talking about the other 
actors and how they should relate to the zero vision. This use of ethos, 
mentioned as a common strategy in the theory section, is also seen 




6.2.2  The Police – “The Police have not been affected by 
the zero vision” 
 
All respondents from the Police state that there have not been any 
organisational changes as a result of the zero vision, and that the zero 
vision has not resulted in new goals for road safety. It is more 
interesting to note that the informants from the Police point out that the 
zero vision has not changed how they prioritise road safety, and 
furthermore, that they have not increased their road safety effort in 
accordance with it. It appears as if the zero vision has not had any 
impact on the Police at all, beyond the fact that they think it has a nice 
ring to it. These views prove the PRA right in their allegation that the 
Police as an organisation have not adopted the zero vision.   
 
Part of the reason why the zero vision has not made an impact on the 
Police could be that road safety work traditionally has had low status in 
the organisation. Respondents from the Police verify this: “Traffic has 
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been unfairly treated in the Police,” one informant from the Mobile 
Police explains. Part of the reason is evidently that there are many 
“cumbersome procedures” in the Police. One regional respondent 
points out that they have too few resources and “road safety easily 
becomes … he would not call it dispensable, but it does come in 
second.” If it comes in second, one could argue that road safety is in 
fact a dispensable item for the Police, the task that is the first to go 
when other duties call. The Police obviously experience a conflict 
between traffic duties and other policing tasks.  
 
The respondents agree about the past status of road safety in the Police, 
but they disagree when it comes to its present status. One respondent 
from the Mobile Police believes the status has improved since 2000. 
Another informant, this one from the National Police Directorate, 
states, on the other hand, that preventive work still has low status. "The 
road spot check is what we cut first. It becomes a dispensable item.” 
This is because “they can’t measure the effect.” Another member of the 
Mobile Police agrees that road safety still has low priority in the Police, 
and finds this strange, “is it not important to save lives?” The prevalent 
view in the Police is that road safety work is still low status. Of course 
this also has implications for how the zero vision is complied with. 
 
A respondent from the National Police Directorate does not have the 
impression that the zero vision is a major topic of discussion in the 
Police. Evidently it is quite coincidental who engage in it. According to 
the respondent, the Police have not been affected by the zero vision: “It 
has not led to specific measures.” A member of the Mobile Police states 
that the Police “focus their attention on their measures, which are 
anchored in the zero vision.” This underscores the impression that 
actors interpret the zero vision to fit existing work. Judging from this 
statement, the Police do not have the same concerns as Safer Driving, 
namely that the zero vision clashes with their existing road safety 
efforts.  
 
One informant from the Police expresses that they are not content with 
how the zero vision is followed up by the PRA. “There is a gap 
between an ambitious vision and what is put on the table.” This 
impedes proper compliance with the zero vision, as the Police see it. 
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What is quite obvious from this is that they believe the PRA is 
responsible for promoting the zero vision, and that the Police do not 
have a particular responsibility for it. All in all, and more so than Safer 
Driving, the informants from the Police seem content to leave the 
initiative for the zero vision with the PRA. 
 
 
6.2.3  Safer Driving – “The vision is in conflict with their 
preventive work” 
 
All the respondents from Safer Driving state that the zero vision has not 
resulted in organisational changes or new goals in their road safety 
work. A majority of informants finds that the zero vision has affected 
the priorities of Safer Driving to some extent. The informants are 
divided as to whether the organisation has increased its road safety 
efforts after the zero vision was introduced. In other words, the views 
on how the zero vision has affected priorities and its overall effort are 
not as bombastic as the Police.   
 
A regional representative from the PRA believes the zero vision might 
be a problem for Safer Driving because they have some activities that 
“do not fit too well with it.” This was evident when it was introduced in 
Norway. The zero vision adopted from Sweden primarily had an 
infrastructure focus. Safer Driving was sceptical to this version of the 
zero vision because of its physical orientation. They were afraid that 
the Norwegian version would become a copy of the Swedish vision. “It 
was too technocratic,” one respondent from Safer Driving remembers. 
Safer Driving nevertheless ended up endorsing the zero vision, but did 
they have a choice? It would certainly seem rather incomprehensible if 
Safer Driving opposed this vision. 
 
If the zero vision primarily focuses on infrastructure, it could be argued 
that it challenges the institutional identity of Safer Driving, which sees 
information and education as their main tasks. This would of course be 
a serious matter for Safer Driving, and the impact would be dramatic 
for their operation and position in the Norwegian road safety campaign. 
Thus, the reaction from Safer Driving when the zero vision was 
introduced was hardly surprising. In the theory section we saw that 
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Solheim (1999A) pointed out that reforms that move away from an 
organisation’s identity demand a considerable concentration of power. 
It might therefore be a suitable strategy on the part of the road 
authorities to conceal the differing opinions about what the zero vision 
entails.  
 
A representative from the Ministry believes that what has assuaged the 
concerns of Safer Driving is that we “have focused more on the 
responsibility of the road users.” One respondent from Safer Driving 
believes the zero vision has “ended up in a balanced form,” suggesting 
that they are content with the zero vision as it is manifested today. 
Safer Driving has been reassured that the zero vision also focuses on 
road users. One representative from the PRA explains that they no 
longer have discussions with Safer Driving about how to interpret the 
vision. “Either they agree or they have capitulated.” This utterance 
clearly underscores that the PRA is in the driving seat when it comes to 
defining the zero vision.  
 
The claim that the zero vision has been adjusted to fit with the agenda 
of Safer Driving might be quite fictitious. It could be seen as an 
example of the rationality of power as elaborated by Flyvbjerg (1998). 
Safer Driving needs the zero vision to be more than a physical strategy 
to preserve their status in the road safety campaign, and the Ministry 
and the PRA probably do not want to cause a commotion by 
brandishing a physical vision. The Ministry and the PRA might be 
portraying the zero vision as including a focus on the road users 
primarily as a rhetorical ploy to please Safer Driving. Safer Driving 
might even understand this. One respondent from Safer Driving points 
out that the vision focuses on fatalities and serious injuries, “which is in 
conflict with their preventive work.” This utterance reveals that Safer 
Driving is not content with the way the zero vision is defined. 
 
 
6.2.4  The zero vision has had minor organisational impact 
 
In the theory section, the zero vision was portrayed as a possible reform 
in the road safety campaign. Brunsson & Olsen’s theories (1990) were 
used to highlight this. Brunsson & Olsen see reforms as changes in an 
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organisation’s structures and methods adopted to achieve better 
behavior and results. One assumption in the thesis is that the zero 
vision has had an effect on processes and structures in key road safety 
organisations. Studying the views of different informants, it is perhaps 
a bit naïve to assume that the zero vision has had an impact in this area. 
The view among all the respondents, from each of the key 
organisations, is that the zero vision has not affected processes and 
structures. In other words, it does not fit Brunsson and Olsen’s 
definition of reforms. That the zero vision has not reformed the road 
safety campaign of course also concurs with the findings in the 
previous section. 
 
A majority of respondents from the PRA, both in the Directorate and at 
the regional level, express that the organisation has changed their 
priorities after the zero vision was introduced, and that the zero vision 
has led to intensified efforts. However, there is a great deal of 
scepticism as to how well the vision is anchored in the organisation. 
The PRA’s management is partly blamed for this. One opinion is that 
the management has become too political in their approach to road 
safety. Several respondents see the organisation itself as an impediment 
when it comes to implementing the zero vision. It seems respondents 
from the PRA have an idea about what it takes to anchor and adapt to 
the vision, but that organisational difficulties impede the work. The 
zero vision obviously has not penetrated the PRA as it was meant to. 
 
Respondents from the Police state that the zero vision has not resulted 
in new priorities and increased effort. This is partly due to the fact that 
road safety has low priority in the Police. Safer Driving is more willing 
to collate the zero vision with organisational changes, in terms of 
priorities and efforts. However, compared to the PRA, respondents 
from Safer Driving are far more hesitant in accepting the vision. The 
fact that Safer Driving was reluctant to favour the zero vision when it 
was introduced suggests that their perception of it is split. They endorse 
the ethics behind the zero vision, but probably have a problem with its 
effects in practice. For the Police and Safer Driving, it is also a question 
of how to adapt to something when you feel that it is still business as 
usual. The data show that the zero vision is not well anchored, even at 
the top level in the Police and Safer Driving, and for this reason it can 
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be assumed that it also does not penetrate and pervade the organisations 
as a whole.  
 
The thesis studies the extent to which the zero vision pervades road 
safety networks and if it has become embedded in the cultural practices 
of the key road safety organisations. According to Hajer (1995), the 
power of new initatives is related to how the new story-line pervades 
networks where policy debates are conducted and how it is embedded 
in cultural practices. In other words, the power of the zero vision is 
related to how it pervades the road safety networks and how it is 
embedded in the cultural practices of the important organisations. The 
data in the thesis indicate that the zero vision does not pervade the road 
safety networks, and, moreover, that it is not embedded in the practices 
of the most important organisations. It could perhaps be argued that the 
zero vision has been embedded in the practices of the PRA. However, 
based on the interviews, I find no grounds to conclude that the zero 
vision has become embedded in the PRA. This most likely undermines 





6.3 THE DEBATE ON SUBSIDIARY GOALS 
 
While the other Nordic countries have formulated quantitative goals in 
their road safety work, this has not been the case in Norway. This 
section looks at how the key actors perceive the absence of subsidiary 
goals, and to this aim, the respondents were asked what they feel about 
the absence of subsidiary goals in the Norwegian road safety work. The 
reason for dedicating a section of this chapter to subsidiary goals is that 
they can be seen as a manifestation of the will to act on the zero vision. 
The intent is not to imply that subsidiary goals are a miracle drug in the 
road safety campaign. Plausible arguments can be given that subsidiary 
goals do not necessarily enhance road safety, although most research 
suggests otherwise.  
 
According to Elvik (1993), national road-safety goals in Norway have 
traditionally not been numerical. Prior to 1970, the authorities did not 
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have road-safety goals because they did not have enough knowledge 
about why accidents occurred and how they could be prevented. Goals 
were gradually incorporated after 1970. The subject was discussed for 
the first time in national documents around 1980. The conclusion was 
that the national policy should not have numerical goals. However, the 
regions should be allowed to formulate such goals if they wanted to. In 
1986/1987, the Norwegian Parliament decided to introduce a non-
numerical goal that the number of accidents should not increase no 
matter how much the traffic volume increased. In 1998, numerical 
goals were included in the Norwegian Road Traffic Plan, and with that, 
Norway became the last of the Nordic countries to adopt a national 
road safety programme that included numerical goals. Elvik believes 
that road-safety goals that are not made operational are not directive 
when choosing between means, and furthermore, that clear and 




6.3.1  The Ministry – “It’s a matter of principle”  
 
The Ministry opposes subsidiary goals, and has dismissed the need for 
such goals by pointing to the lack of knowledge on cause and effect, 
and the uncertainties in the premises for the calulations. The argument 
is that better statistics and more research are a precondition for 
subsidiary goals. Even with skewed statistics, we know too much about 
the reasons for traffic accidents to justify such an argument. The lack of 
subsidiary goals has also been explained as an ethical issue, where 
subsidary goals are tantamount to accepting traffic fatalities. This is 
poor rhetoric because it presupposes zero accidents, which is 
impossible, and it is also far removed from reality. Elsewhere, the 
Ministry explicitly states that we will not reach zero, so in practice we 
face an everlasting acceptance of traffic fatalities. 
 
At a conference in 2005,26 the Norwegian Minister of Transport and 
Communication at the time claimed that “subsidiary goals may be seen 
as a weakening of the philosophy behind the zero vision; human value 
                                                 
26 “Best in the Nordic region,” Stockholm. 
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and the right to live,” and that “subsidiary goals may take the focus 
away from what is done and has to be done well.” The first of these 
arguments is filled with pathos, while the second is quite vague: what 
does it mean that subsidiary goals might take the focus away from 
“what is done and has to be done well”? At the same conference, the 
Minister stated in metaphorical terms, “A vision is a guiding star that 
shows us what to reach for. It is something totally different from a 
strategy or a goal, which has to be instantiated and obtainable.” This 
makes the zero vision appear as if it is supposed to be an abstract 
strategy. The statement underscores that the zero vision remains an 
abstract notion even among the road authorities. 
 
The informants in the Ministry defend the position of the Minister. One 
of them points out that the decision to not have subsidiary goals is 
“based on principle”. The informant goes on to say, “It’s not like the 
Minister doesn’t want subsidiary goals per se.” The respondent sees the 
possible objections to the lack of subsidiary goals: “I guess you could 
claim” that it is based on a fear of not attaining the goals. The 
informants see the convenience of not having subsidiary goals: 
“Subsidiary goals give little leeway,” as one respondent put it, implying 
that there are other motives behind the decision not to have subsidiary 
goals besides “principle”.  
 
In the introduction to the chapter I mentioned that other Nordic 
countries have launched subsidiary goals in their road safety work. The 
Swedish authorities have set themselves very ambitious targets, but 
have not come close to reaching these goals, and much criticism has 
been levelled at them because of this. The head of the Swedish Road 
Traffic Inspection Board believes that if the politicians and the 
authorities responsible for road safety in Sweden had taken the goal of 
270 fatalities by 2007 seriously from the outset, over 1000 lives could 
have been saved. I assume that this has affected the position of the 
Norwegian road authorities on this question. They are probably afraid 
of experiencing the same as the Swedes. What is worse than to be held 
accountable for not saving lives? 
 
The Ministry realises that the PRA wants subsidiary goals. One 
informant explains that the PRA has tried to incorporate subsidiary 
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goals because “they really want goals like this.” The Ministry, on the 
other hand, has a more “pragmatic stance.” A respondent from the PRA 
confirms this: “There are some subsidiary goals out there even though 
the Ministry does not want them.” This is a somewhat peculiar 
situation. Obviously the PRA has found that they have to insinuate 
subsidiary goals into the process to do a better job with road safety.  
 
It is interesting to see what the key government documents say about 
this issue. The National Transport Plan emphasises that we have to be 
goal oriented when striving for zero fatalities and permanent injuries. 
The National Action Plan states that to ensure that we are on the right 
course, “it is important to define specific goals that can direct the actors 
and be followed up on” (HP:31). Even if this is expressed in the action 
plan, only a periodic goal is given in the transport plan itself – a 
maximum of 190 traffic fatalities by 2012. To ensure that we are on 
track, the action plan is equipped with “status” goals – e.g. that 85% of 
road users should keep to the speed limit by 2011. It is hard to see how 
such goals can be a directive tool for the key actors. I believe practice 
does not reflect the intention stated in the key documents when it 
comes to subsidiary goals.  
 
 
6.3.2  The PRA – “When you only have a vision you get a 
heavy feeling” 
 
A vast majority of informants from the PRA favours subsidiary goals. 
Only one informant, from the Directorate, states that it does not matter 
too much if we have subsidiary goals. Some statements that underscore 
the importance of subsidiary goals are: “It’s hard to understand why we 
can’t have goals that are measurable,” “If we don’t have subsidiary 
goals, it’s back to being just a vision,” and “the PRA must have goals 
that can be measured, and we have to come as close as possible to the 
goals.”27 It is clear from these utterances that the main reason for 
demanding subsidiary goals in the PRA is to make the road safety 
effort more concrete. 
 
                                                 
27 In “the Road and Us”, No. 1 – January 15 2004. 
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Several respondents from the PRA object to the claim that having 
subsidiary goals means accepting traffic fatalities. The following 
utterances exemplify this: “The accept-in-itself argument is something 
you say to avoid being measured against,” “this is a substitute motive to 
leave room for other priorities,” and “you’re back to the zero vision 
being just rhetoric.” One informant believes we can just re-phrase it 
and state that the goal is to reduce the number of deaths by 100 within 
2012. “It’s the 100 we are going to save, not the 200 we are going to 
kill.”  
 
Introducing subsidiary goals opens for a debate on what happens if the 
goals are not reached. Many suspect that the real reason why the 
Ministry does not have subsidiary goals is to avoid being measured 
according to them. “The Ministry does not want to plant tripwires for 
themselves,” and “the Ministry could be a little hesitant to commit their 
budgets,” to quote two informants from the PRA. One respondent 
asserts that if they set an attainable goal and do not get anywhere near 
it, yet still believe that the goal could have been reached if they had 
done what they were supposed to, “that would be a strong argument to 
get the ball rolling.” In other words, the zero vision may be used as a 
coercive tactic, which the road authorities will then experience as 
intimidating.  
 
Although the overall impression is that the PRA wants to have 
subsidiary goals, the inclination to dismiss the need for subsidiary goals 
is more visible at the Directorate than on the regional level. Employees 
at the central level could feel an obligation to tone down the necessity 
of subsidiary goals. One respondent from the Directorate believes it is 
not necessarily that important to have subsidiary goals: “We are doing 
the same as the Swedes, but we take into account that there are 
deficiencies in the registration procedures and that there are natural 
fluctuations in the number of fatalities.” If registration procedures and 
natural fluctuations are to determine this issue, we will probably never 
adopt subsidiary goals. Nor does it seem plausible that the Swedes have 
not considered such factors when introducing subsidiary goals.  
 
One respondent in the Directorate expresses doubts about subsidiary 
goals with respect to the division of roles, resources and the fact that 
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they are not in full control over all that is being done: “There are many 
actors and they are only responsible for some of the measures.” Hence, 
they cannot give guarantees on goal attainment. According to this view, 
the PRA would need to have total control over all measures if they 
were to be in favour of subsidiary goals. I believe this view also says 
something about a general desire in the PRA to feel that they are in 
control. The fact is that the PRA already does control many road-safety 
aspects.  
 
The demand for subsidiary goals is strongest at the regional level in the 
PRA. Here subsidiary goals are portrayed as an important tool for 
directing their work, which then requires more resources. The zero 
vision itself is not enough. "When you only have a vision you get a 
heavy feeling,” to quote one respondent. Some respondents link 
subsidiary goals directly with the job they have been told to do. This is 
evident in statements like: “When you do a job you are supposed to 
have goals for measuring results”, and “concrete demands are 
necessary for doing a decent job.” Without subsidiary goals there are 
no milestones and the work lacks commitment. Based on these 
utterances it becomes obvious how important the dichotomy between 
concrete and abstract is when it comes to the zero vision. 
 
 
6.3.3  The Police – “It depends on how you formulate it” 
 
Informants from the Police are split over whether it is a problem that 
we do not have subsidiary goals in Norway. Respondents from the 
Mobile Police find this is unfortunate, while other informants believe it 
is not too significant. A representative from the Mobile Police states 
that we have subsidiary goals in other arenas without referring to this as 
“acceptance.” A respondent from the Police Directorate believes 
subsidiary goals are “a little problematic.” The informant underscores 
the importance of language when stressing that it “depends on how you 
formulate it.” One regional representative expresses that the numbers 
are already low, and becomes defensive when stating, "If we aim higher 
it will be impossible to attain the goals.” This last remark has 
similarities with the belief that the road authorities refrain from 
introducing subsidiary goals because of what has been experienced in 
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6.3.4  Safer Driving – “It is easier to reach concrete goals” 
 
A majority of informants from Safer Driving believe we should have 
subsidiary goals but there is internal disagreement. One key informant 
explains that this is one area where he disagrees with the road 
authorities. “We know that when concrete goals are set, it is easier to 
reach the goals.” It is difficult to communicate the zero vision if such 
goals are not present. “The zero vision is too complicated. It is better to 
set concrete goals for road safety than to talk about visions.”28 This 
utterance marks a clear distance to the zero vision. 
 
One respondent believes the real reason for not having subsidiary goals 
is that “the Ministry does not want negative publicity if they do not 
attain them.” Respondents from Safer Driving are sceptical to 
arguments given by the Ministry for not having subsidiary goals. The 
argument that subsidiary goals can be equated with accepting traffic 
fatalities is a “strange form of rhetoric.” However, one respondent 
agrees with the Minister that subsidiary goals can be equated with 
accepting traffic fatalities. If you set a goal that within a period of time 
fatalities should be halved, “then that is a kind of acceptance.”  
 
Two utterances that convey another view of subsidiary goals in Safer 
Driving are: “It is not the most important thing to have subsidiary 
goals,” and “subsidiary goals do not improve road safety.” If we refer 
to Ramírez (2000), the view that subsidiary goals are not that important 
suggests that the zero vision is being kept on an abstract level in Safer 
Driving.   
 
 
                                                 
28 In the transport magazine published by the Institute of Transport Economics, No. 4 
– May 2006. 
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6.3.5  NAF – “The zero vision is not operational without 
subsidiary goals”  
 
Informants from NAF believe it is unfortunate that we do not have 
subsidiary goals in Norway. NAF is concerned about the abstract level 
of the zero vision, and believes subsidiary goals are necessary to 
counter the perception of it as lacking substance. According to one 
respondent, “the zero vision is not operational without subsidiary 
goals.” Another view is that the Ministry avoids making such goals 
because they “imply comprehensive measures.” One respondent 
believes the lack of rhetorical appeal may be a reason for not 
introducing subsidiary goals. “A goal of 200 deaths does sound ugly.” 
In other words, NAF believes the Ministry is consciously using ethos 
and pathos in its attitude. 
 
 
6.3.6  The County – “It could be interpreted as disclaiming 
liability” 
 
One of the county administration informants believes subsidiary goals 
would require a more determined attitude on the allocation of the 
resources necessary to attain the goals. The lack of subsidiary goals 
could be interpreted as a “disclaiming liability.” One thing is having 
random wishes, but it is quite different to convert these wishes into 
concrete goals that are possible to reach. According to one informant, 
the view that subsidiary goals are tantamount to accepting fatalities “is 
stupid.” It does not mean this is accepted just because a prognosis states 
that traffic fatalities will continue to occur in the future.  
 
 
6.3.7  Only the Ministry opposes subsidiary goals 
 
The Ministry expresses the greatest reluctance to setting subsidiary 
goals. There are many possible explanations for this. They argue that 
subsidiary goals are not a good fit with the ethics of the zero vision. 
However, it seems clear that other motives play an important role in 
this decision, with the experiences in Sweden perhaps being the most 
important explanation in this respect. This preference to avoid 
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subsidiary goals is an example of using rationalising strategies, as 
explained in Flyvbjerg’s theories (1998). There are suspicions as to the 
real reason for not having subsidiary goals.  
 
The general view in the PRA is that subsidiary goals are an important 
managing tool, and that many of the arguments given by the Ministry 
are rhetorical. The fact that subsidiary goals can be used as a coercive 
tactic if they are not reached is given as a possible reason why 
subsidiary goals are absent. It is interesting that there seems to be a 
discrepancy between the central and regional levels of the PRA on this 
subject. The Directorate is more hesitant when it comes to portraying 
subsidiary goals as important in the road safety work. The Directorate 
is close to the Ministry and in many ways represents the policy level. 
This may inhibit this institution from being too direct on the subject. It 
has already been pointed out that some respondents from the regional 
level of the PRA believe their management has become too political in 
its approach to road safety. The position of the Directorate on 
subsidiary goals may be an example of this, even if there are also 
respondents at the central level who favour subsidiary goals.  
 
Looking at the discrepancy between the Ministry and the PRA, 
especially on the regional level, it could be argued that the Ministry has 
an incremental and pragmatic approach to the zero vision, while the 
PRA has a strategic and operational approach. This could also explain 
why there is disagreement on subsidiary goals. Fixed and precise goals 
are not part of an incremental approach, while strategic planning is 
characterised by long-term goals. Thus, in strategic planning, fixed and 
precise goals are desired as a guiding tool. Judging from the views of 
respondents from the PRA, the lack of subsidiary goals means that the 
zero vision to some extent loses its value as an innovative force. 
 
The Police and Safer Driving are not convinced about the necessity of 
subsidiary goals. Based on the interviews, both organisations are split 
on this. The incentives for Safer Driving and the Police to favour 
subsidiary goals are not as evident as in the PRA. For example, 
subsidiary goals are not deemed necessary in terms of guiding the 
efforts, as is the case in the PRA. NAF believes subsidiary goals are 
necessary to make the zero vision more operational. Judging from the 
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interviews conducted at the county administration level, the view is that 
subsidiary goals are desirable. The county also has much focus on the 
operational aspects of such goals.  
 
A common view among the key actors is that a lack of subsidiary goals 
“helps” to preserve the zero vision as an abstract phenomenon. When it 
comes to subsidiary goals, the Ministry is the primary opponent. 
Several arguments are given, although many of the arguments are 
weak. What is said about preserving the zero vision as an abstract idea 
brings us back to Neumann (2001) and his focus on why so many 
practices remain the same over time. I believe other utterances from 
Ministry informants, for instance the view that “there is no problem 
living with the zero vision as it is manifested today,” suggest that there 
are forces in the Ministry who are very concerned about what direction 
the zero vision takes. Thus, the Ministry is probably afraid of the 
consequences if they are more open to subsidiary goals.    
 
The fact that the Ministry has decided not to have subsidiary goals has 
led to mistrust about the willingness to translate the ideological words 
of the zero vision into concrete action. In the absense of such goals, it is 
difficult to say how big the road safety effort should be, and there is a 
pragmatic convenience about that. The absence of subsidiary goals may 
be taken in support of a vision that has yet to materialise into action. 
Elvebakk and Steiro (2005) point out that not having subsidiary goals 
gives more time to prepare and adjust the course of action. At the same 
time, it might lead to less commitment since the “moment of truth” is 




6.4 COMMUNICATING THE ZERO VISION TO THE 
PUBLIC 
 
The zero vision is based on three cornerstones: the zero vision as an 
ethical imperative, as a scientific approach and as a shared 
responsibility. In the previous sections I have established that all the 
respondents agree with the zero vision as an ethical imperative. 
Moreover, I have concluded that very few respondents, and mainly 
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representatives from the PRA, think of the zero vision as bringing new 
aspects to the scientific approach to road safety. This leaves the 
question of how the actors feel about the shared responsibility of the 
zero vision. The county administration level does not feature in this 
section as one of the interviews was conducted as a test interview that 
did not give any results on this question, and therefore I have omitted it. 
 
Due to the stronger focus on a shared responsibility introduced by the 
zero vision, road safety seems much more like a joint venture between 
the road authorities and road users. Bearing this in mind, it could be 
expected that the authorities and the specialist environment see the 
importance of communicating the zero vision to the public, and 
creating pathos for the zero vision and its increased focus on road 
safety. To reveal the respondents’ views on this, they were asked how 
they feel about communicating the zero vision to the public. They were 
also asked to comment on two statements. The first statement was that 
awareness-raising campaigns generally have little impact on the 
accident tolls. The second statement was that it is not possible to 
practise an efficient enforcement of rules and regulations without the 
public’s understanding. The comments on these statements will tell us 
how respondents feel about communication in general. 
  
The challenge documents that preceded the National Transport Plan 
(2002-2011) state that getting road users to accept the zero vision is “an 
important part of the work with it” (53). The plan states that getting the 
number of traffic accidents down is a common challenge for everyone 
involved in road safety work, and that the zero vision should be the 
common basis for the road safety work “in the Ministry, the PRA, the 
Police, counties and municipalities, organisations and for the individual 
road users” (NTP:46). The National Action Plan sees it as important to 
highlight the consequences of the zero vision and “show how it 
concerns everyone who can affect road safety” (HP:44). The plan states 
that it is important to inform about the vision and its consequences, and 
that the PRA bears the main responsibility for this.  
 
As we see, road users are focused on as an important party in the zero 
vision. Emphasis is given to the fact that the zero vision should be the 
basis for how road users think about road safety. Key documents are 
150 
Conceptualisation, Instantiation and Change    
explicit about the necessity of communicating the zero vision to the 
public, and it is difficult to see how the key actors can avoid the 
guidance given in the most important government documents. It is also 
important to note that the PRA is given a special responsibility for this. 
As such, one would perhaps expect that respondents from the PRA are 
more positive to this than the other actors. 
 
 
6.4.1  The Ministry – “Too much up in the air” 
 
Both of the informants from the Ministry state that it is not important 
how the road users understand the zero vision. One respondent believes 
we have to relate the zero vision to something particular and 
communicate why we do certain things. Better road safety will not only 
be achieved by communicating to the public that we now have a zero 
vision. This leaves the zero vision “too much up in the air.” Another 
view is that it is difficult to communicate the zero vision to the 
population without zero fatalities and zero serious injuries appearing as 
“attainable goals.” It is more important to convey the intention behind 
the various measures.  
 
Here we see the fear that the zero vision is too abstract for the public to 
grasp, and the preference to link it to concrete road safety measures. In 
the reasoning, we also see the use of rationalising strategies as 
elaborated by Flyvbjerg (1998): As the public is evidently not equipped 
to understand what the vision entails, we might as well not inform them 
about it at all.  
 
Neither of the informants has an opinion on the statement that 
awareness-raising campaigns in general have little impact on the 
accident tolls. However, they both agree that it is not possible to 
practise an efficient enforcement of rules and regulations without the 
understanding of the public. This suggests that the respondents believe 
that information intended for road users is important in some cases. The 
impression from interviewing respondents from the Ministry is, 
nevertheless, that they do not see it as important to communicate the 
zero vision to the public.  
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6.4.2  The PRA – “Too abstract for the man in the street” 
 
A vast majority of respondents from the Directorate of Public Roads 
state that it is not important how the road users understand the zero 
vision. This view is seen in the following utterances: “The man in the 
street will not be able to make anything out of it – it’s too abstract,” 
“Why communicate a concept that is their internal tool? It has to be 
communicated through projects,” and “It’s stupid to communicate it as 
a package.” One informant explains that he “could not care less about 
communicating the zero vision to the public;” He wants to 
communicate road safety to the public, not the zero vision. The views 
in the Directorate have much in common with what is expressed by 
informants in the Ministry. Both parties seem to believe that the zero 
vision is too abstract to communicate to the public. 
 
At the regional level, a vast majority believe it is important to 
communicate the zero vision to the public. Only one respondent is 
negative to this. One informant asserts that we have to reach out to the 
road users and inform them about what the zero vision implies and 
which measures will be implemented in the future. “In doing this we 
could achieve a better understanding of measures that restrict freedom.” 
In other words, the zero vision could be used to legitimise action.  
 
The respondent who is negative has worked closely with the vision 
since it was adopted in Norway. This informant feels it is pointless to 
communicate the zero vision to the public because they would not be 
able to make anything out of it. “The authorities have used five years to 
come to grips with the zero vision. It is their way of thinking about road 
safety and the public should not be saddled with this. Let this be their 
problem.” A regional respondent contests this view: “When you define 
the zero vision in an easy way, people understand what it’s all about – 
that by exercising normal behaviour you should not be at risk of being 
killed or permanently injured in traffic.” The discrepancy could be a 
result of differing interpretations of the complexity of the zero vision. 
The more complex one makes it out to be, the more difficult the task of 
communicating it. This is probably an important reason why informants 
who have a developed view of the zero vision are more inclined to be 
negative to the communication aspect.   
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It is interesting that the regional level of the PRA is positive, while the 
Directorate is negative to communicating the zero vision to the public. 
To a greater extent than at the regional level, respondents from the 
Directorate see the zero vision as an internal tool of the PRA, and not 
something that is of particular interest to the public at large. One 
explanation might be that the regional level experiences a close link 
with the public, and feels it is important to inform them about all 
aspects of the road safety campaign – the zero vision included. This 
link may not be as close to the Directorate. Moreover, the central level 
may see it as a financial question; that this is not something money 
should be invested in. Thus, they may see a need to rationalise and 
dismiss the importance of communicating the zero vision to the public.  
 
One respondent from the Directorate points out that the zero vision has 
been ridiculed amongst the public. This in itself could be a reason for 
wanting to keep the zero vision out of the public eye. Keeping the zero 
vision within the corridors of the key actors is one way of escaping 
critisism from the public. It could of course be argued that informing 
the public about the zero vision would prevent much of the critisism 
from surfacing in the first place. The fact that the zero vision makes 
demands for more restrictions could also influence the decision not to 
communicate the zero vision to the public.  
 
In the responses to the two statements, there is a tendency to downplay 
the importance of communicating road safety to the public in the PRA. 
A majority of respondents from the PRA believe awareness-raising 
campaigns have little impact on the accident tolls. One reason for this 
might be that respondents from the PRA have a weak relationship with 
such campaigns because they do not do much of this kind of work 
themselves. Three out of four respondents who disagree that it is not 
possible to practise an efficient enforcement of rules and regulations 
without the understanding of the public are from the PRA. The 
respondents probably experience that they can implement measures and 
do a good job with road safety without communicating everything they 
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6.4.3  The Police – “Do we have a vision it is impossible to 
communicate?” 
 
All the respondents from the Police believe it is important to 
communicate the zero vision to the public. As such, the opinion in the 
Police to some extent deviates from the PRA respondents. An 
informant from the Mobile Police asks rhetorically if we have chosen a 
vision it is impossible to communicate. “If that is the case, we have a 
problem. Isn’t one of the aims that it should unite us?” Reading the key 
government documents, the respondent clearly has a point. The 
National Transport Plan explicitly states that the zero vision should be a 
common basis for all the actors involved in road safety work, including 
the road users. Another respondent from the Mobile Police believes 
there is not enough focus on the zero vision in society. “There is a zero 
vision project underway in my region, and there are people working 
full time on this, but there is very little talk about it.” The respondent 
believes we have to “get the zero vision more out to the public.”  
 
A majority of respondents from the Police agree with the statement that 
awareness-raising campaigns in general have little impact on the 
accident tolls. This is a little surprising. One would perhaps expect 
respondents from the Police, with their focus on the road users and tight 
cooperation with Safer Driving, to be more positive to awareness-
raising campaigns. One explanation could be, as in the PRA, that the 
respondents do not feel a strong relation to such campaigns. All the 
informants agree that it is not possible to practise an efficient 
enforcement of rules and regulations without the understanding of the 
public. This indicates that the Police favour some form of 
communication to the public. 
 
 
6.4.4  Safer Driving – “A lot could be gained from 
communication”  
 
All the respondents from Safer Driving are in favour of communicating 
the zero vision to the public. This is not surprising considering that the 
provision and dissemination of information is an integral part of their 
work. One informant believes “a lot could be gained from this.” 
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Respondents from Safer Driving are quick to turn to the PRA in this 
respect. According to a key respondent, the PRA has done a “poor job” 
when it comes to communicating the zero vision to the public. “It’s 
hard when the bureaucracy does not understand it, or cannot convert 
it.” The informant believes too few know what the zero vision is, even 
in the PRA. Another informant believes “questions could be raised 
about the communicative abilities of the PRA in general.” Safer 
Driving obviously believes it is better equipped than the PRA to 
communicate road safety, and it is using its authority in communicative 
skills to underscore this point. Communication and education is the 
domain of Safer Driving. This has many of the same characteristics as 
when the PRA uses its authority to argue about road safety in general.  
 
A representative from Safer Driving stated in 2000 that it would be 
natural if they were given a key role in an attempt to communicate a 
“Norwegian understanding” of the zero vision to the public (NVF 
2000). It was pointed out that it would be impossible for Safer Driving 
to make a professional effort, with a view to creating understanding and 
acceptance of the consequences of the zero vision, if they were not 
provided with more funding. The initiative from Safer Driving could be 
seen as an attempt to acquire more resources, and it was certainly very 
insistent. If Safer Driving had been assigned the task of communicating 
the zero vision to the public, this would have opened for the possibility 
to define it along the lines of their road safety philosophy. Such a 
strategy is emphasised by Elvebakk and Steiro (2005). The proposal 
from Safer Driving would probably have met with resistance within the 
PRA, and as history shows, Safer Driving was never given such an 
assignment.  
 
All the informants from Safer Driving disagree that awareness-raising 
campaigns have little impact on the accident tolls. Moreover, all 
informants agree that it is not possible to practise an efficient 
enforcement of rules and regulations without the understanding of the 
public. The answers substantiate the position of Safer Driving when it 
comes to believing in educating the public about road safety, and 
informing the public about new initiatives, as for instance the zero 
vision. All in all, of the three key actors, Safer Driving is clearly the 
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one most favourable to communication in general and to 
communicating the zero vision to the public. 
 
 
6.4.5  NAF – “It’s important to communicate the 
individual’s responsibility” 
 
Both informants from NAF believe the zero vision should be 
communicated to the public. One respondent sees it as particularly 
important to “communicate the individual’s responsibility to reduce the 
number of fatalities and injuries.” The respondents from NAF agree 
that awareness-raising campaigns have little impact on the accident 
tolls. They also agree that it is not possible to practise an efficient 
enforcement of rules and regulations without the understanding of the 
public. The responses to the statements resemble those given by the 
Police, and even if NAF is not eager about awareness-raising 
campaigns, they believe it is important to inform about other matters. 
 
 
6.4.6  Disagreement on communicating the zero vision 
 
One assumption in the thesis is that the important actors will focus on 
communicating the zero vision to the public as it is seen as an 
important partner in the zero vision campaign. The actors have 
differing views on the necessity of communicating the zero vision to 
the public. The Ministry and the PRA, especially the Directorate, are 
hesitant about this, while the Police, Safer Driving and NAF are 
positive. Safer Driving is clearly the actor most in favour of 
communicating the zero vision. As pointed out at the beginning of this 
section, the PRA has been given the main responsibility of informing 
the public about the zero vision and its consequences. Based on the 
interviews, it does not seem like this responsibility has been taken too 
seriously. The question is whether the PRA are evading this 
responsibility deliberately or if they are even aware that they have this 
task.  
 
One important difference between the actors is the extent to which they 
experience that the zero vision is communicable. Is the zero vision easy 
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to communicate, understand and accept? The answer depends on how 
the zero vision is interpreted by the actors. The more meaning the zero 
vision has, the more difficult it is to communicate. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the PRA, which has the most vivid interpretation of the 
zero vision, is the actor most sceptical to communicating the zero 
vision to the public. The Police and Safer Driving focus more on the 
ethics of the zero vision, and communicating this is not as challenging 
as linking the zero vision to road safety. The Police, Safer Driving and 
NAF evidently do not see any problems in communicating the zero 
vision to the public. Informants from the Ministry also oppose 
communicating the zero vision, even if they do not have a very 
comprehensive understanding of it. As such, they fall into a category of 
their own. It is difficult to say why informants in the Ministry are 
sceptical to communication. 
 
One characteristic of road safety is that the public think they are just as 
competent to assess safety issues as the professionals. This might 
impede professionals from communicating the zero vision and other 
road safety initiatives as they believe they will be ill-received and 
ridiculed. It is difficult to communicate the zero vision in a way that 
satisfies the public, and to convey an image of zero fatalities to a public 
that might not accept traffic fatalities but has grown accustomed to 
them. Torgersen (1993) points out that what is often done in such 
instances is to highlight the intention of the new initiatives and stop 
there. I believe there are many signs that this is exactly what is 
happening. The operational aspects are left in the shadow of the ethical 
focus on the zero vision.  
 
Hellspong (1995) points out the importance of conveying arguments 
that create understanding. Good arguments convey immediate 
understanding, or meaning comes as a result of thought processes that 
are initiated in the listener. Hellspong maintains that a political act that 
does not manage to convince its target group is not a good solution to a 
problem in a democracy. If we apply this thinking to the zero vision, 
where little focus is placed on arguments that create understanding in 
the public, this means that the zero vision is not a good solution to the 
road safety problem.  
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6.5 IS THE ZERO VISION PRIMARILY A VISION FOR THE 
PRA? 
 
This chapter has focused on the change perspective of the zero vision, 
when it comes to how the key actors perceive both road safety and 
organisational change according to it. The discussion has focused on 
subsidiary goals and whether or not to communicate the zero vision to 
the public. In conclusion, I will examine the most important findings 
before I conclude by commenting on the question posed in the heading 
to this section: Is the zero vision primarily a vision for the PRA? The 
reader will notice the many links to theory in this section, but I have 
chosen not to explicitly use references, as this has been done at length 
already.  
 
Moving from the Ministry and the PRA, to the Police, Safer Driving, 
NAF and the county administration level, the zero vision clearly 
assumes a different meaning. Respondents from all these organisations 
agree that the zero vision is a positive thing, but as to the degree of 
change, only the PRA and to some extent the Ministry believe the 
vision has had any real impact. Other actors portray the zero vision 
more as a symbol in their road safety work. It is apparently a guiding 
principle, but on an ethical abstract level, not on an operational 
concrete level. 
 
The ways of conceptualising the zero vision vary, with the PRA 
responsible for most of the conceptualisation. While the vision is 
supposed to be a motivational factor for all the key actors, the PRA is 
in the driving seat when it comes to defining it. The PRA is striving to 
fill the zero vision with real substance, which means it is highly 
associated with the PRA. This has elevated the role of the PRA even 
more; as they now have a greater opportunity to define the future steps 
in road safety. The PRA uses their road safety authority in the process.  
 
All in all, and irrespective of organisations, more utterances portray the 
zero vision as “business as usual” than depict it as a change in the road 
safety efforts. The willingness to see the zero vision as a vehicle for 
change is greatest in the Directorate of Public Roads. The PRA shows 
much reluctance relating to the zero vision. Several arguments discredit 
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its practical effects. One common view in the PRA is that there is a 
potential for change in the zero vision, but that it still has not been 
instantiated into an important change factor in the road safety 
campaign. The degree of negativity ascribed to the zero vision in the 
PRA is surprising, and it is interesting that this degree of negativity is 
more or less absent at the policy level, in the Ministry and in the 
Directorate.  
 
Perhaps it is naïve to assume that the zero vision has affected processes 
and structures in the organisations. However, the ways in which the 
zero vision is portrayed would lead to the assumption that it at least 
affects priorities and efforts, as this is implicit in it. A majority of 
respondents from the PRA maintain that the organisation has changed 
its priorities and increased its efforts due to the zero vision. The views 
in the Police and Safer Driving are more reserved. According to the 
interviews, Safer Driving is more inclined to ascribe organisational 
change relating to priorities and efforts to the vision than the Police are.  
 
A common view in the PRA is that the zero vision is not followed up 
by the organisation as a whole, and there is a great deal of scepticism 
concerning how it is anchored. Evidently, the vision has not penetrated 
the organisation to a noticeable degree. According to respondents from 
the Police and Safer Driving, the zero vision is not well anchored at the 
top level in the organisations, thus it can be assumed that it has not 
pervaded the organisations as a whole either. The Police and Safer 
Driving also question exactly what to adapt to. How do you adapt to 
something when you consider it as business as usual? The data show 
that the zero vision is not embedded in the cultural practices of the key 
road safety organisations. This reduces the power of the zero vision to 
initiate change in the road safety efforts. 
 
I have looked into what kinds of measures are derived from the zero 
vision. When arguing for road safety measures it is sometimes said that 
they are necessary according to the zero vision. The vision is used as a 
legitimising reason for altering the use of measures. I believe the link 
between the zero vision and certain measures is rather far-fetched, and 
that it has been created to enhance the value of the zero vision. Median 
barriers are a good example. There is nothing to suggest that the zero 
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vision is responsible for this solution as it was already well integrated 
in the road safety work when the zero vision was introduced. After the 
introduction of the vision, the PRA has pushed for more median 
barriers, arguing that it is the best measure for preventing head on 
collisions, and we now have a stronger focus on the human tolerance 
level. This shows how important it is to be in the driving seat when it 
comes to giving meaning to the zero vision.  
 
The public debate has revealed that a new division of responsibility is a 
controversial element in the zero vision. One reason is probably that it 
is more tangible than other parts of the vision, which are easier to keep 
on an abstract level. It is also an element that points directly to the 
PRA, so it might be something they would prefer to under-
communicate. The PRA has what can be seen as an amnesty when it 
comes to criminal and liability responsibility. This is in stark contrast to 
what is said about a shared responsibility in the zero vision. The PRA 
states that they already have a responsibility to apply their competence. 
However, the shared responsibility in the zero vision does not only 
refer to an objective responsibility, but also to a judicial responsibility. 
Claiming that they already have a responsibility is a way of 
rationalising that there is no need for change in this respect. 
 
The zero vision does not lead to subsidiary goals and a plan for 
reaching these goals. Thus, the willingness to follow it up can be 
questioned. This was a bigger issue during the initial years after the 
introduction of the zero vision. As the actors have adjusted over time, 
this part of the debate has subsided. Nonetheless, it is still an interesting 
aspect of the zero vision because it reveals how abstract the vision is. It 
would be a step in a more concrete direction if the zero vision were 
given subsidiary goals. The Swedish experience of having these goals 
taken as measures has probably deterred the Norwegian authorities 
from doing this.  
 
Proponents of the zero vision have many positive aspects they could 
promote, and it could be expected that these would inspire them to tell 
the public. A platform for road safety has evidently been created that 
can be communicated in a clear manner. Even if key government 
documents lay down that communicating road safety and the zero 
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vision to the public is important, there is little enthusiasm to do this in 
the PRA. This is especially the case in the Directorate of Public Roads. 
I suspect part of the reason why the PRA is negative when it comes to 
communicating the zero vision compared to other key actors, is that 
they see the zero vision as so complex that it would confuse the public 
more than it would inform them. Other key actors do not see the vision 
in a similar way, and therefore do not have the same hesitations. It is 
undoubtfully odd not to inform the public about the zero vision while 
maintaining that the general population has an important role in its 
success. They are part of the problem and part of the solution, but they 
are not part of the debate.  
 
Turning to the question raised in the heading, I believe the findings in 
the thesis show that the zero vision is primarily a vision for the PRA. 
The PRA is the body that has conceptualised the zero vision to 
operationalise it, while the other actors at best see it as an ethical 
abstract guideline. The implication is that the PRA needs to promote 
the zero vision, as it cannot be expected that the other actors, who do 
not feel they have a strong relationship with it, will do much in this 
vein. This means that the PRA will continue to lead the way. While it is 
concluded that the zero vision is primarily a vision for the PRA, the 
data suggest that it is not even well anchored in the PRA. This leaves 
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7.  Cooperation and Conflicting Interests 
 
This chapter deals with cooperation between the actors, and how the 
relationships have been affected by the zero vision. The respondents 
were asked to elaborate on their relationship with other actors after the 
zero vision was introduced, and to what extent the relationships had 
changed.  
 
The National Action Plan explains that through the zero vision, the 
road authorities are seeking to create a common perception among the 
key actors. “When a policy based on the zero vision is developed, it is 
important that this is integrated by all the actors in the field” (Appendix 
3 – HP: 7-8). The discussion in the previous chapter has shown that 
such a common perception does not exist among the key actors. For the 
most part, only the PRA ascribes change to the zero vision, while the 
others see it as more or less business as usual. Thus, it is natural to 
assume that the Police and Safer Driving do not feel that the zero vision 
affects the relationships. The PRA may have a different view; as to 
some extent it sees the zero vision as a change with practical 
consequences. 
 
The disagreements over what the zero vision means make 
communication between the actors difficult. Communication largely 
depends upon having common concepts to which the various parties 
attach much the same meaning. It should be clear by now that the zero 
vision represents what Ball (1988) refers to as a contested concept. 
When a concept like the zero vision is omnipresent and the actors and 
individuals do not agree on its interpretation, this will have impact on 
the inter-organisational possibilities of reaching agreement and working 
together, and hence on its ability to initiate change. 
 
With respect to road safety work, it could be assumed that the actors 
would see the value in optimising relations between each other. But this 
is difficult to achieve because the actors have different perspectives. 
There are also cultural differences and conflicting interests between the 
actors. When there are many actors and different perspectives, friction 
might occur when planning road safety. As the new strategy in the road 
safety campaign, the zero vision implies that changes are being 
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introduced to change the way the work is conducted. These changes 
may challenge the distribution of responsibility for road safety and 
result in confrontation on important issues. Conflicting interests among 
the actors may embitter the relationships, depending on how well the 
zero vision fits with the existing practices of the various actors.  
 
The focus in the following will mainly be on the relationship between 
the three most important road safety actors. I will look into the 
relationship between the PRA and Safer Driving, between the PRA and 
the Police, and between the Police and Safer Driving. I will also 
examine some views on NAF as a partner in the road safety campaign, 
as NAF’s political department has expressed the desire for more 
cooperation with the key road safety actors on road safety. The main 
focus will be on areas where there is tension between the actors and on 
possible explanations for this, especially the degree to which the zero 
vision is one of the factors. The deliberations may give the impression 
that the actors do not cooperate well. Hence, it must first be pointed out 
that overall, the road safety actors cooperate very well. The thesis is not 
an attempt to undermine this cooperation, but to point out areas where 
there is a potential for improvement, and areas where the zero vision 
may have affected the relations. The chapter ends with a debate on 
whether the zero vision can be seen as a repositioning tool for the 




7.1  THE PRA AND SAFER DRIVING 
 
Several respondents from the PRA express dissatisfaction with Safer 
Driving as a partner in the road safety campaign. The viewpoints are 
quite similar at the Directorate and the regional level. The objections 
are centred on many inter-connected issues. Safer Driving feels much 
the same about the cooperation with the PRA, although their objections 
to the PRA are not as strong. Several issues have helped to create a 
tense relationship between the two. There are also signs that the zero 
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7.1.1 “We intrude into each other’s territory” 
 
A respondent from the Directorate of Public Roads believes the 
relationship between the PRA and Safer Driving is strained. “There is a 
love-hate relationship between them.” Part of the explanation is that 
they intrude into each other’s territory. In other words, this is a mutual 
feeling. According to the informant, the PRA has started going to 
schools with their own campaigns without consulting with Safer 
Driving beforehand. Safer Driving has not appreciated this. The 
Ministry has given the Directorate the main responsibility for 
coordinating national information campaigns and measures. At a road 
safety conference in September 2004, the Minister explained that the 
National Transport Plan gives the PRA the responsibility to formalise 
and follow up on the cooperation with the authorities and interest 
organisations in the road safety campaign. However, this is not 
supposed to change “the role Safer Driving has as a nationwide 
organisation for voluntary road safety work.”  
 
It seems like the division of roles in information campaigns and 
education measures is unclear. The question of who owns the right to 
inform and educate in schools seems unresolved. One respondent from 
the county administration level believes the PRA has discovered that 
awareness-raising work is important after the zero vision. “The zero 
vision has affected the division of roles between the PRA and Safer 
Driving”. The informant has worked with both the PRA and Safer 
Driving. While appearing as good friends, they have a professional 
conflict. “The PRA feels that Safer Driving is steeling from them, while 
Safer Driving experiences that the PRA is intruding into their territory.” 
Berg and Olsen (2005) believe that good relations between actors are 
enhanced when there is agreement about responsibility and where the 
actors do not impinge upon each other. This is clearly an area where 
such agreement does not exist, and where the PRA is intruding into 
what Safer Driving sees as their territory.  
 
The discussion is difficult, as the PRA has both the resources and the 
drive to conduct this type of work. The PRA evidently believes that 
they can do just as good a job as Safer Driving. In the PRA newsletter, 
“the Road and Us,” a representative from the Directorate expresses that 
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they have too little leeway when it comes to traffic education for 
children and young people. “The zero vision should lead to their 
involvement from cradle to grave.”29 Here we see that the zero vision is 
used as a legitimising reason for the PRA to become more involved in 
educational activities. This could be a sign that the PRA is seeking to 
reposition itself following the introduction of the zero vision. 
Moreover, this yet again illustrates the point that the PRA thinks of 
itself as the actor with the most knowledge on road safety. As pointed 
out by Foucault (1983), modern power is to a great extent connected to 
knowledge, and as such, power and knowledge become inseparable.  
 
There is internal disagreement in the PRA about whether or not to get 
more involved in education measures. One respondent from the 
Directorate thinks they should stay out of the schools and leave this to 
Safer Driving. One respondent from Safer Driving is surprised by the 
extent to which the PRA ventures into the schools. “They are 
trespassing on our territory.” One of the reasons is probably that “they 
want to work in more exciting areas”. Another respondent believes the 
PRA has different motives for this. This is unfortunate because “Safer 
Driving could have used the money in a better way since they have a 
better pedagogical basis.” This is a typical ethos-argument. Safer 
Driving obviously feels that if they were just handed the necessary 
resources, they could perform this task, without having to suffer from 
the “intervention” of the PRA.  
 
One respondent from Safer Driving believes they are constricted by 
small budgets. “We have the measures and the strategies but not the 
means to carry them out.” Another respondent from Safer Driving 
believes resources should be transferred from the PRA to Safer Driving 
in the areas where Safer Driving has the responsibility. One informant 
from Safer Driving believes the zero vision has been a “psychological 
element” in the road safety campaign. One way of interpreting this is 
that the zero vision has put pressure on certain tasks, and that Safer 
Driving experiences this more than the PRA.  
 
                                                 
29 No. 17 – November 4 2004. 
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A representative from Safer Driving has the following harsh judgment 
on the PRA. “They have so much money that they do not know how to 
spend it. They have redundant personnel they want to keep in 
employment, without considering that it takes pedagogical skills to 
teach. They probably want all the tasks. They are thinking more about 
their ego than road safety.” According to the respondent, actors should 
not “sit on their high horse and believe they are best, but put their 
resources together and exploit each other’s competence.” It is evident 
from this that Safer Driving feels the PRA is “pressing them out.” It is 
also evident that Safer Driving fears that it will lose assignments and 
thus their basis for existence. While the view that the PRA wants to 
muscle in on their territory would appear to be a case of professional 
paranoia on the part of Safer Driving, such feelings do not develop out 
of thin air. This reveals a relationship that is far from perfect. 
 
 
 7.1.2 “The contribution from Safer Driving is very insignificant” 
 
One informant from the PRA states that Safer Driving often has “too 
simple” a perspective on road safety. They use statistics in a disorderly 
fashion, they jump to conclusions and they often say things on 
insufficient grounds: “The truth is often a bit duller.” The implication is 
that Safer Driving is not too worried about the facts. When one 
respondent from the PRA says that Safer Driving should be more 
creative and better at evaluating the effects of their work, he seems to 
be implying that Safer Driving often does not know what it is talking 
about. The PRA is clearly using its authority and ethos in its reasoning 
on this. 
 
According to one informant from the PRA, the PRA has to be more 
reserved when speaking out on road safety matters. “A challenge for 
them is to convey good messages based on facts.” Another respondent 
points out that “The PRA is better at being focused on the problem and 
how to solve it. Safer Driving finds an arrangement they feel is nice to 
carry out and which is easy to sell, but does it contribute to enhanced 
road safety?” One informant from the PRA sees the contribution from 
Safer Driving as “very insignificant.” They have their outcries now and 
again, but they get little approval. It is a little shallow, and they spend 
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too much time on their own. They are not part of a professional 
environment that enables them to move beyond what their own 
organisation is feeding them.”  
 
In one district, Safer Driving used to participate with the PRA when 
they arranged meetings. Apparently, the PRA no longer has an interest 
in this. According to a county representative, “it’s because of their 
[Safer Driving] way of thinking which is not the same as at the PRA.” 
The informant believes it is impossible to build good relations with 
someone by telling them “I‘m the boss of this department and Safer 
Driving is on their own. I want nothing to do with you.” One informant 
from Safer Driving believes the PRA is not willing to work closely 
enough with them: “The PRA likes to do things on its own, which 
undermines the relations with Safer Driving.”  
 
One reason why the PRA in some regions is not interested in working 
closer with Safer Driving could be that they do not find the contribution 
from Safer Driving particularly interesting for them. Comparison can 
be drawn to what Foucault (1983) says about the inseparable link 
between power and knowledge. Informants from the PRA do not see 
Safer Driving as an organisation pervaded by knowledge on road 
safety. Thus, the incentive to cooperate with Safer Driving is perhaps 
not too strong. The fact that there is tension in some regions could also 
be dependent on persons and “chemistry.”  
 
Safer Driving is accused of not involving other actors. One respondent 
from the Ministry asserts that “Safer Driving has a tendency to do 
things on their own.” Informants from the PRA also infer this. Safer 
Driving is very focused on being in the media, and they are quick to 
respond. One explanation why Safer Driving does not involve other 
actors, as asserted here, could be practical considerations; they are a 
small organisation and can respond quickly. As pointed out by one 
respondent from the PRA, it is a more cumbersome organisation. There 
is reason to believe that they have to “go through the channels” before 
they can address the media. It could also be argued that Safer Driving 
does things on their own because they are excluded by the PRA, as 
shown above. This is also pointed out in other statements from Safer 
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Driving informants. Whatever the reason, it is evident that there could 
be a much better dialogue between the two organisations.  
 
 
7.1.3 “There are a lot of people in the PRA that do not know the 
zero vision” 
 
According to one respondent in Safer Driving, “the knowledge about 
the zero vision is not impressive, even among professionals. There are a 
lot of people in the PRA who do not know about the zero vision … they 
think it is the same as in Sweden.” The view that the PRA equates the 
zero vision in Norway with the one in Sweden reveals the differences 
between the PRA and Safer Driving that arose when the vision was 
adopted to Norway. Initially, Safer Driving hesitated to accept the zero 
vision, believing that the physical orientation of the vision dominated, 
compared to the focus on education and information. Referring to 
Solheim (1999A), it could be argued that this interpretation of the zero 
vision undermines the identity of Safer Driving.  
 
Allegedly, there is now agreement among the key road safety actors on 
the fact that road users play an important role in the zero vision. 
However, this appears to be very fragile, with the threat of 
disagreement not far off. The attitude that road users play an important 
role in the zero vision could be something that is primarily said to 
please Safer Driving. I believe the finding that respondents from the 
Ministry and the central level of the PRA are sceptical to 
communicating the zero vision to the public shows that road users do 
not have a particularly important role to play in the zero vision.  
 
Even if the zero vision to some extent counters the interests of Safer 
Driving, it could be argued that Safer Driving has no choice but to 
support it. The positive sound of the zero vision makes it virtually 
impossible for an ideological organisation like Safer Driving to oppose 
it without undermining their position. There are certain expectations 
connected to Safer Driving, and they probably do not feel that it would 
favour their cause to oppose the zero vision. Referring to Flyvbjerg 
(1998), there are signs that the rationalising of strategies enters into the 
reasoning from informants in Safer Driving. It is perhaps not rational 
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for Safer Driving to favour the zero vision. Still, they feel captured by 
it, and find that they have to be positive. To make it justifiable, the 




7.1.4 “Safer Driving basks in the glory” 
 
Respondents from the PRA are preoccupied with the position Safer 
Driving has attained in the road safety campaign, considering their 
mandate and size. One respondent points out that Safer Driving has 
managed to build a position for itself. The media “sees them as bigger 
than they are.” One respondent believes this is due to the general 
manager in Safer Driving. “The manager is present in all arenas, 
turning Safer Driving into a giant, but there is no connection between 
their media role and the work they perform. They are given a bigger 
role than they deserve.” Elaborating on the media position of Safer 
Driving, one respondent from the PRA points out that the PRA has the 
position it is meant to have both in relation to the Ministry and 
Parliament: “It’s not that important if they are visible in the media. The 
important thing is to do a good job.” Flyvbjerg (1998) would call this a 
way of rationalising the PRA’s apparent absence in the media.  
 
There is tension within the PRA over the fact that many see road safety 
as synonymous with Safer Driving, while the PRA is thought of as an 
organisation that builds roads. According to a respondent from the 
Ministry, this is not an accurate impression. The PRA is a road safety 
actor, but they also have “other considerations they have to address”, as 
opposed to Safer Driving, which only has to deal with road safety. By 
“other considerations”, I assume the Ministry is referring to goals 
competing with road safety, as for instance mobility, the environment, 
economic efficiency and individual freedom. The point made by the 
Ministry is important for the deliberations in the thesis and the focus on 
goals competing with road safety. This discussion will be returned to in 
the next chapter.  
 
One PRA informant from the central level expresses that they “do not 
get the attention they deserve when it comes to road safety.” Similar 
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views are expressed at the regional level. One respondent believes it is 
somewhat difficult for them that Safer Driving is seen as the major road 
safety actor. “It is unfortunate because the PRA has a different 
foundation and level of competence.” According to another informant, 
the fact that road safety is often linked to Safer Driving “is probably 
much of the reason why there is a rivalry between them.” Considering 
that a common view in the PRA is that they are the most important 
actor, it is not surprising that several respondents feel this way.  
 
Respondents from the PRA underscore that Safer Driving is a small 
organisation with limited means. One of the regional representatives 
from the PRA strongly suggests that Safer Driving will have trouble 
surviving, and that “they need their fair share of media coverage.” A 
respondent from the Directorate points out that “Safer Driving is 
merely an umbrella organisation without any means.” The image 
conveyed by informants from the PRA is that Safer Driving has to fight 
for their existence, and in this process they become self-centred and at 
times disagreeable. What seems to annoy the PRA is that while they are 
the ones to launch campaigns, “Safer Driving basks in the glory,” as 
one informant put it. Berg and Olsen (2005) maintain that conflicts may 
arise in cases where some organisations are skilful in marketing their 
organisation and “forget” to mention others in the process. Based on 
the views expressed above I believe this is present in the relationship 
between the PRA and Safer Driving. 
 
 
7.1.5 “Safer Driving should become part of the PRA” 
 
Representatives from the PRA maintain that the difference in size 
between the PRA and Safer Driving impedes further cooperation: 
“There is too large a disparity between the two organisations,” to quote 
one informant. As pointed out in the theory, Morgan (1986) sees 
asymmetrical power relations as an important reason behind inter-
organisational conflicts. 
 
To solve the cooperation problems and rationalise the road safety work, 
two informants from the PRA propose the possibility of making Safer 
Driving part of the PRA. One informant believes it would be an 
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advantage to have one organisation dealing with everything. “If Safer 
Driving were incorporated into our organisation, they would perhaps 
produce a better product.” As mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
the road director was the head of the first version of Safer Driving. 
Perhaps what they want to do is to reinvent Safer Driving, making it 
into an organisation that is run by the PRA? The opinion that seems to 
be implied under the surface is that we can manage without Safer 
Driving in its present form.  
 
This is a controversial suggestion, which again signals that some 
respondents in the PRA see their own organisation as the superior actor 
in road safety. If Safer Driving were to be incorporated into the PRA, 
the Police would be on the outside, performing their controlling 
activities as normal. The view that Safer Driving and the PRA could be 
united in one organisation reveals that the PRA feels they could easily 
take on the tasks Safer Driving performs. As the PRA to an increasing 
degree has engaged in activities usually linked to Safer Driving, it also 




7.1.6 Summary of the relationship between the PRA and Safer 
Driving 
 
The interviews have disclosed that there is disagreement in the PRA 
concerning the extent to which it should conduct information 
campaigns in the schools. One view in the PRA is that they are just as 
competent as Safer Driving in performing such tasks. Informants from 
Safer Driving seriously contest this and believe they should have full 
responsibility for information and education activities. A small 
organisation like Safer Driving probably feels threatened by the PRA. 
Berg and Olsen (2005) point out that good relations are enhanced if 
there is agreement on responsibility. The data suggest that this is not 
the case between the PRA and Safer Driving when it comes to 
information activities in the schools. 
 
Several informants from the PRA are critical of the contribution of 
Safer Driving to road safety. A common view is that Safer Driving has 
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a coincidental approach to road safety and that it addresses the media 
and speaks about road safety in a tendentious way, without involving 
the PRA. Safer Driving, on the other hand, is unhappy with the PRA, as 
it does not want to work closely enough with them. The data in the 
thesis suggests that the relationship between the PRA and Safer Driving 
is not very close in some regions. I have pointed to some possible 
reasons for this. Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the PRA 
finds that there is little to gain from cooperating with Safer Driving. 
This brings us to what Foucault (1983) says about the link between 
power and knowledge. The PRA informants state that they are the most 
important actor in the road safety campaign, and also that the 
knowledge base in the PRA is superior to the other actors.  
 
One topic that often arose in the interviews with the informants from 
the PRA and Safer Driving is that Safer Driving was reluctant to accept 
the zero vision when it surfaced in Norway because of its strong 
physical orientation and close links with the Swedish zero vision. 
Representatives from the PRA and Safer Driving feel that the 
Norwegian version of the zero vision has incorporated road users to a 
greater extent, and that there is now agreement about this among the 
important actors. However, as mentioned before, this may have been 
said simply to avoid further discussion. According to Flyvbjerg (1998), 
they may choose to rationalise that the zero vision fits with their 
agenda. A question in the thesis is if the zero vision moves away from 
the institutional identity of Safer Driving. The interviews substantiate 
that the respondents from Safer Driving are sceptical to the vision. 
However, I do not believe that in its present manifestation, it is 
concrete enough to challenge the institutional identity of the key 
organisations.  
 
Road safety is often seen as synonymous with Safer Driving. Several 
informants from the PRA have a hard time accepting this, as they feel 
that the PRA is a more important road safety actor. One important 
reason why Safer Driving has attained its position is its media role. The 
PRA does not have a similar tradition of addressing the media. 
Informants from the Ministry and the PRA point out that the PRA also 
has to focus on goals competing with safety, while Safer Driving can 
173 
Cooperation and Conflicting Interests   
direct all their attention on road safety. This appears to mean that the 
PRA is rationalising about its lack of a similar strong media position.  
 
Morgan (1986) sees asymmetrical power relations as an important 
explanation for the emergence of inter-organisational conflicts. It is 
surprising that some respondents from the PRA point to this as an 
impediment to cooperation between the PRA and Safer Driving, and as 
a possible motivating factor for making Safer Driving part of the PRA. 
While it is highly unlikely that this will happen, it is interesting that the 
idea is proposed, and it indicates that information and education are 




7.2 THE PRA AND THE POLICE 
 
The PRA expresses some dissatisfaction with the Police, but only on a 
few issues. The Police also have problems with the PRA, but their 
worries are mainly related to territorial issues and not the foundation 
for how the PRA conducts their road safety work.  
 
 
7.2.1 “Automatic Traffic Control is the PRA’s baby” 
 
Based on how the Police prioritise cases and their lack of resources, the 
challenge document for the National Transport Plan proposes that the 
PRA should assist the Police more than it does today. It has been 
suggested that the PRA should be given the authority to issue speeding 
tickets for violations up to 20 kph over the speed limit, while the Police 
handle the more serious offences. Here we see a desire in the PRA to 
take on more tasks related to road safety. It is somewhat surprising that 
this proposal surfaces in the challenge document, and moreover, that a 
lack of resources in the Police is used to justify the initiative.  
 
The discussion on this issue is a source of conflict between the two 
actors, as the Police want full responsibility over speed checks. One 
informant from the Police Directorate believes “it is principally wrong 
to decriminalise speeding just because one organisation has more 
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resources.” A respondent from the Mobile Police believes the PRA 
should never be given the authority to issue fines for speeding, arguing, 
“It is a matter of principle.” The discussion resembles the debate 
between the PRA and Safer Driving concerning information activities 
in the schools. To a great extent, the focus is on whom has the formal 
responsibility as opposed to who has the financial muscle to perform 
such work. Berg and Olsen’s (2005) belief that good relations are 
enhanced if there is agreement on responsibility is relevant theory for 
this discussion. When it comes to conducting speed controls, there is 
obviously disagreement between the PRA and the Police.   
 
There is agreement between the PRA and the Police on the value of 
automatic traffic controls (ATC).30 However, there is tension over the 
administration of the system. The debate is about both method and 
principles, and territory and resources, which makes it a sensitive 
matter. The PRA see the division of roles when it comes to ATC as a 
practical question and not about territory and principles. One 
respondent explains, “This is not a big issue for the PRA. They are 
thinking about finances, that it is more efficient if they handle it. They 
do not want to become police officers.” In this straightforward way he 
states that it would be more efficient if the PRA dealt with the various 
aspects with ATC. This concurs with Flyvbjerg’s theory (1998) and his 
distinction between rationality and rationalisation. This is clearly an 
attempt to rationalise that the PRA should administer the entire system. 
 
One informant from the PRA points out that the purpose of ATC and 
other measuring methods is to reduce speeding. “If ATC can do this 
alone, there is no need for visible Police”. This is an interesting point, 
as the Police probably fear that the traditional way of conducting speed 
checks will be supplanted by ATC. “They are probably afraid that ATC 
will take over,” as one informant from the PRA expressed it. The 
Police may have reason to be worried about what the future holds for 
traditional ways of measuring speed. A respondent from the National 
Police Directorate points to a conflict between ATC and traditional 
methods. “ATC only deals with speeding and is a resource-demanding 
method.” The Police do not oppose ATC, but they have a more 
                                                 
30 From now on referred to as ATC. 
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balanced way of seeing it and traditional measuring methods. 
According to the informant, “ATC is the PRA’s baby.” This is an 
interesting standpoint, which suggests a weak relationship to ATC on 
the part of the Police. It also explains why the PRA is eager to take 
over more of the tasks related to ATC.   
 
 
7.2.2 “We have limitations we cannot control” 
 
One informant from the PRA points out that they have limitations they 
cannot control, “but if they get control over the limitations without this 
costing anyone anything…” One limitation is the capacity of the Police 
to handle cases generated by ATC. The respondent seems to believe 
that it would not cost the Police much to hand over the judicial 
responsibility for ATC. This is a qualified truth. Another respondent 
from the PRA believes the Police are afraid of losing resources, and 
“the more tasks they are released from, the fewer arguments they have 
to get more resources.” In this perspective, there could be major 
consequences in transferring the responsibility for ATC to the PRA. 
Thus, it is not hard to see why the Police are unwilling to give up their 
part of the ATC system.     
 
One informant from the Mobile Police maintains that to a great extent 
this is a question about resources: “It should not be the case that if you 
just have the resources you should take over both this and that.” As the 
respondent sees it, some principle guidelines have to be followed. 
According to this informant, the solution should be that the PRA is 
responsible for operating the system, while the Police deal with the rest. 
“Resources should be transferred to the Police to make this possible. 
The resources have to follow the tasks.” A respondent from the 
National Police Directorate believes some people in the PRA have too 
strong a belief in building their way out of the problems. “If the Police 
had received a minor share of what median barriers cost, they could 
have accomplished a lot.” This discussion reveals much about the 
asymmetrical power relations between the PRA and the Police, which 
according to Morgan (1986) may give rise to conflicts. There is a 
clearly a conflict over the ATC system.  
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7.2.3 “Road safety is not very prioritised in the Police” 
 
The National Police Directorate was established in 2001. The 
Directorate is limited to one person handling road safety issues on an 
overriding level. One respondent from the Directorate of Public Roads 
finds this “pretty ridiculous when we have three whole sections in our 
Directorate dealing with road safety.” One informant from the Mobile 
Police also finds this unfortunate. The new National Police Directorate 
has not exactly helped the situation: “The difference with or without a 
Police Directorate is that now one person works with road safety as 
opposed to two in the previous organisation.” According to the 
respondent, the fact that people are selected for this position in the 
Directorate for a two-year run also has implications for the cooperation 
with other actors. There is no continuity to their road safety work and 
the foundation for cooperation is fragile.  
 
The above-mentioned situation means that road safety does not have a 
very high priority in the Police. Respondents from the PRA are 
concerned about the degree to which the Police prioritise road safety. 
Much of the criticism of the Police is related to the status of road safety 
work and their lack of road safety competence. Several statements from 
PRA respondents substantiate this view: “Road Safety is not very 
prioritised in the Police”, “The Police have low competence when it 
comes to road safety,” “The Police do not think about the foundation of 
their work,” “The Police should become smarter,” and “The Police 
often think in conventional terms.” One view, which addresses the zero 
vision, is that the Police have to start looking into where “serious 
accidents occur.” The respondent is here suggesting that the police also 
lack a strong focus on the zero vision. The PRA is using its road safety 
authority when addressing this issue, and with reference to Foucault 
(1983), it is obvious that the PRA sees itself as the most important actor 
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7.2.3 Summary of the relationship between the PRA and the 
Police 
 
The relationship between the PRA and the Police is not characterised 
by as many conflicts as the relationship between the PRA and Safer 
Driving. One disagreement is over the PRA’s initiative to be more 
involved in speed checks. The Police feel that this interferes with their 
judicial responsibilities and reject the initiative. I doubt the PRA will be 
given the responsibility for conducting speed checks of the magnitude 
that is suggested. This attitude notwithstanding, it is an interesting 
initiative on the part of the PRA. There is another disagreement over 
the ATC system. The PRA want control over the entire ATC system, 
arguing that this is most practical. The pragmatic approach of 
respondents from the PRA and the ways of rationalising this issue make 
it natural to refer to the theory of Flyvbjerg (1998).  
 
There is disagreement between the PRA and the Police concerning 
these topics, and as Berg and Olsen (2005) point out, such 
disagreement does not help the relations. One argument the PRA 
respondents give for having complete control over the ATC system is 
that the Police have limited capacity. They counter this by asserting 
that resources should be transferred to them so that they can do a better 
job with ATC and road safety in general. The debate brings to light the 
asymmetrical relations between the actors and what Morgan (1986) 
suggests about this. In using asymmetrical relations, I am referring to 
the resource and manpower situation for road safety in the two 
organisations.  
 
A common view among respondents from the PRA is that the Police do 
not prioritise road safety and have a low level of competence in this 
area. There is no visible discrepancy between the Directorate and the 
regional level on this issue. Several respondents from the Police 
confirm that road safety has low priority. However, no informants from 
the Police agree that the competence level is low. Even if informants in 
the Police believe this is the case, they would probably not say so in an 
interview. It can be argued that the criticism of the Police is another 
example of how the PRA maintains its position as the most important 
actor in the road safety campaign. Foucault’s (1983) link between 
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power and knowledge should be mentioned in this respect. Implicit in 
the reasoning from the PRA is that they have another knowledge base 




7.3  THE POLICE AND SAFER DRIVING 
 
The relationship between Safer Driving and the Police is apparently 
very good. The interviews reveal few if any conflict areas. The Police 
and Safer Driving both focus on road users, and they are both organised 
into small regional units working with road safety. In many regions 
police officers also function as district secretaries for Safer Driving. All 
in all, this leads to a tight relationship between these two actors, which 
in many ways is different from the relationship between the PRA and 
Safer Driving and between the PRA and the Police. 
   
 
7.3.1 “They are our closest partner” 
 
The Police and Safer Driving identify with each other to a great extent. 
“The relations with Safer Driving are very good,” “Safer Driving is a 
good ambassador for the role of the Mobile Police” and “Safer Driving 
is their closest partner,” are some statements from the Police that 
illustrate the good cooperation with Safer Driving. That these feelings 
are mutual is apparent in utterances from the Safer Driving informants. 
“The Police are easy to relate to” and “The Police are their best 
partner.” It is interesting that both the respondents from the Police and 
Safer Driving see each other as their closest partner in the road safety 
campaign. 
 
An employee in Safer Driving explains that the two organisations have 
mutual goals and views on most things: “It would be very difficult to 
find a case that we have disagreed on.”31 The two organisations 
evidently have a common platform and perspective on road safety. The 
                                                 
31 In the transport magazine published by the Institute of Transport Economics, No. 4 
– May 2006. 
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representative explains that because of the resource situation in the 
Police they have to count on the Mobile Police as “the cornerstone in 
the road safety work of the Police.” A respondent from the Police 
Directorate states that he has treated Safer Driving somewhat unfairly 
because “the PRA demands more of their time.” Other respondents 
from Safer Driving and the Police also point to time as an impediment 
to even better cooperation between the two organisations.  
 
 
7.3.2 “Concerns about priorities” 
 
Some respondents from Safer Driving believe road safety is not given a 
high priority in the Police. As such, the respondents share the concern 
of the PRA. One respondent believes the Police have prioritised road 
safety even lower after the reorganisation. “The opportunity for the 
Police to do more on road safety is virtually absent.”  
 
One regional respondent from the Police questions the contribution of 
Safer Driving to the zero vision. "Safer Driving continues as before. 
They don’t think too much in a zero vision way. They go on handing 
out reflectors. Have they contributed at all?” The respondent obviously 
believes the Police have contributed more to the zero vision than Safer 
Driving. As the previous discussion has shown, this is questionable. It 
would probably be more accurate to say that neither of the 
organisations has contributed very much to the zero vision, as they both 
primarily see it as an ethical guideline without practical consequences. 
 
 
7.3.3 Summary of the relationship between the Police and Safer 
Driving 
 
The interviews show that the relationship between the Police and Safer 
Driving is impeccable. They cooperate very well and they apparently 
agree on “everything.” The only thing lacking is to have more time 
with each other. The way the relationship is portrayed it almost feels as 
if the PRA is left on the outside.  
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Respondents from the Police and Safer Driving express concerns about 
how road safety is prioritised in the two organisations. I doubt these 
worries are very deeply rooted. The harsh judgments given by some 
informants are probably a result of individual experiences and cannot 
be taken as the view of the entire organisation.  
 
The theory of Morgan (1986), Berg and Olsen (2005) and Flyvbjerg 
(1998) enlightens our look at the relationship between the Police and 
Safer Driving. Morgan maintains that asymmetrical power relations 
may create inter-organisational conflicts. The basis of power between 
the Police and Safer Driving is fairly symmetrical, which points to few 
conflicts between the organisations. While symmetrical power relations 
are not a guarantee that conflicts will be avoided, they can be a benefit. 
Turning to Berg and Olsen, the authors point out that agreement on 
responsibility is, if not a prerequisite for a good relationship, at least 
indicative of one. The Police and Safer Driving evidently “agree on 
everything”. This indicates that there is a good relationship between the 
two actors.  
 
Flyvbjerg looks at how rationalising strategies are utilised in politics. 
Rationalising is common when the power of rationality is no longer an 
option for the participants of a given discourse. The use of rationalising 
strategies is pointed out many times in the thesis, but in this case, there 
are no traces of this. This is indicative of a good relationship between 




7.4 THE COOPERATION WITH NAF 
 
There is an ingrained perception among the key road safety actors that 
NAF is not concerned with road safety, and that NAF mainly focuses 
on mobility. In this section I elaborate on some views concerning the 
position of NAF in the road safety campaign, and how key actors see 
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7.4.1 “NAF is not a serious road safety actor” 
 
NAF is attempting to become a more active partner in the road safety 
campaign, but is met with much scepticism, especially in the 
Directorate of Public Roads, but also at the regional level of the PRA. 
Some utterances that exemplify this are: “NAF is not a serious road 
safety actor. Their focus is on cars, taxes and on the authorities not 
building enough new roads,” “NAF is pretty laid back when it comes to 
road safety,” “NAF is concerned with other things than road safety” 
and “NAF prioritises individual freedom.”  
 
There are some interesting opinions here. For instance, some 
respondents in the PRA are clearly annoyed with the fact that NAF 
blames the authorities for not building enough new roads, believing that 
this is too simple. It is also highly interesting that one informant in the 
PRA maintains that NAF prioritises individual freedom. The message 
is apparently that NAF prioritises individual freedom while the other 
actors do not. I believe an important difference between NAF and the 
others is that the key actors are not explicit about this, while NAF is not 
afraid of saying that individual freedom is important. The key actors 
probably do not feel that it would be politically viable to say this, even 
if they believed it. This discussion will be returned to in the next 
chapter when goals competing with road safety are studied in terms of 
the zero vision. 
 
It is hardly worth disputing that a road user organisation like NAF has 
the potential to become an important road safety actor. It is worth 
noting that NAF has close to 500 000 members. However, based on the 
data material in the thesis, the willingness of NAF to measure up to this 
potential has not been taken seriously by the key actors. According to 
one respondent from the Ministry, NAF does not have a strong position 
in the road safety campaign. “NAF is a consumer interest organisation 
worried about gasoline prices.” One respondent from the Police thinks 
“NAF should work as much with road safety as with tax policies,” 
while an informant from Safer Driving believes that “people do not 
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7.4.2 “There is a prejudice against NAF” 
 
One informant from NAF explains that they are preoccupied with 
“meaning the right things.” This is an interesting choice of words. Does 
“right” refer to what they really mean or how they want to be seen by 
the outside world? This focuses on the ethos of the organisation, and on 
portraying NAF as a serious actor committed to road safety. According 
to the respondent, “there is a prejudice against NAF.” Bearing their 
political platform in mind, NAF wants to focus more on road safety, 
but they have a credibility problem with the key actors.  
 
One possible reason why the PRA is negative to NAF could be because 
of their role as a public “watchdog.” This is also the role Safer Driving 
often assumes. Over the years, NAF has criticised the PRA extensively 
for not focusing enough on infrastructure, and for their tax policies. 
This may have provoked the PRA. Moreover, NAF has often talked 
negatively about the PRA. As a result, the PRA may be reluctant to 
give NAF credit for their road safety work.  
 
 
7.4.3 Summary of the relationship between the key actors and 
NAF 
 
The discussion in this section is not an attempt to conclude that the 
official view among the key actors is that NAF is not a serious road 
safety actor. Nonetheless, it is worth noting how the PRA in particular 
is so negative to NAF, even when this organisation says it is willing to 
be a more active road safety partner. NAF and the PRA share a 
mutually negative view of each other. One common view is that NAF 
focuses on other things than road safety, while NAF counters this by 
stating that there is a prejudice against NAF. According to Flyvbjerg 
(1998), this could be seen as a way of rationalising that other actors are 
wrong in their views of NAF. Respondents from NAF believe their 
road safety efforts deserve more credit.   
 
The power relations between NAF and the key road safety actors are 
clearly asymmetrical, where the PRA stands out compared to the 
Police, Safer Driving and NAF. Based on Morgan’s theory (1986), this 
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could be expected to lead to conflicts. Since the PRA assumes a special 
role in the road safety efforts, it is not surprising that respondents from 
the PRA express the greatest reluctance towards NAF as a road safety 
actor. There is hardly any cooperation between the PRA and NAF, and 
there is reason to believe that a more developed relationship would 
result in conflicts on several issues. The climate of cooperation is 
probably better for the Police and Safer Driving. According to 
informants in the Police and Safer Driving, there is some measure of 
cooperation already. NAF probably finds it easier to relate to these 
actors due to their size and focus. 
 
It will take time for NAF to build a position where the key actors take 
them more seriously, but it is not inconceivable that they could acquire 
more credibility in the years to come. This in part depends on the 
direction NAF decides to take. One decision for NAF is if it should 
show more tact when it addresses the media, in order to “please” the 
key road safety actors, or if it should continue to serve as a “watchdog” 
and be critical of the authorities. The first alternative might make them 
more popular with the other actors, but at the same time undermine 
their “watchdog” role. If they choose to continue more or less as 
before, they will maintain their present position without getting any 




7.5 IS THE ZERO VISION A REPOSITIONING TOOL FOR 
THE ACTORS? 
 
The chapter has discussed how the zero vision has influenced the 
cooperation between the key road safety actors. Based on Hajer (1995), 
I wondered about the extent to which the zero vision has had an effect 
on the relationships between the important actors, and hence on 
discourse coalitions. The data in the thesis do not give grounds for 
claiming that the zero vision has had an effect on the relationships 
between the actors. The view among respondents, irrespective of the 
organisation, is that their relations have not been affected by the zero 
vision. It is evidently business as usual when it comes to how these 
actors cooperate. This is surprising, and it could be a sign that the zero 
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vision has not been instantiated to the point that it affects existing 
relations.  
 
The inter-organisational cooperation is not unilaterally positive. There 
are major cultural differences between the actors and several lead to 
conflicts, especially between the PRA and the other key road safety 
actors. The PRA is the strong operational leader with a unique position 
as the figurehead of road safety, while the Police and Safer Driving 
perform their tasks to the best of their abilities, but with few resources. 
While both the Police and Safer Driving “struggle” with the PRA, the 
cooperation between the Police and Safer Driving is very good. NAF is 
still not an accepted part of the road safety community. 
 
With reference to Morgan (1986), one assumption is that the power 
relations between actors are asymmetrical and give rise to inter-
organisational conflicts. The fact that there is tension between the PRA 
and the other actors, while the relationship between the Police and 
Safer Driving is more or less free from conflict, makes it tempting to 
conclude that asymmetrical power relations are the reason for this. The 
data have shown that some conflicts, for instance the willingness of the 
PRA to visit schools and the desire to be more involved in speed checks 
could be explained as an example of asymmetrical power relations. 
However, this hardly explains all the conflicts. I believe another 
important variable is the different perspectives of the key actors. Here 
the Police and Safer Driving have more in common compared to the 
PRA.  
 
The thesis looks into whether the division of road safety roles is unclear 
and the extent to which this leads to conflicts over who does what in 
the road safety efforts. This is based on Berg and Olsen’s theories 
(2005). The data suggest that this is a factor in the relationship between 
the PRA and the other key actors. The debates on education in schools, 
controlling activities and the division of roles when it comes to ATC 
are examples of this. Nonetheless, even if we find cases like these, the 
overall impression is that there are not many cases where the roles of 
these actors are unclear.  
 
185 
Cooperation and Conflicting Interests   
There are few open confrontations between the key road safety actors, 
and the data material shows that confrontations have been kept to a 
minimum after the introduction of the zero vision. Flyvbjerg (1998) 
believes this is often the case because actors understand that they do 
not benefit from open confrontations. Confrontations are therefore 
quickly transformed back to stable relations where the power of 
rationality and the good argument weigh more heavily than the 
rationality of power. Whether it is a conscious strategy to limit the 
number of confrontations is difficult to say, but this is probably not 
coincidental. An interesting question is how the zero vision has affected 
the level of confrontations between the studied actors. I believe the zero 
vision has had little effect on this. More important is probably the 
reorganisation process in the PRA in 2003. To a great extent, the 
matters in dispute are connected to resources. The PRA has many 
resources, while the Police and Safer Driving suffer from a lack of 
resources. This gives the PRA an opportunity to broaden their horizon.  
 
The PRA focuses on the entire range of road safety activities, education 
and information, control activities and physical measures. The Police 
and Safer Driving have a more narrow focus. The Police focus on 
control activities and Safer Driving on education and information. 
While the roles of the Police and Safer Driving have seemingly been 
fairly stable over the years, the role of the PRA is changing in a 
direction where they are preoccupied with more and more activities 
connected to road safety. They argue that they should take on more 
tasks, to some extent anchoring this in the zero vision and their road 
safety competence. This worries the other actors, as it threatens their 
positions. One assumption in the thesis based on Foucault (1983) and 
the link between power and knowledge is that the PRA see itself as the 
actor with the most knowledge on road safety, and hence as the most 
important actor in the road safety campaign. The data material shows 
that several informants from the PRA are proponents of this view.  
 
As with political innovations in general, the zero vision may give rise 
to inter-organisational strategies with a view to strengthening positions. 
The PRA is in a leading position with the zero vision. It has promoted 
the zero vision to become the new strategy in road safety work and has 
spent the most time on defining it. In the previous chapter it was 
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concluded that the zero vision is first and foremost a vision for the 
PRA. Bearing this in mind, it is plausible to assume that the PRA might 
try to benefit from the zero vision and how it is instantiated. Other 
actors have not adopted the zero vision into their practice so it would be 
difficult to claim that they would try to benefit from it in the same way.  
 
As pointed out by Elvebakk and Steiro (2005), the offensive by the 
PRA could be an attempt to re-position itself after the introduction of 
the zero vision. One key question in the thesis is if the PRA has a desire 
to redefine their role when it comes to road safety after the zero vision. 
The findings do not give grounds for such a claim. I believe there are 
more important reasons for this than the zero vision, for instance the 
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8. Competing Goals and Political Pragmatism 
 
Planning for an ideal state, like zero fatalities and permanent injuries, 
usually leads to unintended consequences. The authorities are aware of 
the side effects of the zero vision when stating that measures that 
reduce the number of injured and killed may have “unwanted affects on 
other considerations in the transport field” (NTP:143). By “other 
considerations”, which is a very vague term, I assume the road 
authorities mean other goals than road safety.  
 
The aim of the first part of this chapter is to study how the zero vision 
challenges different values that to some extent are contradictory. Has 
the zero vision contributed to a keener focus on this point? If the zero 
vision has resulted in change, it has to be assumed that it challenges 
contradictory goals. It will be interesting to see if the actors have 
changed their attitude when it comes to goals competing with road 
safety after the introduction of the zero vision. Four goals besides 
safety are studied: mobility, the environment, economic efficiency and 
individual freedom. These goals have to be acknowledged and 
prioritised, and one goal often comes at the expense of another. How 
much priority do the actors give to each of these goals after the 
introduction of the zero vision?  
 
The prioritising of goals is a task for politicians. However, politicians 
tend to avoid the debate on competing goals or treat the subject 
superficially. Due to the link between goals and politics, I believe a 
discussion on competing goals also has to deal with the political 
aspects. It is important to create a political climate for increased efforts 
in accordance with the zero vision. The planning will be superfluous if 
the political climate does not agree with the aims of the planning. At 
the end of the chapter I will conclude by looking at the importance of 
the competing goals and the role politics plays in complying with the 
zero vision.  
 
The chapter does not aim to test theory to the same extent as the 
previous two chapters, and draws in part on a report from Solheim 
(1999A) who has studied the possibilities of implementing the zero 
vision while dealing with conflicting interests and competing goals. 
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8.1 COMPETING GOALS IN GENERAL 
 
To convey an image of how the key road safety actors feel about 
competing goals in general, irrespective of the zero vision, the 
respondents were asked to name goals that compete with road safety. 
The answers show that mobility is clearly at the top. Twenty-seven out 
of 30 respondents point to mobility as a competing goal. One third of 
the respondents points to economic efficiency and the environment as 
competing goals. A vast majority of respondents prioritising the latter 
goals represents the PRA, while none of these respondents mentions 
individual freedom. To obtain their views on individual freedom as a 
competing goal I had to ask them explicitly about this.  
 
The respondents were asked if they had experienced any new conflicts 
following the zero vision. A vast majority of the respondents in the 
organisations expressed that they did not. I interpret this to mean that 
the respondents believe the conflict level is the same as before the zero 
vision. However, it could also indicate that the zero vision is still an 
abstract notion and that it has not been instantiated. For this reason new 
conflicts have not emerged.  
 
One interesting aspect with the competing goals is whether or not they 
impede the implementation of measures enhancing safety. To obtain 
the respondents’ views on this, they were asked to comment on the 
statement that safety measures are difficult to implement if there is a 
conflict with other interests. The inclination to disagree is most visible 
in the PRA, especially in the Directorate, where a majority of 
respondents disagree that this is a problem. This could reflect a belief in 
the possibility of forcing measures through regardless of how they 
affect competing goals. On the other hand, all the respondents from 
Safer Driving either totally or partially agree. The Police and NAF are 
divided on this issue.  
 
An interesting finding is that the PRA is more attentive to the 
complexity of competing goals compared to the other actors. 
Considering the position of the PRA, this is not surprising. The 
intervention of the PRA in road safety is more varied compared to the 
other actors. This organisation works on more levels and has more 
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aspects to consider. The Police and Safer Driving apparently do not 
find the prioritising of goals as much of a concern. Nonetheless, even 
the PRA has a tendency to downplay the importance of competing 
goals. This can be contrasted with the desire in organisations to avoid 
conflicts, and to not focus on troublesome aspects of new initiatives, for 






Prioritising between mobility and safety has taken a new turn after the 
zero vision was introduced, as it has an overwhelming focus on safety, 
and the conflict with mobility has become more visible. Implicit in the 
zero vision is that we should not have better mobility than what safety 
considerations will allow. One way of interpreting this is that safety 
should be the premise when it comes to transport politics. However, no 
guidance is given for how to act on this, and it is questionable as to just 
how much the road authorities want to negatively impact mobility, 
considering that this is traditionally their main task.  
 
One passage in the National Transport Plan seems to contradict the 
premise that safety comes first as it states that the main challenge in 
transport politics is to “develop a transport system with good mobility, 
where consideration should be given to the environment and road 
safety” (2004:8). Judging from this, mobility is still the main premise in 
the transport sector. All in all, there is reason to believe that the road 
authorities are not prepared to spend time on what they consider to be 
negative aspects of the zero vision because of the consequences this 
could have.  
 
The respondents were asked what they read into the statement that we 
should not have better mobility than safety considerations allow, and 
how they see setting priorities between mobility and safety. The 
informants were also given three statements on these goals: 1) putting 
the zero vision into effect reduces mobility, 2) one goal should be to 
reduce the growth in traffic, and 3) speed limits should be reduced to 
70 kph on all roads without median barriers.  
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8.2.1  The Ministry – “Safety should be prioritised ahead of 
mobility” 
 
Both respondents from the Ministry believe safety should be prioritised 
ahead of mobility. At the same time, they point out that there will 
always be a conflict between mobility and safety. As one informant 
sees it, the statement saying we should not have better mobility than 
what safety considerations will allow means that “we shouldn’t build 
new and fast roads without median barriers”. One respondent points out 
that safety is one of many considerations and goals for the Ministry, 
“but if there is a conflict between goals, safety is prioritised.” The 
difficult task of setting priorities between safety and other 
considerations becomes evident when studying the utterances from the 
Ministry informants.  
 
One informant in the Ministry agrees that the zero vision reduces 
mobility, while the other informant disagrees. The same is true for the 
claim that speed limits should be reduced to 70 kph on all roads that do 
not have a median barrier. The same informant agrees with both claims, 
which makes sense. Both respondents agree that a reduction in the 
growth in traffic should be a goal. All in all, the respondents from the 




8.2.2  The PRA – “Safety is not prioritised ahead of 
mobility” 
 
A vast majority of respondents from both the Directorate and the 
regional level of the PRA believe safety should be prioritised ahead of 
mobility. Bearing the aims of the zero vision in mind, it is not 
surprising that the respondents convey this view. It would be politically 
incorrect to state otherwise. “The zero vision is based on the fact that 
we should not have better mobility than what safety considerations will 
allow”, one respondent from the PRA stated.  
 
Even if the ideal is that safety should be the main premise, several 
respondents from the PRA point out that this is not the case in practice: 
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“When we have a zero vision, safety should be the first priority. Now 
it’s the other way around. What is said about the zero vision is not 
followed up in practice,” “Safety is not prioritised ahead of mobility in 
the organisation,” “Traditionally roads are built so that people can 
move around better … this is not a need you can suddenly switch off 
and say that safety is now the only consideration,” “We can’t build all 
the roads from scratch,” and “If mobility has no value, we could have 
come pretty close to a zero vision quite quickly.” Considering the focus 
on mobility, it is safe to assume that there are people in the PRA who 
want to restrict the zero vision’s effect on mobility. 
 
Road safety is struggling to attain status in the PRA compared to 
mobility. One regional respondent explains that he sees himself “more 
as a salesperson than as a road safety person. You get status in the PRA 
by being project manager on big road building projects. This is also 
reflected in the salaries.” Road safety work is more like “missionary 
work.” According to this informant, you feel like an outsider when you 
demand more expensive safety solutions. “The development culture 
still applies in the organisation.”  
 
A majority of the informants from the Directorate of Public Roads 
disagree with the claim that the zero vision reduces mobility, while a 
majority of respondents from the regional level agree. It is interesting 
that the regional level appears to believe that the zero vision has a more 
negative impact on mobility than the central level. The reason might be 
their proximity to the effects of the zero vision. Respondents at the 
regional level probably see this as a natural consequence of the zero 
vision.  
 
The National Transport Plan states that the growth in traffic implies 
that “the number of traffic accidents will rise through the planning 
period if new measures are not implemented” (NTP:179). There is 
general agreement in the PRA that one goal should be to reduce the 
growth in traffic. However, two out of three who disagree represent the 
Directorate. That two out of three respondents from the Directorate 
believe it should not be a goal to reduce the growth in traffic is a clear 
indication of the reluctance to have a negative effect on mobility.  
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One cornerstone of the zero vision is that it represents a new view on 
exterior violence and the human level of tolerance. Thus, the goal of 
reducing speed limits from 80 kph to 70 kph on roads without median 
barriers is in accordance with the zero vision. The chance of surviving 
an accident is considerably higher when travelling at 70 kph compared 
to 80 kph. A majority of informants from the regional level of the PRA 
agrees with the claim that the speed limits should be reduced to 70 kph 
on all roads that do not have a median barrier, while a majority from 
the Directorate disagrees. The findings show that the Directorate is 
more hesitant when it comes to detrimentally affecting mobility than 
the regional level. 
 
 
8.2.3  The Police – “Two sides to the story” 
 
Informants from the Police are clear on the fact that they have to set 
priorities between safety and mobility, and the respondents seem 
reluctant to convey that one is more important than the other. One 
representative from the Mobile Police points out that emphasising 
safety affects mobility in a detrimental way. According to the 
respondent, “mobility should be prioritised so that road users do not get 
agitated. At the same time we cannot raise the speed limits on roads at 
the expense of safety.” The Police are not afraid to say that mobility 
has high priority.  
 
A majority of the respondents from the Police disagree that putting the 
zero vision into effect will reduce mobility. Part of the explanation 
could be that the Police do not feel the zero vision represents much 
change. Informants from the Police tend to disagree with statements 
that hint at changes after the zero vision has been introduced. The 
Police are preoccupied with mobility, and this might make it hard for 
them to be positive to measures that reduce mobility. A majority of 
respondents from the Police disagrees that the speed limits should be 
reduced to 70 kph on all roads without median barriers. However, a 
majority of respondents from the Police agree that the reduction in the 
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8.2.4  Safer Driving – “We do not have to choose between 
mobility and safety” 
 
Based on the interviews, Safer Driving is not on the same wavelength 
as the PRA and the Police when it comes to mobility and competing 
goals in general. The following statements exemplify this: “Competing 
goals do not concern them too much. Their main focus is on road 
safety,” “There are no major conflicts,” and “The conflict between 
mobility and safety is often contrived … you do not have to choose 
between mobility and safety.” Safer Driving recognises mobility as a 
conflict, but mainly sees it as a focus for the PRA. One respondent 
believes the PRA “probably fights internally about whether mobility or 
safety should be their main focus.” The overall impression is that Safer 
Driving does not dwell too much on setting priorities between mobility 
and safety.  
 
Safer Driving is in a position where they can solely focus on safety. 
This is evident from their reasoning on safety versus mobility. Safer 
Driving maintains that they do not have think about competing goals. 
To a large extent, the informants from Safer Driving do not recognise 
the conflicts. Safer Driving cannot be blamed for choosing to focus 
solely on road safety, as that is their mandate, and it is probably correct 
to not spend much time on competing goals. This organisation probably 
also feels it is part of their responsibility to downplay the importance of 
mobility, for example. 
 
Respondents from Safer Driving disagree that putting the zero vision 
into effect reduces mobility. One possible explanation could be that 
they do not see the vision as incorporating the same degree of change 
as the PRA. Informants from Safer Driving tend to disagree with 
statements that suggest there have been changes since the introduction 
of the zero vision. All informants from Safer Driving agree that the 
speed limit should be reduced to 70 kph on all roads without a median 
barrier. This agrees with the reasoning in the zero vision. The 
respondents from Safer Driving also agree that reducing the growth in 
traffic should be a goal. The answers are as expected from an 
organisation that has safety as their only priority. 
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8.2.5  NAF – “The public put mobility ahead of safety” 
 
NAF is often accused of putting mobility and individual freedom 
before safety, and for viewing infrastructure developments as a miracle 
drug in the road safety work. The following quote from NAF’s political 
programme exemplifies their keen focus on mobility: “The need for 
personal and collective mobility is increasing” (NAF 2004:3). 
Utterances from the interviews underscore the focus on mobility in 
NAF: “In Norway much of the focus is on reducing speed limits and 
not on improving the roads … They reduce the speed limits and 
increase the number of criminals,” “Mobility is put ahead of safety by 
the public,” “Safety is important and has to be a top priority, but so 
does mobility,” “NAF is not willing to relinquish mobility for safety” 
and “When mobility increases so does the safety level.”  
 
Several of these statements are controversial. It is, for instance, 
surprising that one informant believes that the public puts mobility 
ahead of safety. As NAF is a consumer interest organisation, it is not 
surprising that they focus so much on mobility if this is the official 
view of the organisation. When it comes to speed limits, the director 
has stated, “reducing the speed limits is not a good measure for 
enhancing road safety. It’s the only measure the road authorities have 
that does not strain the budgets.”32  
   
Both respondents from NAF believe the zero vision has affected 
mobility, which is evidently a source of concern for NAF. The 
respondents disagree that the speed limits should be reduced to 70 kph 
on all roads without a median barrier, while they agree that reducing 
the growth in traffic should be a goal. It is surprising that a car-owner 
organisation like NAF agrees with this goal. This could be due to their 
outspoken commitment to the environment through Agenda 2133, but it 
does not correlate with other views expressed by their informants.  
 
                                                 
32 In Aftenposten [Norwegian daily] November 2005. 
33 Agenda 21 is the name of an action plan developed by the UN-conference for 
environment and development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The plan was a challenge to 
all the local communities in the world to make their own “Local Agenda 21” (source 
www.wikipedia.com). 
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8.2.6  Mobility is still the main priority 
 
A vast majority of the respondents, irrespective of their organisation, 
agree with the claim that we should not have better mobility than safety 
considerations will allow. The closer the actors are to the policy level, 
the more they see safety as the overriding premise. It is easy to agree 
with this, and it is politically incorrect not to. However, this could be a 
little misleading, and it is questionable as to what extent their 
agreement reflects their real views. Some respondents probably feel 
that they “have to” agree with the statement.  
 
One assumption in the thesis it that the key actors find that the zero 
vision has led to a change where mobility is traded for safety. This 
conclusion is mainly based on views expressed by respondents from the 
PRA. This is natural considering that it is first and foremost the PRA 
that has to set a priority between safety and mobility in practice. The 
impression based on the interviews is that the discussion concerning the 
conflict between mobility and safety has not been instantiated as a 
challenge to the existing division between mobility and safety. The zero 
vision does not promote a state where mobility is traded for safety. On 
paper, safety is now the main priority, but in practice mobility is still at 
the top. Mobility is an important goal in the transport sector and 
continues to be so after the introduction of the zero vision. Safety is 
supposed to come before mobility, according to the zero vision, but the 




8.3 THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Proponents of the zero vision maintain that “softening” the roadside 
terrain is an important focal area in the zero vision. Off-the-road 
accidents are one of the three major causes of serious accidents. They 
often have a serious outcome because of fixed barriers alongside the 
road. The accidents themselves may be difficult to prevent, but the 
basic belief is that the consequences of such accidents should not be as 
severe as they often are. In dealing with this problem, safety 
considerations often compete with environmental/aesthetic issues. In 
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the following I will primarily use the term “the environment” to 
describe this competing goal, even if the term “aesthetics” in many 
cases is just as descriptive of the situation.  
 
Let us assume that there is a tree two metres from the driving lane and 
the speed limit is 70 kph. According to the zero vision, this tree should 
not be there as it represents a hazard if someone drives off the road. 
However, lines of trees have been alongside the road for decades. They 
create a harmonic picture and are treasured, not only by landscape 
architects, but also by the public. So will the tree be removed? This is 
an important discussion according to the zero vision.  
 
To ascertain how respondents view the potential conflict between the 
environment and safety, they were asked if they find that environmental 
concerns are muscled out of the picture by other competing goals after 
the introduction of the zero vision. This section is shorter than the 
previous section on mobility and the next section on economic issues. 
This reflects the focus of the informants, which first and foremost is on 




8.3.1  The Ministry – “Safety is prioritised ahead of the 
environment” 
 
The two respondents from the Ministry differ in opinion when it comes 
to whether or not the environment loses out to other goals after the 
introduction of the zero vision. One respondent thinks the environment 
was more popular in the 90s, now sometimes “They don’t give a damn 
about the environment.” Safety is prioritised when it comes to 
resources, and this will have consequences for the environment. “If you 
prioritise something you will have to give lower priority to other 
things.” Judging from this statement, the respondent is open about the 
fact that the zero vision challenges other interests in the transport 
sector. According to the informant, this can be traced back to the zero 
vision. The other informant from the Ministry disagrees with this, 
stating, “The environment doesn’t lose the battle with other goals.” 
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8.3.2  The PRA – “The environment is more of a concrete 
thing” 
 
The PRA is split when it comes to whether or not the environment loses 
out compared to other competing goals after the introduction of the 
zero vision. The views are similar moving from the Directorate to the 
regional level of the PRA. Overall, a slight majority believe the 
environment does not lose out compared to the other goals, and that the 
environment has maintained its strong position, even after the zero 
vision came into force. It is a little surprising that a majority of 
informants from the PRA believe this is the case considering the heavy 
focus on road safety following the introduction of the zero vision.  
 
The respondents who believe the environment has a strong position in 
relation to road safety argue the following: “The focus on the 
environment is on the rise after having been down for a while,” “In 
some cases it would be more accurate to say that the environment 
comes before road safety,” “There is an environmental department in 
the Directorate … they’re still planting trees alongside the road, which 
breaks with the zero vision,” “It’s politically demanding to remove 
dangerous plantation,” “The landscape architects with their aesthetic 
perspective have too much power,” and “It’s often an argument instead 
of a dialogue, and the environmental side usually wins … road safety is 
not that evident because it lies ahead in time. Aesthetics is more of a 
concrete thing. It’s impossible to argue when you see how nice it 
looks.”  
 
It seems the environment (and aesthetics) are ascribed a high priority 
because the results are visible compared to road safety, which is 
preventive non-visible work. Some of the utterances could be 
interpreted as if there are two camps in the PRA, one consisting of 
people responsible for development and environment, and one 
consisting of people responsible for road safety. One regional 
respondent believes this is the case. “They have to get together and ask 
how they can address both goals.”  
 
The informants from the PRA who disagree that the environment has 
such a strong position compared to other goals often relate this to the 
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zero vision, as the following statements show: “The environment is not 
as sellable after the zero vision came along,” “The environmental side 
does not want to live with the risk of compromising safety,” “Safety 
would lose to the environment prior to the zero vision, but the zero 
vision has changed things,” and “The zero vision created new pressure 
and road safety became more politically important.” Here we see that 




8.3.3  The Police and Safer Driving – “Safety comes before 
the environment” 
 
What is perhaps most interesting with the answers from the informants 
in the Police and Safer Driving is that most respondents do not have an 
opinion on this subject. This is also why I have chosen to address the 
organisations together. The respondents seem to think that safety comes 
before environmental goals without elaborating on this. One informant 
from the Police Directorate maintains that there is “not much focus on 
the environment compared to road safety.” One respondent in Safer 
Driving believes that in order to get better roads, “you have to sacrifice 
something.” The informant evidently believes that the environment is 
sacrificed for road safety. It seems the organisations take it for granted 
that safety is the top priority. The fact that the organisations do not 
work with environmental issues may go a long way to explaining why 
they do not have strong opinions on this. Neither the Police nor Safer 
Driving probably feels any particular connection to dilemmas involving 
the environment.  
 
 
8.3.4  NAF – “There is a connection between the 
environment and safety” 
 
NAF has claimed that the environment loses out compared to the other 
transport policy goals. Since 1998 NAF has encouraged municipalities 
to “integrate their road safety work in their local Agenda 21 activities.” 
They have argued about “the important connection between the 
environment and road safety … road safety work promotes a better 
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8.3.5  The County – “The environment counts a little bit 
more” 
 
A respondent from the county administration points out that the 
environment issue is often a matter of setting priorities. “The 
environment, land use and economics count a little bit more than 
obtaining the theoretically most effective safety solution.” The 
environment is not losing out compared to other goals, as the 
respondent sees it. Those working on the environmental side will 
probably say that, but they balance between environment, safety and 
mobility in a reasonable way. It comes down to “where your standpoint 
is.” If you work with safety, you might feel that other goals come 




8.3.6  Does road safety come before the environment?  
 
A majority of the respondents, irrespective of organisation, believe the 
environment loses to other goals. This is also the view conveyed by 
informants from the Ministry. The data suggest that the PRA has the 
most developed opinion on this subject. The Police and Safer Driving 
do not have much to say about this. The Police and Safer Driving do 
not have to decide priorities between these competing goals in their 
everyday work. As such, it is quite understandable that they do not 
have very strong opinions on this issue. 
  
It is interesting that the opinions of the informants from the PRA differ 
as much as they do. There is reason to believe that the development 
department in the Directorate has much to say in matters concerning the 
environment. The zero vision principle of removing dangerous objects 
alongside the road is not always complied with, which shows how 
important the environment is in road matters. Evidently aesthetics plays 
a particularly important role – the environment around the roads should 
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be nice. According to the informants, there is a power struggle in the 
PRA between people working with road safety and people working 
with the environment. Considering that road safety and the 
environment are both considerations that have to be adhered to in the 
PRA, it would be more surprising if the results suggested that there 
were no difficulties in setting priorities in this field.  
 
Based on the interviews, it is impossible to conclude whether safety 
comes before the environment, or to determine the status of the 
environment compared to the other goals. However, there is reason to 
believe that the environment plays an important role when setting 
priorities between the competing goals. The thesis studied the extent to 
which safety considerations came before the environment after the 
introduction of the zero vision. As mentioned above, the PRA is the 
main organisation that has to decide priorities between road safety and 
the environment in practice. Here a slight majority maintain that the 
environment does not lose priority compared to the other goals. Other 
informants believe the zero vision has given road safety more emphasis 
in relation to the environment. Nonetheless, the data material does not 
support the assumption that road safety considerations come before the 
environment after the introduction of the zero vision. The importance 
ascribed to the environment could be an impediment to the 






An important objection to the zero vision is that its absolute focus on 
safety could result in a sub-optimal allocation of resources compared to 
other health-benefit initiatives in society. The efforts to further reduce 
the death toll caused by traffic accidents may affect other sectors in 
society in a negative way, and thereby increase the overall mortality 
rate. Most of the doubts that are expressed about drawing nearer the 
zero vision in the National Transport Plan are also connected to 
economic concerns. What seems clear from the zero vision is that it 
should result in an increase in resources allocated to road safety. It does 
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not seem plausible that the zero vision would not have an economic 
impact on road safety work.  
 
In the Norwegian Parliament’s question and answer period in February 
2000, a member of the labour party (AP) expressed that the zero vision 
is so costly that “is will cause a ‘hullabaloo’.” The politician obviously 
believes that a natural implication of the zero vision is that more money 
will be spent on road safety, and it would appear that the respondents 
from the key road safety actors share the same view. The focus in this 
section is on how actors see the economic aspects of the zero vision. 
The respondents were asked if it is their experience that the zero vision 




8.4.1  The Ministry – “Reduced economic efficiency” 
 
Both respondents from the Ministry believe the zero vision has had an 
effect on economic efficiency. “Some politicians recently pointed out 
that we now get fewer metres of road for the same amount of money,” 
one political adviser asserts. But this is a natural consequence of the 
zero vision and its increased demands on safety. The politicians 
probably see this, but “still want to score a cheap rhetorical point.” One 
informant explains that when the Swedes launched their zero vision, 
one of the scenarios the Ministry was concerned about was that the 
cost-benefit analysis would be viewed in a different light. It seemed 
like “Every life is sacred, whatever the cost,” was the new guiding 
philosophy. The zero vision has possibly affected efficiency in a 
negative way but “it is not a problem living with the zero vision as it is 
manifested today.”  
 
It is interesting that both informants from the Ministry maintain that the 
zero vision has reduced economic efficiency, and moreover that they 
see this as a natural consequence of it. The point about the cost-benefit 
analysis is also interesting. Bearing this in mind, it would quite 
probably be a problem for the Ministry if the zero vision developed 
more radically. Thus it is in the Ministry’s interest to preserve the 
current “version” of the zero vision. One question is if the Ministry is 
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capable of making the zero vision develop in this way, or if the zero 
vision develops in its own way regardless of what the Ministry wants.  
 
 
8.4.2  The PRA – “Safety is prioritised ahead of economic 
concerns” 
 
The PRA is divided when it comes to whether the zero vision has 
reduced economic efficiency, but a majority of respondents believe this 
is the case. Some utterances that point to this are: “Higher costs are a 
new conflict issue brought by the zero vision … it’s so expensive to 
implement measures that you ask yourself whether to do this or not,” 
“The zero vision is often used to obtain a specific safety solution 
independent of costs,” “They have to a greater extent found a willing 
ear for safety solutions that are derived from the zero vision, even if 
they are expensive,” “Safety now weighs heavier than you would 
expect compared to efficiency,” “Roads have become more expensive 
to build” and “Safety is prioritised ahead of economic concerns.” 
 
The view that the zero vision has not affected the economic efficiency 
of the road safety work is first and foremost seen in the Directorate, 
with statements like: “The work on road safety is as efficient as ever,” 
and “There has not been a rejection of economic efficiency. It’s more 
the opposite”. The discrepancy between the Directorate and the 
regional level of the PRA could be explained by the closeness to the 
executive sides of road safety. It could also be that the policy level is 
hesitant to ascribe what could be perceived as negative effects to the 
zero vision. As pointed out above, the respondents at the regional level 
are apparently not afraid to raise doubts about the practical effects of 
the zero vision. 
 
 
8.4.3  The Police – “Others experience the economic effects 
more than we do” 
 
Respondents from the Police think it is difficult to say whether the zero 
vision has reduced economic efficiency. One respondent from the 
Police Directorate thinks the PRA probably “experiences the economic 
204 
Competing Goals and Political Pragmatism  
effects” to a greater extent, while a regional respondent from the 
Mobile Police states that he has not seen a reduction in economic 
efficiency, but “he can imagine that others have.” It is safe to assume 
that this is the general view in the Police, as they do not have first-hand 
experience of how the zero vision affects projects. 
 
 
8.4.4   Safer Driving – “Safety is prioritised independent of 
money” 
 
A majority of respondents from Safer Driving state that the zero vision 
has not reduced economic efficiency. Two statements that exemplify 
this are: “The zero vision has not affected economic efficiency” and “If 
you stretch the zero vision farther, this discussion becomes interesting, 
but we can still have a long way to go before the projects become 
inefficient.” One informant states the opposite; there is a “bigger 
willingness to prioritise road safety independent of money after the 
introduction of the zero vision.” This is the same view expressed by a 
majority of respondents from the regional level of the PRA. Informants 
from Safer Driving are more inclined to take a stand on the economic 
consequences of the zero vision compared to respondents from the 
Police, but it is surprising that a majority believe that the zero vision 
has not affected economic efficiency. I would have thought that the 
view expressed by the latter informant would be the dominant view in 
Safer Driving.   
 
 
8.4.5  NAF – “The focus has shifted” 
 
Only one informant in NAF had an opinion on economic efficiency 
after the introduction of the zero vision. As the respondent sees it, “the 
focus has shifted, or is about to.” According to him, the focus has 
shifted from economic efficiency to road safety, even if the measures 
are expensive. This resembles the opinions in both the PRA and Safer 
Driving. It is impossible to say something in general about how NAF 
views the question of economic concerns versus safety, but based on 
the interviews, there is willingness in the political department to put 
road safety ahead of economic concerns.  
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8.4.6  The County – “We end up with some economically 
unprofitable effects” 
 
According to one county informant, the zero vision is taken too far in 
some cases. For a long time the prevailing philosophy has been that the 
resources should be spent where we benefit most from them. There are 
examples with the zero vision where this is not the case, for instance 
when pouring resources into such “exclusive measures” as median 
barriers in areas where there is a small risk of accidents. This 
respondent said that we end up with some economically unprofitable 
effects that are more or less meaningless. Another example given by 
the informant is barriers aimed at preventing accidents were the car 
swerves off the road. These are so expensive that they are impossible to 
realise. The informant believes the zero vision can be misused. “It is 
too absolute.” It is difficult to plan for something that statistically will 
happen once every 5000 years. “Should society expend resources on 
such things when the money could be re-routed to other projects?” The 
reasoning has much in common with what Elvik (1999B) has stated 
about the possible economic consequences of the zero vision. 
 
 
8.4.7  Facing the economic consequences of the zero vision 
 
It is no surprise that the PRA, which has done most of the work in 
instantiating the zero vision, also has the clearest image of whether the 
zero vision reduces economic efficiency in road-building projects. We 
have to keep in mind that to a great degree the PRA steers the cash flow 
for road safety measures. A majority of respondents from the PRA 
believe the zero vision has led to a reduction in economic efficiency in 
such projects. This is to be expected considering that the zero vision is 
supposed to make tougher demands on road safety. If the zero vision 
has not affected the economy, it is not living up to its intentions, as if 
there is no effect, than there is reason to believe that there is something 
wrong with how the zero vision is being acted upon. 
 
The interviews reveal that the Police and Safer Driving do not have 
similar strong views on this. Informants from the Police primarily see 
economic efficiency as a concern for the PRA, while a majority of 
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respondents from Safer Driving believe the zero vision has not resulted 
in reduced efficiency. The answers could be interpreted as another 
example that the Police and Safer Driving have not instantiated the zero 
vision beyond its ethical starting point. If they had, they would 
probably claim that the zero vision has affected the economy of road 
building projects at least to some degree. However, even in the 
Directorate of Public Roads some respondents say that the zero vision 
has not affected economic efficiency. Does this mean that the 
respondents in the Directorate have not instantiated the zero vision 
beyond the ethical starting point? The reason why informants from the 
Directorate express this is most likely at least in part political, as they 
do not want to give the impression that the zero vision is having a 
negative impact on the financial situation.  
 
The study focuses on the extent to which the key actors believe the zero 
vision has affected the economic efficiency of road building projects. 
The data reveal that the PRA is the actor most inclined to ascribe this 
effect to the zero vision. Bearing the other data in the thesis in mind, 
this is not surprising, and also fits with the conclusion that the PRA 
ascribes the most change to the zero vision. The view that the zero 
vision has an effect on the economics of road building projects has to 
be seen as a healthy sign for the future prospects of the vision, as this 




8.5 INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
 
Implicit in the zero vision is the demand for restrictive measures that 
influence individual freedom. In a Parliamentary debate in February 
2000, before the zero vision was passed, a member of the Socialist Left 
Party (SV) forecasted the controversies to come by stating that the zero 
vision was a dramatic suggestion that had to be implemented through 
“very controversial means,” including lower speed limits, intelligent 
speed adaptation, breathalysers and more control activities.  
 
We experience some areas of private life as the responsibility of the 
authorities, while also expecting a certain degree of individual freedom. 
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The tension between social control and individual freedom is a difficult 
issue. What are the limits of public intervention in private motoring and 
values like individual freedom and independence? The car is an 
important symbol of freedom, and the public does not want the 
authorities to interfere too much. Is there anything to suggest that the 
limit can be pushed further in today’s political climate? 
 
The need for more restrictive measures is emphasised in the challenge 
document for the National Transport Plan 2002-2011: “Everyone has to 
accept that there will be more behaviour control and more restrictions” 
(1999:6). The National Action Plan indicates that the course of action is 
not vigorous enough to satisfy the vision. “In the next six years, 2006-
2011, a continued focus on the measures in the action plan will 
contribute to 35 fewer deaths annually. This will only barely manage to 
counteract the rise in the death toll caused by the growth in traffic 
volume. If the target set by the transport departments in the proposal for 
the National Transport Plan 2002-2011 (fewer than 190 killed by 2012) 
is to be reached, what is needed is more and stronger means” (HP:77).  
 
The suggestion for the new transport plan 2006-2015 also stresses the 
need to implement more restrictive measures: “In order to achieve a 
reduction in the number of fatalities and serious injuries in road traffic, 
the use of measures has to be further sharpened” (2004:79). If the 
measures are cost effective, the Ministry will consider them “even 
though they may curtail the road user’s experience of freedom” 
(2004:80). The road authorities are thus expressing a clear willingness 
to implement more restrictive measures. 
 
The Swedish researcher, Christer Hydèn, finds it worrying that the 
transport plan states that some measures will restrict individual freedom 
without elaborating on this. According to Hydèn, “all research and 
experience shows that it is wrong to use this term.”34 Hydèn uses 
intelligent speed adaptation as an example. Studies show that this is 
perceived as a support to drivers in their struggle to keep to the speed 
limit. With such a system, the driver does not have to be so preoccupied 
with what the speedometer shows. The result is calmer driving, and no 
                                                 
34 No. 11 – July 1 2004. 
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need for physical speed reducing measures in the cities. Hydèn also 
stresses that such regulations give greater freedom and safety to 
pedestrians. 
 
In the proposal for the National Transport Plan 2002-2011, it is stated 
that putting restrictions on the car and the freedom it gives in relation to 
work, vacations and recreation in society, “will intervene in our 
everyday life and demand that society in general agrees to take on a 
different attitude to road safety” (138). At a road safety conference in 
September 2006, the Minister of Transport and Communication stated 
that it is “a challenge to draw the lines for how far the authorities can 
go when it comes to controlling use of the car.” The authorities are 
obviously careful about moving too fast in this respect. However, they 
risk undermining the intentions of the main documents if they do not 
comply with them through their practice.  
 
The informants were asked about the necessity of implementing more 
restrictive measures in order to increase road safety. A vast majority 
see this as necessary. The respondents were also asked to respond to 
several statements relating to measures generally seen as restrictive. 
What counts as freedom-depriving measures is debatable. What often 
characterises such measures is that they are related to vehicle 
intervention or more control activities. The latter are the responsibility 
of the Police, while vehicle interventions come from international 
regulations. Because of this, actors besides the Police may feel a weak 
relationship to such measures. The responses to these statements will be 
returned to in the conclusion to this section. 
 
 
8.5.1  The Ministry – “The use of measures has to be 
further sharpened” 
 
Both respondents from the Ministry believe that more restrictive 
measures are needed. According to one respondent, “there is no doubt 
that more restrictive measures will have an effect.” One informant 
believes the challenge is to “present measures well and to make them 
politically feasible.” The answers coincide with what is emphasised in 
the main documents, namely that the use of measures has to be further 
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sharpened. It is interesting that one informant points out that it is 
important to make measures “politically feasible.” This indicates the 
important role politicians have when it comes to restrictive measures, 
something the respondents from the Ministry would know very well. 
The role of the politicians will be returned to below.   
 
 
8.5.2  The PRA – “Safety is more important than individual 
freedom” 
 
A report prepared by the road safety section in the Directorate of Public 
Roads (2003) emphasises that it will be necessary to increase the use of 
measures that affect the personal freedom of road users with respect to 
the choice of driving pattern. Four out of six respondents from the 
Directorate favour more restrictive measures, even if this comes at the 
expense of freedom. The following statements exemplify this: “Safety 
is more important than individual freedom,” and “Road safety work is 
not ‘a popularity contest’ ... we must reduce people’s freedom. It is 
necessary even though it’s not popular.” The two informants who are 
not in favour of more restrictive measures maintain that “There is a 
limit to how far we should go with restrictive measures,” and “It seems 
as long as we have invented a technical solution it has to be 
implemented. How far can people be controlled?” 
 
Not everyone agrees that so called restrictive measures restrict 
individual freedom. According to one respondent, “we have many 
restrictive measures already and they do not affect freedom. It depends 
on whether you call such measures restrictive or supportive.” If you 
call them supportive, perhaps it is possible to circumvent this entire 
discussion. This becomes a way of rationalising that such measures are 
not restrictive. The opinion that such measures should be called 
supportive and not restrictive approaches the views of Hydèn. 
 
The Directorate of Public Roads recognises that restrictive measures 
give rise to a political dilemma. One respondent points out “if only the 
willingness of the politicians were present, we could achieve a 
substantial decrease in the number of traffic fatalities.” But this would 
affect freedom and privacy, so the respondent doubts this will take 
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place. “The politicians are mainly concerned about getting re-elected.” 
Another respondent in the Directorate believes one of the main 
impediments in the coming years will be “the political willingness to 
out restraints on individual freedom.” These utterances show the 
political impact on road safety.  
 
All the respondents at the regional level of the PRA believe more 
restrictive measures are necessary to some extent if a marked reduction 
in fatalities and serious injuries is to be achieved. This is seen in the 
following utterances: “When adapting to the existing road system, 
measures have to be more restrictive,” “Weighed against the risk of 
accidents, freedom should not matter too much.” A majority of the 
informants believe such measures affect individual freedom. 
Statements like, “You will take away some of the pleasure of driving 
with restrictive measures,” and “Every impediment will be seen as 
deprivation of freedom,” are examples. 
 
Several respondents from the regional level of the PRA do not believe 
they have much to say about restrictive measures. This is a political 
question and it is up to the Directorate to convince the politicians about 
their necessity. One regional informant is not impressed with how his 
own organisation has handled this issue. “More restrictive measures 
follow from the objectives that appear in the guidelines. But the 
measures are political and the PRA has become political instead of 
using their road safety authority. It’s politics, politics … we have to 
reduce individual freedom and mobility. They have the authority to do 
something about it, so they should do something about it, but they’re 
expected to avoid these situations … the leaders are populist and 
concerned about their position.” 
 
At the regional level, half of the respondents believe that the political 
system represents an impediment to implementing more restrictive 
measures. “You can always run strict measures that people will have to 
adapt to, but we’ll not get it through the political system … you reach a 
point where you just have to accept things as they are,” as one 
informant expressed it. One informant believes we are too cautious 
about applying restrictive measures and points to the politicians as a 
bottleneck. “It’s important that the politicians show courage when the 
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math is self-evident.” According to another respondent, the politicians 
do not always consider the cost-benefit ratio, as “they represent the 
people.” Restrictive measures may be so radical that the politicians are 
reluctant to support them. Implementation depends on whether 
measures serve the public interest, and measures affecting freedom will 
usually not serve the public interest, at least not the way the public sees 
it. This becomes an uphill battle, one that the politicians as the public 
caretakers are likely to shy away from. While it is politically hazardous 




8.5.3  The Police – “We have to make more unpopular 
decisions” 
 
A majority of respondents from the Police believe more restrictive 
measures are necessary, as can be seen in the following utterances: 
“We have to make more unpopular decisions and we need politicians 
who are willing to make them”, “The kind of freedom we have today 
won’t not be accepted in the future … in 30-40 years people will 
wonder why we accepted so many accidents without implementing 
more restrictive measures,” and “When people see why things are done 
they accept it.” We see that informants from the Police also point to the 
politicians when it comes to restrictive measures. One reason why the 
Police favour restrictive measures could be because they see it as an 
opportunity to obtain more resources.  
 
There are always major objections when more restrictions are 
proposed. One respondent in the Police uses the ban against smoking in 
restaurants that was introduced in 2004 as an analogy. There was 
uproar when this law was first introduced, but when things settled, 
virtually everyone agreed that it was the right thing to do. According to 
this respondent, it just takes a “running-in period,” and then more 
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8.5.4  Safer Driving – “We have to look more at unpopular 
measures” 
 
All the respondents from Safer Driving think more restrictive measures 
are needed, saying such things as: “Restrictive measures are a natural 
consequence of things not working properly,” and “We have to look 
more at unpopular measures, and we have to be prepared for more 
regulations.”  
 
One respondent maintains that the wording of restrictive measures is 
important in trying to gain their acceptance, for example calling them 
“supportive measures.” Some of the measures that have been 
mentioned in relation to the zero vision are undoubtedly restrictive, but 
they could also be seen as supportive. It is a shrewd rhetorical move to 
use the term “supportive” when the aim is to gain acceptance for such 
measures among the public and the politicians. This is a way of 
rationalising the need for this type of measure. Moreover, it is no 
surprise that Safer Driving points to the importance of how restrictive 
measures are communicated to a broader public. 
 
 
8.5.5  NAF – “It is hard to be entirely positive” 
 
Judging from the data material, the reluctance to favour restrictive 
measures is highest in NAF. One respondent opposes such a strategy 
whereas another of the respondents states that it is necessary to a small 
degree. “We don’t need more restrictive measures,” as one informant 
put it. We need an educational system that “makes it possible for the 
road users to obey rules and regulations.” NAF thus takes the side of 
the road users and reverses the issue. The message is evidently that 
road users break rules and regulations due to inadequate education. One 
informant sees the conflict between the need for control and individual 
freedom, and that their members value individual freedom. “It’s hard to 
be entirely positive to more restrictive measures.” At a workshop in 
September 2002, the head of information in NAF stated that 
technological control would destroy the car’s value as a public-health 
hygiene factor. “Norwegians will have reduced quality of life if driving 
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a car becomes more automated.” NAF separates from the other actor’s 
in being very focused on the inherent value of driving a car. 
 
The fact that NAF is hesitant to accept more restrictive measures is not 
surprising. It has a position that resembles the standpoint of the 
politicians. They both represent the people, NAF in its role as a major 
consumer organisation, and the politicians in their role as elected 
representatives of the people. As such it is no surprise that they have 
similar views on restrictive measures.  
 
 
8.5.6  Who will “fight” for more restrictive measures? 
 
A vast majority of informants in the key organisations favour more 
restrictive measures. Some scepticism is expressed in the Directorate of 
Public Roads and in the Police, while both respondents from NAF do 
not see the necessity of more restrictive measures. These responses 
were given to a general statement on such measures. As mentioned in 
the introduction to this section, I have also studied the inclination to 
favour restrictive measures by asking the informants to respond to 
statements on concrete measures generally considered restrictive. The 
following responses are examined: 1) the introduction of demerit points 
on the driving license has minimal importance for road safety. 2) All 
cars should be equipped with a breathalyser. 3) Seat belt reminders will 
not have a particular effect on the number of fatalities and permanent 
injuries. 4) The number of seat belt checkpoints should be raised. 5) 
Enough speed checks are conducted.   
 
A vast majority of respondents from the Police, Safer Driving and NAF 
disagree that demerit points in the driving licence have little importance 
for road safety. All the informants who are negative to this measure 
represent the PRA. Six out of fourteen informants from the PRA agree 
that this measure has little importance for road safety. For 
breathalysers, nine respondents disagree, five of whom represent the 
PRA. Turning to the statement concerning seat belt reminders, four out 
of the six respondents who disagree represent the PRA. There is 
general agreement that the number of seat belt controls should be 
raised, but one informant, from the PRA, disagrees. Two respondents 
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agree that enough speed checks are conducted, one of whom represents 
the PRA.  
 
The measures elaborated on here are often highlighted as ones with a 
major potential. Thus, the responses to these statements tell a story 
about a general view on restrictive measures. It should be emphasised 
that a majority of respondents from all the organisations agree with the 
statements. However, for three of the statements a significant number 
of respondents from the PRA argue against the measures. Judging from 
the answers, the central and regional levels of the PRA are more 
hesitant to implement restrictive measures than other actors. One 
explanation for this could be that they do not feel in charge of such 
measures. Nevertheless, there is no reason why, for instance, Safer 
Driving should feel more strongly for the measure than the PRA, so this 
is just part of the explanation. Based on the data in the thesis, there are 
clear signs that the PRA tends to be more positive to measures they 
have a direct responsibility for. This could be related to the fact that it 
sees itself as the most important actor in the road safety work. That the 
PRA is apparently more negative to restrictive measures than the other 
actors may impede the realisation of such measures. 
 
Another assumption is that the key actors give little attention to 
individual freedom, mainly because it is not politically correct to have 
this as a goal. The data substantiate this. When asked about competing 
goals, none of the respondents point to individual freedom. Either the 
informants do not see individual freedom as a goal, or they believe it is 
politically incorrect to point to this as a goal, especially after the 
introduction of the zero vision.  
 
Several respondents from the regional level of PRA point to politicians 
as an impediment to implementing more restrictive measures. The close 
ties between the Directorate and the Ministry are mentioned as a cause 
of concern. Their role as professionals is apparently mixed with the 
typical concerns of the politician. This makes it more difficult to 
intensify the road safety efforts in accordance with the zero vision. The 
central level of the PRA needs to push the Ministry and hence the 
politicians for more radical measures. They have to tell the politicians 
what is needed to comply with the zero vision in a more forceful 
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manner. At this point in the thesis it is natural to turn more directly to 




8.6  ROAD SAFETY AND POLITICS 
 
Advancements in road safety affect many layers of society and have a 
direct impact on the value of life, so this needs approval and support 
from politicians, who often have the final say and the power to cut off 
initiatives. Politicians therefore to a large extent decide the direction of 
the road safety work. For instance, politicians play a key role in 
selecting between competing goals. Two important goals in this respect 
are mobility and individual freedom, goals that are interests valued by 
the public. In many ways they are probably valued even more than road 
safety. Most people are not preoccupied with the thought that they will 
become involved in traffic accidents, but measures that effect mobility 
and individual freedom are experienced every time the road users 
venture out in traffic.     
 
The predicament of politicians is that they have to deal with local 
problems and demands made by the public, and at the same time act on 
government directives. To a great extent this leaves the politicians in a 
very difficult position. The public does not only demand mobility and 
individual freedom, they also want safe roads to travel on, and safer 
roads might reduce mobility. Thus, the politicians have to juggle many 
different considerations in the transport field. One question that arises 
and which is important for the future effects of the zero vision is why 
politicians should endorse restrictions on mobility and freedom just 
because we now have a zero vision. 
 
In this section I deal with how the respondents perceive the role of 
politicians in general and the way they deal with the competing goals. I 
have not explicitly asked about politicians in the interviews. However, 
the respondents often refer to them, underscoring the important role 
they have in road safety. There are two areas where this is particularly 
eminent: 1) who is responsible for the lack of implementation of 
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measures based on the zero vision, and 2) what are the most important 
impediments to enhanced road safety?  
 
The section is divided into three parts. First I look at how politicians 
see the zero vision. I then focus on the interplay between politicians 
and professionals on road safety, and then lastly I look at challenges 
connected to implementing safety measures.  
 
 
8.6.1  How politicians understand the zero vision  
  
In a Parliamentary debate in 2002, a member of the Socialist Left Party 
(SV) compared the zero vision to a rainbow. “Those of us who have 
tried to search for the end of the rainbow have seen that we can get 
close, but no one has yet found it. But it’s nice trying to reach it.” The 
Minister of Transport and Communication has stated that a “strong 
focus on the zero vision in itself will create a foundation for a reduction 
in the number of traffic fatalities and injuries.”35 Both of these quotes 
are illustrative of an abstract way of viewing the zero vision that is 
common in political circles. The Member of Parliament uses a 
metaphor to illuminate the zero vision, while the Minister states that 
reflection on the issue is enough to reduce the number of traffic 
fatalities and injuries.  
 
It was mentioned above that politicians tend to see the zero vision 
primarily as an ethical guideline. The utterances referred to above 
substantiate this view. They have an abstract way of reasoning about 
the zero vision. As we have seen this way of seeing the vision is not 
reserved for politicians. However, the fact that the politicians 
apparently see the zero vision in this way determines to a large extent 
the impact it has in practice due to the important role the politicians 
play. As one respondent from the Directorate put it, “road safety is 
directed by the politicians.” If this is the case, and the politicians 
primarily see the zero vision as an ethical guideline, the future potential 
of the vision may be very limited. 
 
                                                 
35 At the 2005 road safety conference: “Best in the Nordic region”. 
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One respondent from the county administration sees it as positive that 
the politicians focus on visions because the professionals are too caught 
up in their professions. “The politicians do a better job – they are more 
capable of seeing the visions.” The question is if the politicians delve 
deeper into the visions or if the visions are all they see. The discussion 
so far suggests the latter. The opinion that the professionals are too 
caught up in their fields of interest is intriguing. I believe the bigger 
problem is that professionals wander away from their profession and 
“become politicians.” While it is a good thing that politicians focus on 
visions, the professional milieu has to consider how the visions can be 
applied in practice. It would appear that this is not happening at the rate 
it should for the zero vision. Part of the explanation is evidently that 
professionals focus too much on the political environment, and that this 
is directing the road safety efforts in practice. 
 
One question is how committed the politicians are to the zero vision, as 
it was implemeneted at the administrative level. The politicians took 
part in deliberations in Parliament, and that was their introduction to 
the vision. The politicians also voted to adopt the zero vision as the 
new overriding strategy in the road safety campaign. As such, it is 
natural to assume that at least some politicians feel as though they have 
something invested in the zero vision. However, I do not believe this 
compares to what some of the employees in the PRA feel. The PRA has 
put an effort into instantiating the zero vision, and this gives them a 
unique position.  
 
 
8.6.2  The interplay between politicians and professionals 
 
The interviews reveal that the key road safety actors are dissatisfied 
with the politicians. One respondent from the PRA points out that they 
have to compete with political populism: “The politicians have to think 
about getting re-elected and they are immensely preoccupied with the 
media.” According to one of the respondents from Safer Driving, “road 
safety is downgraded in political circles.” An informant from the 
Mobile Police finds it worrying that the politicians talk so much about 
expensive measures and so little about seat belts. “It’s not sexy enough, 
and it’s annoying for the road users.” 
218 
Competing Goals and Political Pragmatism  
One respondent from the PRA believes that politicians have a problem 
because it “takes time for results to show.” Politicians like to see visible 
results while in office. Thus, it is important to have a short-term 
perspective for the actions they propose. Professionals, on the other 
hand, maintain the necessity of long-term thinking. Short-term versus 
long-term perspectives may have a sub-optimal effect on road safety. 
The Minister recognises the problem: “I am fully aware that there is a 
danger of a gap developing between the long-term zero vision on the 
one hand, and short-term practical considerations on the other.”36 One 
of the informants at the Ministry explains that the politicians sometimes 
demand concrete action “just because the electorate wants it,” and that 
“this is an effect of the short-term perspective of the politicians.” The 
measures demanded by the politicians, one respondent from the PRA 
explains, are not always the measures the PRA would like to prioritise.  
 
If the politicians had resolve, the number of traffic fatalities could be 
significantly reduced in just a few years. But this resolve is apparently 
not present. Part of the explanation could be that the politicians have 
not been made aware of the various possibilities by the road safety 
actors, in particular the PRA. One respondent from the PRA points out 
that the organisation has “to dare to challenge the politicians on the 
zero vision and show them what choices they have.”37 But as one 
informant explains, road safety is not positive news. “It’s talking about 
the negative, and if you do something negative no one wants to have 
their name attached to it. Management has also become political, and is 
incredibly cautious and does not lead the organisation the way it needs 
to be led.” One consequence might be that management only proposes 
what they think the politicians will support. If this is true, this 
detrimental attitude will impede advancement in the road safety efforts. 
 
 
8.6.3  The challenge of implementing restrictive measures 
 
The intention here is not to point to all imaginable impediments to the 
implementation of road safety measures. The aim is to show how the 
                                                 
36 At the 2005 road safety conference, “Best in the Nordic Region”. 
37 In “the Road and Us”, No. 1 – January 15 2004. 
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political conceptions of the zero vision and the interplay between the 
politicians and the professionals determine the potential for further 
implementation of measures implicit in it. It is a common perception 
among the key actors that the implementation of measures is 
insufficient compared to what effect the zero vision is supposed to 
have. A majority of respondents, irrespective of organisation, partly 
blame the politicians for this. Respondents from the Ministry, on the 
other hand, deny that there is a lack of implementation, arguing that 
everything cannot be done at once. “There is an excessive belief in how 
fast things can be done,” as one respondent in the Ministry put it. The 
discussion surrounding median barriers is used as an example. “We 
have never built as many median barriers as now.” However, this is just 
one of the measures under consideration as part of the zero vision. 
Moreover, it is a positive measure, meaning there is hardly any 
resistance to it. When arguing that the implementation of measures is 
insufficient compared to what should be the consequences of the zero 
vision, I believe the key actors are primarily referring to so-called 
restrictive measures. Here the politicians are reluctant because of the 
negative reactions such measures generate due to their effect on 
mobility and freedom.  
 
One of the respondents from the PRA believes “it is easy for the 
politicians to support the ethics of the zero vision, but when it comes to 
specific action…” There is a difference between supporting the ethics 
of the zero vision and supporting the actions that are called for. This 
could explain why it was easy to garner political support for the zero 
vision. At the outset, the vision was not that explicit. Compared to the 
PRA, which has a more practical way of seeing the zero vision, it 
evidently appears to primarily be an abstract notion for the politicians. 
Perhaps that is also why the Minister has raised the question: “Do the 
politicians know what they have adopted?”38 The Minister expresses 
concern when it comes to acting on the zero vision. “It’s a major 
challenge to build a bridge between the high ambitions for road safety, 
which the zero vision is an expression of, and the possibilities we have 
in practice to improve road safety within the frameworks of our 
                                                 
38 At the seminar: Veg- og trafikkdagene [Road and Traffic Days] at NTNU, 
Trondheim 2002. 
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political system.” It is interesting that the Minster refers to the political 
system as a potential impediment, but in so doing the Minister is 
echoing the view expressed by many of the key actors. 
 
There is an apparent mismatch between what has to be done to come 
closer to the zero vision and the willingness of politicians to exercise 
the necessary force. Politicians are more preoccupied with investments 
than maintenance, one respondent from the PRA claims: “What gives 
the most recognition is building a new road.” A new road represents a 
specific change, and change is what politics is all about. Road safety 
may be a winning cause in speeches, but it is not a cause you win votes 
with if it is equated with restrictions on car use. Politicians prefer to 
work with the more visible aspects of society, and preventive road 
safety work does not fit the bill. One respondent from the PRA 
maintains, "It’s not a career-promoting area.” Other utterances 
highlighted earlier in the thesis underscore this informant’s point.  
 
 
8.6.4  Summary of the role of politicians relating to the zero 
vision 
 
Politicians have an abstract way of seeing the zero vision, focusing on 
it as something born out of an ethical necessity to do something about 
traffic accidents. Several of the respondents from the organisations 
express dissatisfaction with how the politicians handle road safety. 
Politicians often have a short-term perspective for the actions they 
propose, while the professionals have a long-term perspective. 
Politicians focus on achieving visible results, and they are preoccupied 
with public sentiments. If the public demands concrete action, the 
politicians are quick to “jump on the train.” Because of this, there is 
reason to believe that the road safety professionals are reserved in what 
they present to the politicians. Respondents from the PRA believe their 
own managers have become too political in how they address road 
safety. The professionals have to be more daring when making 
proposals. The role of the professional should be to propose and argue 
for road safety measures he or she believes should be implemented to 
meet the objectives of the vision. This is apparently not happening.  
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A common view among the respondents from the key actors is that the 
implementation of road safety measures does not match what should be 
the case under the zero vision, and the politicians receive much of the 
blame for this. Some respondents believe this reveals that the 
politicians primarily have an abstract way of seeing the zero vision. 
They support the ethics behind it, but it is a different matter when it 
comes to instantiating it. In practice, there is no resolve to intensify the 
efforts in accordance with the zero vision. The Norwegian politicians 
might be content with keeping it in its present form, and they may also 
be thankful that it is imprecise and non-binding. In the heading for this 
chapter I used the term “political pragmatism.” In many circumstances 
it is positive to be pragmatic. However, when it comes to how the 
political environment relates to the zero vision, this is a pragmatism 




8.7 IS THE ZERO VISION MORE STATIONARY THAN 
VISIONARY? 
 
The reigning opinion based on the interviews is that we should not have 
better mobility than safety considerations allow. Primarily, the road 
authorities are the ones who decide between safety and mobility, and 
digging deeper into the perceptions of the informants from the PRA, it 
becomes evident that, in practice, mobility is still leading the way. This 
does not agree with the zero vision, which states that safety should now 
be the prevalent objective. There is agreement about the need for more 
restrictive measures. When such measures are instantiated through 
different statements, the PRA, in comparison to the other key actors, is 
more hesitant to implement restrictive measures. A majority of the 
respondents believe the environment loses when confronted with other 
goals. However, it is a common view in the PRA, which does most of 
the priority setting, that the environment counts more than you would 
expect under the zero vision. The most common view in the PRA is 
that the zero vision has reduced economic efficiency. Neither the Police 
nor Safer Driving has very strong opinions about this. Considering that 
the PRA is the body that has to set priorities for these competing goals, 
this is not surprising. 
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The views in the PRA on the competing goals underscore that the zero 
vision has been instantiated to a limited degree so that little has 
changed with respect to priorities. I believe this is especially revealed 
in the responses to the questions on mobility, restrictive measures and 
the environment. At the outset, a majority of respondents from the PRA 
maintains that safety should now be the main objective and that more 
restrictive measures should be implemented in the road safety efforts. 
However, when elaborating on this, several of the respondents from the 
PRA find that, in practice, mobility is still the main objective. Much 
scepticism is also expressed about restrictive measures, but not before 
they are instantiated. It is found that the environment still has a strong 
position and that at times it also comes before road safety. With respect 
to economic efficiency, the responses from the PRA point to reduced 
efficiency after the introduction of the zero vision.  
 
The previous section has focused on the views in the PRA, which is 
natural considering that the Police and Safer Driving do not have to set 
priorities between these goals in their work. It is nevertheless 
interesting to examine the views of the other key actors. There is 
agreement that safety should be the main objective and that more 
restrictive measures should be implemented. In the Police and Safer 
Driving there are very few opinions on the environment, while a 
majority of the respondents from Safer Driving believes the zero vision 
does not reduce economic efficiency. The Police have no clear views 
on this issue. Their responses underscore to a certain degree that the 
Police and Safer Driving see the zero vision as business as usual. They 
believe safety should come before mobility under the zero vision and 
they are positive to more restrictive measures, but overall the views 
expressed by respondents from the Police and Safer Driving do not 
suggest that they believe the zero vision has changed the situation in 
terms of the goals competing with road safety.  
 
Based on Van Meter & Van Horn (1975), the thesis points to the fact 
that when the zero vision is instantiated through new policies, it will 
challenge other goals besides safety, and this might inhibit a further 
realisation of the zero vision. Having studied the competing goals to 
road safety, it should be evident that an instantiation of the zero vision 
will challenge other goals, such as mobility, the environment, economic 
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efficiency and individual freedom. Examples where these goals will be 
affected are reduced speed limits (mobility), softening of the roadside 
terrain (the environment), more safety considerations incorporated in 
road building projects (economic efficiency) and more restrictive 
measures (individual freedom). These are all relevant measures under 
the zero vision, and it is surprising that the respondents from the key 
actors are not more explicit when it comes to the consequences it will 
have in practice.  
 
One possible explanation is that the respondents do not find that the 
zero vision has had a particular impact on the competing goals. It could 
also be that the respondents are reluctant to ascribe this effect to the 
zero vision because there are negative connotations. To some extent, 
the measures mentioned above have already been implemented, even if 
they cannot be ascribed to the zero vision. Nonetheless, there is a long 
way to go to before the implemented measures satisfy the objectives of 
the zero vision. It seems there is a climate of reluctance. Much of the 
reason is probably connected to the fact that intensifying the road safety 
efforts will challenge the competing goals examined in this chapter. As 
it is manifested today, we can say that the zero vision is more stationary 
than visionary. 
 
I believe an important reason for the tardy development is the political 
impact on road safety and hence the zero vision. There is apparently a 
mismatch between the perspectives of the professionals in the PRA and 
the politicians. This impedes the radical approach the zero vision calls 
for. The politicians do not view the vision in the same way as the 
employees in the PRA do. The view of the politicians resembles the 
views in the Police and Safer Driving. They see the vision as a positive 
thing but do not see it leading to significant change. The quotation 
referred to above from the Minster of Transport and Communication, 
asking if the politicians know what they have adopted, has much to say 
about the reality of the situation.  
 
There is reason to believe that the professionals adapt to the situation 
by only proposing measures they know the politicians will support. If 
this is the case, this will inevitably impede progress. The interplay 
between the professional environments and the politicians is an 
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important factor when it comes to advancements in road safety. It is 
crucial that the professionals show a willingness to confront the 
politicians with the measures needed to realise the zero vision. There is 
no guarantee that the politicians will endorse these measures, but if 
they are never brought up to the political level they will definitely 
never be implemented. Implementation of restrictive measures in 
accordance with the zero vision is an important topic in this respect. 
The politicians are reserved when it comes to restrictive measures, as 
they probably fear that such measures will meet public resistance, 
which in turn will result in bad publicity. This could lead to a vicious 
circle, where the politicians see more benefit in preserving the status 
quo.  
 
The discussion leads to the question of whether there are forces in the 
road safety environment and political circles that are attempting to 
preserve the zero vision in its present form. I refer here to Neumann 
(2001) and his question as to why new reforms and initiatives often 
have little capability of altering existing practices. The data in the thesis 
reveal that the zero vision has not developed, as it should have. 
Whether this is due to deliberate strategies or not is difficult to 
ascertain. The findings suggest that the politicians play an important 
role as they allocate resources to the transport sector and to road safety. 
Thus, they are the ones who mainly determine how fast the zero vision 
will develop.  
 
In the Ministry, one informant is very explicit about the fact that the 
authorities “could live” with the zero vision as it is manifested today. 
Based on this and other findings in the thesis, it is clear that there are 
forces in the road safety and political environments that are impeding 
the development of the zero vision. The closer to the policy level the 
more obvious this becomes. The Directorate of Public Roads, serving 
as the arm of the Ministry, has a special position in this respect, trying 
both to adhere to the opinions of politicians and behave professionally 
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9. Summary of Major Findings 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the most important findings. It is 
natural to structure the summary around the three perspectives of the 
thesis, which are repeated below. It should be evident from the 
scientific approach of the study that the findings do not represent “the 
truth.” The data reflect views expressed by the informants from the key 
road safety organisations. Having said this, the respondents were not 
picked at random. As such, the views reveal to some extent how these 
organisations view the issues covered in the thesis. 
 
1) Exploring how the zero vision is conceptualised and 
instantiated by key actors with respect to implicit change 
2) Examining the role of inter-organisational relations and 
conflicting interests after the introduction of the zero vision 
3) Assessing the political impact of the zero vision and how it 




9.1 CONCEPTUALISATION, INSTANTIATION AND 
CHANGE 
 
There is a positive tone in what the informants say about the zero 
vision. I believe it is primarily the wording of it that gains the positive 
response, the focus on the ethics of so many traffic fatalities and 
permanent injuries. This is evidently well received and is the pervading 
reason for the informants’ positive response. Although all the 
respondents express that the zero vision is a good thing, there is a 
dividing line between the PRA and other key actors when it comes to 
ascribing change to it. The PRA interprets the zero vision as more of a 
concrete strategy, and this organization has a more practical orientation 
compared to the other actors, who have a more abstract, ethical and 
pragmatic way of seeing the vision. To many, the zero vision is first 
and foremost a symbol in the road safety work.  
 
Although the PRA is most inclined to ascribe change to the zero vision, 
the informants from this institution also have a high degree of doubt 
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about the vision’s implicit changes. When elaborating on the zero 
vision, a majority of informants from the key actors state that the road 
safety work is more or less unaffected by it. In other words, we have a 
new strategy, but it does not influence how the work is conducted. This 
is tantamount to saying that the vision has not contributed much to the 
road safety efforts. This is quite a warning signal about the effects of 
the zero vision in practice. What is interesting is the range of scepticism 
expressed about the zero vision, ranging from the view of implicit 
change to how it affects the organisations. This is surprising, especially 
considering the positive tone given to the vision at the outset. I believe 
this reflects transition problems in moving from concept to 
conceptualisation.  
 
It seems the zero vision concept is well anchored, but a lot remains to 
be done in conceptualising it. How the road safety work is being 
conceptualised is apparently more or less unaffected by the zero vision. 
This relates to the theory of Rawls (1993) and the division between 
concept and conceptualisation. According to Rawls, it is one thing to 
agree about a concept, because the concept does not say anything about 
what is implied in practice, but it is another matter indeed when the 
concept is to be conceptualised. I believe the zero vision is a good 
example of this. The conception of the vision differs significantly 
between the key actors. To borrow a term from Ball (1988), the zero 
vision is a “contested concept”. The actors define and adjust the zero 
vision to fit their existing work. 
 
When the actors try to conceptualise the zero vision, what is also 
evident is the widespread use of what Flyvbjerg (1998) refers to as 
rationalising strategies. The fruitfulness of the zero vision is 
rationalised by employing arguments that could have been used 
independently of strategy, and which are not exclusive to the vision. 
The thesis has shown that such strategies are also used in several other 
areas, and as pointed out in the theory section, they are often used when 
the power of rationality comes up short. Widespread use of 
rationalising strategies could be a sign that the informants lack more 
persuasive arguments in their reasoning.  
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Safer Driving has questioned the content of the zero vision, claiming 
that it has too strong a physical orientation. There is some degree of 
protectionism in this argument as this could have implications for Safer 
Driving and the work they do. It is interesting that the dispute over how 
to define the zero vision has faded away. Both the PRA and Safer 
Driving now stress that road users are an integral part of the zero 
vision. The thesis asks if this is primarily said to assuage Safer Driving 
and their reservations about the zero vision, or if representatives from 
the PRA genuinely believe that road users have a more important role. 
Increased education and information activities on the part of the PRA 
are an indication of the latter. At the same time, the PRA is also the 
actor that is most reluctant to communicate the vision to the public. 
This indicates that the PRA may not be as willing to incorporate road 
users in the zero vision as they say. Hellspong (1995) points out the 
importance of creating understanding among the public about new 
initiatives, especially if the public has a direct role in their success. This 
is very much the case with the zero vision, which has “a shared 
responsibility” between the road authorities and road users as one of its 
cornerstones.   
 
After working closely with the zero vision, one acquires a more varied 
and sublime view of it. Working closely with something gives 
individuals a good relationship to it. It is worth noting that a majority of 
the respondents express that they do not feel they have a good 
relationship with the vision. This is not surprising considering that very 
few people working with road safety took part in the deliberations 
when it became the new national policy. It is primarily respondents 
from the PRA, who have worked closely with the zero vision, who 
express that they feel they have this type of relationship. Hajer (1995) 
believes the success of new policies depends on how they pervade 
networks and the extent to which they are embedded in cultural 
practices. The data in the thesis substantiate that neither is the case for 
the zero vision. This is probably due to the fact that few people in the 
key organisations feel they have a good relationship with the zero 
vision. It is not talked about to any large degree, and it has not spread 
like a “virus” in the organisations, to borrow a term from Røvik (1992).  
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The zero vision has been instantiated only to a limited extent, even by 
the respondents from the PRA itself, the institution that is supposed to 
be its main advocate. The vision appears as an abstract ethical guideline 
and not as a concrete action-oriented strategy. The degree of change 
ascribed to the zero vision by some respondents from the PRA might be 
little more than wishful thinking. Informants who ascribe change to the 
zero vision primarily use vague and ideological concepts. According to 
Ramírez (2000), widespread use of such concepts is not action-
oriented. The zero vision has not been instantiated into an important 
change factor.  
 
It could be argued that the rhetorical potential of the zero vision has not 
been utilised. The reasoning about the vision points to few troublesome 
aspects, disagreement, clashes of interests and competing goals. 
Asmervik and Hagen (1997) see these as important factors to dwell on 
to create more balance when arguing for a new plan or policy. The zero 
vision concept could have been used in a more proactive way to 
instantiate the road safety work and the changes it wants to bring about. 
What is missing is a more proactive attitude, both on the part of the 
professionals and the politicians. 
 
All in all, the findings elaborated on above show that there are 
problems with the zero vision. The actors agree that it is a good thing, 
but there they stop. Little change is ascribed to the zero vision and it is 
not embedded in the important road safety organisations. It is also 
worth mentioning that little effort has been made to “sell” the zero 
vision to the public. The PRA dominates all aspects of the zero vision 
and it is first and foremost a vision for the PRA, which is in a unique 
position to lead the way. This raises the question of how the zero vision 
has affected the relationships between the key actors and the extent to 
which the different ways of relating to the zero vision are an 
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9.2 COOPERATION AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
 
The data suggest that the zero vision has not resulted in changes in 
inter-organisational cooperation. The zero vision has apparently not 
contributed to bringing the actors closer together. This is not surprising 
considering the findings in the previous chapter. Hajer (1995) points 
out that new “discourse coalitions” and changes in inter-organisational 
relations are often seen following the introduction of new storylines. 
That this is not the case after the introduction of the zero vision is 
another sign that it has only been instantiated to a small degree. This is 
also evident based on the finding that there are small changes in the 
level of conflicts. Consensus or a dominating “discourse order” might 
appear because latent conflicts are not made explicit. Abstract views 
dominate the depictions of the zero vision, and it is “harmless” as long 
as it is kept on an abstract level.  
 
Even if the zero vision has seemingly not affected the relationships 
between the actors, it is nevertheless interesting to look at the 
cooperation between them, as well as the potential conflicts. Road 
safety work is characterised by asymetrical power relations. This 
influences how the actors relate to each other. Safer Driving and the 
Police often come together. Their focus is similar, they have relatively 
small units and they participate in many of the same activities. The 
PRA is more on the outside and does more work on its own. It is 
unfortunate, we could say, that these two camps working on road safety 
cannot always communicate. The asymmetrical power relations are 
probably part of the explanation for the tension between these actors. 
This concurs with Morgan’s theory (1986), maintained that 
asymmetrical relations can lead to conflicts. 
 
Looking at the relationship between the PRA and Safer Driving, the 
data indicate that the conceptual alteration caused by the zero vision 
has strained the relationship between the two actors. The division of 
roles between the two organisations is unsettled. Berg and Olsen (2005) 
have found that unclear roles can have impact on the cooperation 
between actors. The unsettled roles between the PRA and Safer Driving 
obviously detrimentally impact the relationship between them. The 
PRA is becoming more and more involved in information activities in 
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the schools, and is using the zero vision to legitimise this activity. This 
is difficult to accept for Safer Driving, as this organisation feels that 
they should be responsible for information and education activities. 
Whether these developments are caused by the zero vision is, however, 
questionable. I do not find it plausible to claim that the vision has 
caused the relationship between the PRA and Safer Driving to 
deteriorate. The vision has not been instantiated to the extent that this 
could be inferred.  
 
It should be pointed out that there are few conflicts and open 
confrontations between these actors. Some antagonism is found 
between the informants, but all in all, the actors cooperate well and the 
relations are stable. The thesis cannot conclude whether this is a 
conscious strategy on the part of the actors or if it is more coincidental. 
Flyvbjerg (1998) has found that this is often deliberate because there 
are few benefits from open confrontation. The debate between the PRA 
and Safer Driving on the role of the road users in the zero vision could 
be seen as an example of both parties finding that it is best to play 
down the discussion.  
 
It seems we are moving away from the days when the PRA focused on 
building roads, Safer Driving focused on information and education 
and the Police focused on control activities. The difference appears to 
be that the PRA is moving into all aspects of the road safety work. 
There is an internal wish in the PRA to “broaden the horizon.” 
According to Elvebakk and Steiro (2005), this could be seen as a 
repositioning strategy after the introduction of the zero vision. 
However, this approach by the PRA is not necessarily due to the 
introduction of the vision. While such cause and effect discussions are 
common after the introduction of the vision, I believe a more plausible 
explanation is that the PRA has the resources to expand its activities, 
while Safer Driving and the Police have very little resources. The 
situation might create a feeling of resignation and envy in Safer Driving 
and the Police, which in turn may make it natural for these two to “join 
forces.”  
 
The PRA believes it is the most important actor in the road safety 
campaign, and the informants in the PRA are very explicit about this, 
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some in a quite arrogant way. Some of their reasoning makes use of “us 
against them” jargon. This clearly shows that there are “two camps” in 
the road safety campaign. Informants from the PRA use their 
knowledge base to underscore their position, which is an example of 
Foucault’s (1983) link between power and knowledge. This attitude 
probably undermines the relations with the other actors. Moreover, it 
reveals there are serious impediments to cooperation between the PRA 
and the other actors.  
 
Having many actors involved in road safety work enriches the efforts. 
The different qualities of the actors should be cultivated, not avoided. 
There is reason to believe, based on the findings in the thesis, that these 
actors do not utilise each other’s capacities to the extent they could and 
perhaps should. Rivalry and disputes get in the way of an even more 
coordinated effort. The findings suggest that there is a potential for 
improvement in this respect and the conclusion is that the vision has 




9.3 COMPETING GOALS AND POLITICAL PRAGMATISM 
 
Considering that the zero vision puts a more direct focus on road safety, 
the conflicts with other goals should become more visible. It is thus 
surprising that a vast majority of respondents do not believe the vision 
has had any influence on goals competing with road safety. This can be 
explained by the lack of instantiation of the concept. It also varies as to 
how the actors view competing goals. The PRA has a more varied view 
of this compared to the Police and Safer Driving. Mobility is clearly 
seen as the most important competing goal. In general, the actors have 
little to say about such goals as individual freedom, the environment 
and economic efficiency, which is an interesting finding in itself. It is 
also interesting that there appears to be a tendency to downplay the 
importance of these competing goals. One explanation could be that the 
informants avoid this because it is difficult to set priorities in this area.  
 
According to the zero vision, safety is supposed to be the main 
objective in the transport sector; meaning safety comes before the other 
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goals. A vast majority of the respondents agree that this should be the 
prevailing attitude. However, the informants have a hard time seeing 
what this means in practice as no guidance is given. The end result 
appears to be business as usual when it comes to deciding between 
these goals. The discussion has not been instantiated so the existing 
division between mobility and safety can be challenged. Safety is the 
premise on paper, but not in practice, so the question remains, what is 
most important?  
 
An interesting debate in relation to the zero vision is the position of the 
environment compared to other goals in the transport sector. The 
informants have varying opinions on this. While the informants from 
Safer Driving and the Police have little to say about this, the PRA has a 
development department in the Directorate and landscape architects 
scattered around the organisation. As such, it is to be expected that the 
PRA informants have an opinion about the conflict between the 
environment and road safety. The data suggest that the PRA has 
difficulty deciding between these goals. The opinion as to whether the 
environment loses to other goals depends on who you ask in the 
organisation. The findings suggest that there is a split in the PRA on 
this issue.  
 
Economic efficiency could have been undermined by the zero vision, as 
road-building projects now have to take road safety issues more into 
consideration. The informants from Safer Driving and the Police have 
few opinions about this, which is not so surprising considering that they 
are not involved in such projects. In the PRA, a vast majority of the 
informants find that the zero vision has affected economic efficiency. I 
believe this agrees with the intention behind the zero vision. It is 
interesting that powerful voices in the Directorate of Public Roads see 
this in another way. Part of the explanation is probably that at the 
central policy level, the Directorate is reluctant to ascribe negative 
effects to the zero vision. The Directorate might also be concerned as to 
how this will be perceived by the transport sector in general.  
 
Individual freedom is distinguished from other goals by being a more 
implicit value that is not the topic of much discussion. The respondents 
do not mention this as a goal in itself. I believe this is partly due to the 
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fact that individual freedom is not considered a legitimate goal, 
especially not according to the zero vision. Individual freedom is 
affected if the measures used to combat traffic accidents become more 
restrictive. One challenge when it comes to so-called restrictive 
measures is who will strive to get these measures implemented. The 
general view is that restrictive measures are unpopular with the public, 
so the question boils down to who wants to become unpopular. This 
will most likely be left to the professionals. Thus an important task for 
them is to inform the politicians and the public about what has to be 
done to meet the requirements under the zero vision. However, if the 
professionals see it as unlikely that the measures will be well received 
by the politicians, they will probably refrain from proposing them. 
Several informants in the PRA refer to this as a problem when it comes 
to implementing more restrictive measures.  
 
It is interesting to contrast this with the theory of Van Meter and Van 
Horn (1975). These authors see implementation as dependent upon at 
least two factors: the degree of change and agreement on goals. They 
believe policies with little implicit change and solid consensus on goals 
will be the most easy to implement. The goal of zero vision is to 
achieve a considerable and lasting reduction in the number of traffic 
fatalities and serious injuries. There is solid agreement on this. 
Moreover, an important finding in the thesis is that there is little 
implicit change in the zero vision. Bearing this in mind, it should be 
easy to implement it.  
 
I believe it has been easy to implement the zero vision “concept” 
because it has hardly been conceptualised. This can also be seen in how 
the respondents view the goals competing with road safety. Informants 
from the PRA describe some changes, while the Police and Safer 
Driving point to few changes in the competing goals. The more the 
vision is instantiated relating to change; the more difficult it will be to 
ensure implementation of the zero vision’s intentions. When the zero 
vision is instantiated through new policies, it will challenge the 
competing goals to a higher degree than what is the case today.  
 
At this point, when speaking about the possibilities of intensifying the 
road safety efforts and introducing more radical measures, it is natural 
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to consider the political impact of this. Politicians plays a very 
important role in road safety and hence also the zero vision. How close 
we come to the intentions of the zero vision is very much a political 
question. As we have seen, securing political consent for the zero 
vision and securing consent for its consequences are two different 
matters. The steps to radicalise the road safety campaign to satisfy the 
zero vision are to a great extent political, but do the politicians have the 
incentive to actually follow through on this?  
 
One problem with some of the restrictive measures implicit in the zero 
vision is that they are met with resistance by the public and important 
interest groups. If important interest groups indicate their displeasure 
with something, it does not take the politicians long to react and seal its 
fate in Parliament. Furthermore, politicians usually have a short-term 
perspective for their actions; they want to see visible results while in 
office. The short-term perspective of the politicians often collides with 
the long-term perspective of the professional road safety actors. Both of 
these factors may have a negative impact on road safety.  
 
One view that is expressed in the interviews is that the professionals 
often yield to pressure from politicians. They are not strong enough and 
do not make the proposals they should based on the knowledge they 
possess. This might be due to loyalty upwards in the system. The PRA 
is a hierarchic organisation with no tradition of challenging the upper 
echelons to any dramatic degree. The interplay between professionals 
and politicians, and the mechanisms that influence these relations, to a 
large degree protect the status quo and undermine the radicalisation of 
road safety efforts. As Neumann (2001) puts it, the system becomes 
self-preserving, which favours the existing practices. 
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10. Conclusion and Further Reflections 
 
The thesis has studied the impact of the zero vision on road safety in 
Norway: How the zero vision is conceptualised and instantiated by the 
key road safety actors with respect to change, the role of inter-
organisational relations and conflicting interests after the introduction 
of the zero vision, as well as the political impact of the vision and how 
it challenges goals competing with road safety. This final chapter 
provides some overall conclusions on the perspectives the thesis has 
examined, and offers some reflections on what the future might hold 




10.1 CONCLUSION – MAIN PERSPECTIVES 
 
The zero vision has not been conceptualised, instantiated or made ready 
for action by the key actors. The idea of zero fatalities and serious 
injuries is visionary, but in practice there are few traces of this. The 
PRA has done most of the work in this respect and it has considerable 
leeway in defining future developments. It has the power to design and 
define the road safety campaign. The PRA is the prime mover in 
defining the zero vision. The Police and Safer Driving have not 
“dedicated themselves” in the work with the zero vision. They have 
noted that it is there, but they do not see it as something tangible that 
they can shape and fit into their existing work. Thus, the future shaping 
of the zero vision is reserved for the PRA. It will be up to the PRA to 
decide where to go with the zero vision. Therefore, it is mostly a vision 
for the PRA.  
 
The zero vision has affected the relationships between the important 
actors to a limited degree, and there are few signs that they are utilising 
the zero vision as a repositioning tool in their road safety work. The 
PRA has done the most work in conceptualising the zero vision. Thus, 
if any organisation were to use it as a repositioning tool, it would be 
natural to think of the PRA. It is an enticing thought that this is taking 
place, and there are some indications that the zero vision is being used 
as a legitimising factor for taking over more tasks. However, the overall 
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impression is that this is not a prominent feature. One reason why the 
zero vision is utilised as a repositioning tool to such a small degree is 
probably because it has not been adequately instantiated, even in the 
PRA. If the road safety work is more or less unaffected by the zero 
vision, there is no reason why it should lead to such tactics. The 
intensified efforts implied in the zero vision challenge different values 
and interests in the organisations. This may be an important reason why 
the zero vision remains on an abstract level. 
 
Another reason why the zero vision remains on an abstract level is 
probably that it challenges competing goals. The more the zero vision 
is instantiated, the more it will challenge competing goals, for instance 
mobility, the environment, economic efficiency and individual 
freedom. Even if the informants from the key road safety organisations 
have road safety as their top priority, it is obvious that they have 
problems prioritising the other goals in the transport sector. 
Intentionally or not, this is slowing down the zero–vision process, as 
does also the political impact on road safety. Apparently, politicians 
have few incentives to radicalise their road safety efforts in accordance 
with the zero vision. In conclusion to the question, as to whether the 
zero vision in practice is visionary or stationary, the data suggest that as 




10.2 THE ZERO VISION AND THE FUTURE 
 
It is not possible to point to one or two aspects when judging the effects 
of the zero vision ten years on from its introduction. Just as with other 
parts of the road safety work, many factors play a part, and collectively 
make it difficult to pursue the zero vision in a more whole-hearted way. 
The main conclusions in the thesis reveal this to be the case.  
 
In light of the conclusions to the three perspectives, as well as other 
findings in the thesis, is there a future for the zero vision? How can the 
zero vision lead to and enhance innovative road safety work ten years 
after its introduction? I believe a lot of work has to be done with the 
vision to maintain its legitimacy. It could be argued that the zero vision 
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has already played out its role. It has put a greater focus on road safety, 
but based on the findings in the thesis, it has not led to important, 
concrete changes. Now that the initial focus on the zero vision has 
subsided, and the profit from a greater focus on safety has been gained, 
should we now drop it as the main strategy for road safety work? 
 
We will probably not find a sympathetic ear amongst politicians or 
professionals for such a proposal, mainly because of how it will be 
perceived by the public. Under such circumstances the zero vision will 
undoubtedly be seen as a failure. Thus, I do not believe we will 
publicly admit that we have abandoned the zero vision as the strategy 
for our road safety efforts. However, it may just fade away, simply 
because the actors stop referring to it. To some extent this is already 
happening. It seems the zero vision has had its fifteen minutes of fame 
and now has to struggle just to be mentioned as part of the road safety 
work. In many ways it is natural that the zero vision receives less 
attention now than when it was first implemented, and it is probably a 
more appropriate strategy to leave the situation as it is, compared to 
announcing the end of the zero vision as the prevailing policy in the 
road safety campaign.  
 
The thesis has studied the impact of the zero vision on road safety in 
Norway. Has the zero vision made any impact at all? Based on the 
findings elaborated on in the previous chapters, it is tempting to 
conclude that it has contributed little or nothing. However, I believe 
this is too easy a conclusion. There is no doubt that the zero vision has 
helped to raise awareness about traffic accidents and the human 
suffering that follows, and this in itself is an important contribution. 
Thus, even if the zero vision have not revolutionised the road safety 
work in terms of more radical measures and intensified efforts, there is 
always this to look back on.  It is no small achievement that the zero 
vision has helped to increase the focus on traffic fatalities; even if it is 
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1.2 Present occupation/position:   
 
1.3 Years in present position: 
 
1.4 Earlier positions in the organisation (if yes, what kind and how 
long)? 
 
1.5 Other experience and practice (where/how long)? 
 
1.6 Can you talk about your role and your tasks in the organisation 




2. ROAD SAFETY IN GENERAL 
 
2.1 What is your experience of working with road safety the past 
five-ten years? 
 
2.2 Regardless of organisation and responsibility for 
implementation, what do you consider to be the most important 
focal areas in the road safety campaign? 
 
2.3 Which measures are the most important for your organisation in 
contributing to reduce traffic fatalities and serious injuries? 
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3.  THE ZERO VISION AND CHANGE 
 
3.1 Is it your opinion that it is a good idea that we have a zero 
vision in the road safety campaign (please elaborate)? 
 
3.2 What do you personally experience as new with the zero vision? 
 
3.3 Do you have belief in the zero vision and does the zero vision 
guide you in your everyday work (please elaborate)? 
 
3.4 The zero vision is intended to stimulate the development of 
measures that are necessary for realising the zero vision. Which 
measures do you see? 
 
3.5 The Swedes have subsidiary goals in the zero vision campaign. 
What are your thoughts on the fact that we do not have similar 
goals in Norway? 
 
3.6 Is it your experience that the various actors have their own 
understanding of the zero vision (please elaborate)? 
 
3.7 What should be emphasised when communicating the zero 




4. ORGANISATIONS AND CHANGE 
 
4.1 How is the road safety work organised in your organisation? 
 
4.2 Has the zero vision resulted in organisational changes (if yes, 
which)?  
 
4.3 What influence has the zero vision had on goals in the 
organisation? 
 
4.4 What influence has the zero vision had on priorities in the 
organisation? 
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4.5 Is it your experience that your organisation has increased its 




5. ORGANISATIONS AND COOPERATION 
 
5.1 How do you experience the cooperation on road safety between 
your organisation and other key actors in relation to the zero 
vision? 
 
5.2 As you experience it, how has the cooperation with other 




6.  CONFLICTING GOALS 
 
6.1 Safety is known to conflict with other goals in the transport 
sector. Which other goals would you emphasise? 
 
6.2 Do you experience any “new” conflicts after the introduction of 
the zero vision (in general and in the organisation you 
represent)? 
 
6.3 It is stated that we should not have better mobility than what 
safety considerations will allow. What do you read into such a 
statement? Do you agree? 
 
6.4 Is it your experience that the zero vision and its keener focus on 
safety has led to less economically efficient projects (please 
elaborate)? 
 
6.5 Is it your opinion that there is a need for more restrictive 
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6.6 Is it your experience that environmental concerns are muscled 
out of the picture by other competing goals after the 
introduction of the zero vision (please elaborate)? 
 
6.7 The media is continually claiming that we are not implementing 
measures as intended by the zero vision. Where does the 




7.  STATEMENTS ON ROAD SAFETY 
 























All cars within the European 
Union should be equipped 















The introduction of demerit 
points on the driving license 


















All cars should be equipped 
















Speed limits should be 
reduced to 70 km/t on all 
roads without a median 















Seat belt reminders will not 
have a particular effect on the 


















It is more important to build 
new roads than it is to 













The number of seat belt 












































Putting the zero vision into 















Safety measures are difficult 
to implement if there is a 
















The progression in the 

















One goal should be to reduce 















Automatic traffic checks are 












generally have little impact on 
















Heavy vehicle transport 
should as far as possible be 











                                                 
39 26 respondents answered the question. 
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The zero vision in practice is 
a continuation of the existing 
















It is not possible to practice 
an efficient enforcement of 
rules and regulations without 

















The liability legislation for 
traffic accidents should be 
changed so that others than 
the road users can be held 















One has to expect a certain 
number of traffic victims as 

















8.  THE FUTURE 
 
8.1 If you look five-ten years into the future, which hopes do you 
have and which possibilities do you see for the road safety 
work? 
 
8.2 Which impediments do you see to road safety in this period?  
 
8.3 Which possibilities do you see for road safety in this period?    
 
8.4 Is there something we have not covered in this conversation that 
you think is important to point out in relation to the zero vision 
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